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The Third Annual Kentucky
Court of Appeals Review
FoimwARD
The Court of Appeals Review is a combined project of the entire staff of the Kentucky Law Journal. This third edition is the
culmination of considerable work and effort on the part of the entire
staff in attempting to adequately serve the Kentucky Bar and to assist
legal scholars throughout the Commonwealth and the nation. This
review covers the 1964-1965 term of the Kentucky Court of Appeals
with the cases categorized and analyzed in relation to the previous
law in each specific area. Our purpose has been to integrate the
combined talent of the staff into a single product which would serve
as a ready reference material.
The EditorialBoard
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I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
AGENCIES
A. An~m xsxri
The scope of operations of state administrative agencies was examined in six cases arising during the last term of the court,

1. Railroad Commission
In the case of Kentucky Railroad Comnn v. Railway Express
Agency' the Court of Appeals, in affirming the circuit court, held that
the order of the Railroad Commission refusing permission to the express agency to consolidate its Morganfield office with its EvansvilleHenderson office was not supported by substantial evidence. The
court reaffirmed its prior holding that the scope of review by the
circuit court extends only to determining whether there is any substantial evidence to support the finding of the Railroad Commission.
The evidence briefly summarized was that Morganfield had a
population of approximately 5,000 persons, that the express agency
would save about 3,500 dollars per year by establishing a pick-up and
delivery route instead of maintaining a full-time agent at Morganfield,
and that a small number of customers would suffer the inconvenience
of not being able to deliver outgoing express to that office at any time
of the day. In so deciding, the court reaffirmed its prior position 3
that even though the express agency is regulated by the state for the
public welfare, it is still a private company with a right to cut costs
and meet competition unless it is clearly established that the public
will suffer substantial loss or inconvenience.
2. Public Service Commission
In Blue Grass State Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n.4 the court
held that the Public Service Commission acted unreasonably in
denying the telephone company's application for a certificate of
convenience and necessity to operate a telephone system solely because of a disparity between the depreciated original cost of the
system and the price actually paid for the system. The court reasoned
that since the commission's duty when an existing utility is purchased
is to determine if the utility will continue to be operated in the
public interest, that the application should not be denied merely
because of prospective rate increases due to a large purchase price.
1387 S.W.2d 298 (Ky. 1965).

" Railroad Comm'n of Kentucky v. Illinois Cent. R. R. Co., 265 S.W.2d 797
(Ky. 3 1954).
Railroad Comm'n of Kentucky v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 358 S.W.2d 533
(Ky. 1962).
4382 S.V.2d 81 (Ky. 1964).
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The commission can in the future adjust the rate base if an excessive
purchase price was paid, by excluding the amount of the excess.
The court, in Kentucky Util. Co. v. Public Serv. Comfru,5 held
that the Public Service Commission acted reasonably in granting a
certificate of convenience and necessity to a rural electrical cooperative
which proposed to construct a generating plant to supply immediately
foreseeable electrical needs where the facilities of the existing utilities
are presently inadequate for this purpose even though the existing utilities desire to expand in the future to fulfill these needs. This decision
was based on findings that there would be no wasteful duplication and
that the rural cooperatives proposal was feasible. The court was careful to point out that the existing utilities have no absolute right to
supply the inadequacy or to be free of competition. The tests used to
determine the "inadequacy" and the "immediately foreseeable needs"
had been laid down in a prior decision. 6
3. Alcoholic Beverage Control Board
In Moberly v. Brunet' the court reaffirmed its prior interpretation8 of Ky. Rev. Stat. 243.450 (2) [hereinafter cited as KRS] by
holding that even though an applicant for a retail beer license has
fulfilled the technical requirements for obtaining a license, the Board
may still refuse to issue said license if substantial reasons exist why its
issuance would not be in the public interest. Those reasons found to
be substantial in this case were that the proposed site is at a heavily
traveled intersection and that the outlet would increase congestion, that
school children load and unload buses at that intersection and they
would be exposed to a detrimental influence, that the outlet is in
the midst of a residential section and within 250 feet of a church
whose pastor and a number of the church members oppose it, and that
beer is now obtainable at two shopping centers in the vicinity.
4. Department of Motor Transportation
The only case involving this department this term was Jones v.
Meigs.9 This case was an original proceeding in the Court of Appeals
to prevent the Franklin Circuit Court Judge from assessing an unsuccessful applicant for a common carrier truck certificate the costs of his
successful competitors transcript expenses for an appeal to the Franklin Circuit Court. The Court of Appeals rightly held that the pro890 S.W.2d 168 (Ky. 1965).
Kentucky Util. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 252 S.W.2d 885 (Ky. 1952).
78 382 S.W.2d 406 (Ky. 1964).
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Acoholic Beverage Control Bd. v. Woosley, 367 S.W.2d 127 (Ky. 1963).

9 383 S.W.2d 324 (Ky. 1964).
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visions of KRS 281.780(3), Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04
[hereinafter cited as CR], and KRS 453.040(1) (a) providing for the
taxation of costs to the losing litigant take precedence over regulation
11-04(J) of the Department of Motor Transportation.
5. Division of Boating
The court in Lovern v. Brown'° held a regulation of the Division
of Boating prohibiting the operation of vessels within one-hundred
feet of the Kentucky Dam generator water exhaust chutes was reasonable and within the limits contemplated by KRS 235.280 and KRS
235.320 and a valid exercise of the police power of the state. The
plaintiffs, commercial fishermen, had obtained an injunction prohibiting the enforcement of the regulation in the Circuit Court of
Marshall County. The evidence showed that the water below the
dam would suddenly boil up and suddenly sink into a pocket
depending on how much electricity was being used.
B. ScHooLs AND SChOOL Dismncrs
The Court of Appeals had occasion to decide three cases in this
area during the last term.
The first case, Board of Educ. of Harrodsburgv. Bentley,'. was an
action brought to test the validity of a school board regulation requiring that any student who marries must withdraw from school, subject to being readmitted with the principal's consent after one year.
The court held the regulation to be arbitrary and unreasonable and
therefore void. In reaching its decision the court paid its respects to
the general principle that the courts will not interfere with the
board's exercise of its discretion unless the board has acted arbitrarily
or maliciously.' 2 It then pointed out KRS 158.100 which requires each
board of education to provide public education facilities for residents
of its district who are under 21 years of age. The court further showed
that the rule was bad because of its "sweeping, advance determination
that every married student, regardless of the circumstances, must lose
at least a year's schooling." As its rule in this case the court adopted
that of 47 Am. Jur. Schools section 155:
However, a pupil may not be excluded from school because married, where no immorality or misconduct of the pupil is shown, nor that
the welfare and discipline of the pupils of the school is injuriously
affected by the presence of the married pupil.

10390 S.W.2d 448 (Ky. 1965).
383 S.W.2d 677 (Ky. 1964).
2'Casey County Bd. of Educ. v. Luster, 282 S.W.2d 383 (Ky. 1955).
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The court distinguished those cases upholding the right of the school
board to exclude married students from certain extracurricular activities.
In the second case in this area, Trimble v. Board of Educ. of4
13
PaintsvilleIndependent School Dist., the court reaffirmed prior law'
in holding that a sheriff cannot recover from a school board an amount
in excess of the reasonable cost of collecting its school taxes and
found that the amounts set by the circuit court were supported by
adequate evidence.
The third case in this area, Griffey v. Board of Educ. of Washington
County,15 was a reaffirmation of prior law.16 The court held that the
Attorney General and a claimant to a position on a school board are
the only parties who may bring an action to oust a member of a school
board for violation of KRS 160.180. The decision is undoubtedly correct under our present state statutes. KRS 160.180 declares that the
office is vacant without further action, but KRS chapter 415 spells out
directly who must bring the action. Perhaps repeal of chapter 415
would solve the problems inherent in a situation where one elected
official is the only person who can take action against another elected
official for misfeasance or other actions on his part which should cause
his office to be vacated. In other words, where one politician is investigating another politician there is not always the most accurate
investigation.
C. MUNICrIPA

CORPOR TMONS

1. License Taxes
The only case decided in this area last term was Commissioners
of the
Sinking Fund of the City of Louisville v. Our Own Deliveries,
InC.'7 This case involved the question of whether a local cartage
business which would deliver cartons for anybody that asked within
the area in which it was authorized to operate was a "common carrier" and hence not liable for the license fee imposed on the owners
of private carriers by the city. The court followed an 1834 case' s in
holding that the carrier was a "common carrier" and in defining a
"common carrier" as "Everyone who pursues the business of transporting goods for hire, for the public generally ..
134 385 S.W.2d 216 (Ky. 1964).
i Board of Educ. of Carter County v. Greenhfll, 291 S.W.2d 36 (Ky.
1956).
15 385 S.W.2d 319 (Ky. 1964).

16Kirwan

v. Speckman, 232 S.W.2d 841 (Ky. 1950).

17382 S.W.2d 878 (Ky. 1964).
18 Robertson & Co. v. Kennedy, 32 Ky. 430, 26 Am. Dec. 466 (1834).
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2. Bond Issues
Massey v. City of Franklin 19 was a taxpayers' action challenging
the issuance of revenue bonds by the city of Franklin. The court held
that the words "either by purchase or construction" in KRS 103.210,
which permits a city to issue revenue bonds, were not mutually
exclusive alternatives, but that an acquisition of any industrial building may encompass some existing facilties and some newly built
facilties. The court in this case also reaffirmed a prior case20 by holding that the acquisition of such industrial facilities need not be by
competitive bidding.
3. Zoning
The first case decided in this area was Louisville & Jefferson
County Planningand Zoning Comm'n v. Coin.21 This case was pending
on appeal when American Beauty Homes Corp. v. Louisville Jefferson
County Planning & Zoning Comrn 2"2 was decided. Both cases stand
for the principle that KRS 100.057(2), insofar as it provides that
zoning hearings in circuit court shall be de novo, violates section 27 of
the Kentucky Constitution and that the hearing in the circuit court
should be confined to questions of law.
The other case decided in this area was Pierson-TrappCo. v. Knippenberg.23 This case involved an interpretation of KRS 100.420, which
requires a majority vote of the entire membership of the commission
to approve a zone change. The commission had ten members, nine of
whom were present at the meeting. Five members voted for the
change, two voted against the change, and two abstained. The Court
of Appeals held that when a quorum of a governing body is present
those members who are present and do not vote will be considered as
voting with the majority of those who do vote.
D. CoUNTIEs Aim CoUNTY OFFiciAs
One of the cases decided in this area was Cook v. Chilton.24 The
Court of Appeals here held that the Legislature's amendment of KRS
78.610 increasing from two and one-half per cent to four per cent the
contribution rate of county officers to the county employees' retirement system did not amount to a change in the county judge's
compensation during his term of office as prohibited by sections 161
S.W.2d 505 (Ky. 1964).
Gregory v. City of Lewisport, 369 S.W.2d 133 (Ky. 1963).

19 384
20

"1382 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1964).
23379 S.W.2d 450 (Ky. 1964).
S.W.2d 587 (Ky. 1965).
24 390 S.W.2d 656 (Ky. 1965).
233 87
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and 235 of the Kentucky Constitution. The court reasoned that both
the retirement system and the constitutional provisions were intended
to promote independence and security for the county official and that,
therefore, it would be a distortion of the meaning of the constitution
to hold that those provisions were intended to forbid a legislative act
designed to achieve the same results as the provisions.
The other case decided this term in this area was Fanninv. Davis,2 5
in which the court laid down a number of general principles as regards invalid expenditures of a county's money by the fiscal court and
other county officers. Some of those principles are as follows:
(1) Where a fiscal court raised the salaries of county officers
after the first Monday in May in the year of their election in violation
of KRS 25.250, KRS 69.250 and KRS 67.120 (1) and before July 1, 1950,
as authorized by section 246 of the Kentucky Constitution as amended
in 1949, then those officers are liable to the county for the amount of
their salary raises until July 1, 1950;
(2) A magistrate may recover for the benefit of the county any
money paid by the fiscal court to any of its members for work done or
supplies furnished to the county in connection with the roads or
bridges in violation of KRS 61.210(1);
(3) Where the county clerk's quarterly report and the county
treasurer's monthly report apprised the fiscal court of the condition
of the county finances the members of the fiscal court will be deemed
to have acted wilfully in ordering the clerk to write warrants for claims
in excess of budgeted funds, and that such expenditures are illegal;
(4) Where a county treasurer wilfully or negligently signs or
countersigns any illegal warrant as in (3) above, then KRS 68.300
makes him liable on his bond for such illegal payments;
(5) If the county funds are illegally disbursed by the fiscal court
as in (3) above and cannot be recovered from those persons to whom
the payments were made, then the members of the fiscal court are
themselves jointly and severally liable for the funds;
(6) All disbursements of county funds by the fiscal court to be
legal must be made by majority vote of a quorum present and acting
as a court, at a meeting held for that purpose;
(7) Liability would attach for illegally disbursed funds under (6)
above in the same manner as for illegally disbursed funds under (3)
above.
(8) The surplus funds remaining after the object of a special tax
levy has been accomplised are treated as a part of the general fund
25 385 S.W.2d 321 (Ky. 1964).
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of the county and become available for general county use, notwithstanding section 180 of the Kentucky Constitution;
(9) KRS 64.410(1), which requires a sheriff to sign all fee bills
presented to the fiscal court is merely directory and not mandatory;
(10) Repayment by the court of funds borrowed in contravention
of section 157 of the Kentucky Constitution is payment of an involuntary obligation arising under the principles of unjust enrichment
and is not recoverable under KRS 68.100(4);
(11) KRS 179.180 allows a fiscal court to lease machinery without
competitive bidding.

II. COMMERCIAL LAW
This past year witnessed two particularly significant developments
in the Court of Appeals treatment of the problems in commercial law.
First, the court indicated a willingness to rely on the official comments to the Uniform Commercial Code in deciding issues in this
area which are not specifically covered by the black-letter law. This
approach resulted in two substantial changes in Kentucky commercial
law: a repudiation of the old rule that, upon delivery of the goods to
the buyer, the seller in a cash and delivery transaction loses all rights
to them; and an invalidation of former decisions which gave priority
to a properly filed chattel mortgage over a subsequent motor vehicle
repairman's lien arising under KRS 376.270. The other important
statement of court policy was its very liberal interpretation of the
scope of Kentucky's Mechanics' and Materialmen's Lien Statute.
Greater Louisville Auto Auction, Inc. v. Ogle Buick, Inc.26 was an
action by out-of-state sellers of automobiles for amounts of checks
which had been rendered worthless when the auction company
stopped payment on its checks to the buyer. The buyer had received
advances from the auction company to finance his acquisition of the
cars from the Indiana sellers. After the auction company sold the
cars, it stopped payment on its checks, thereby wiping out the buyer's
account and causing his checks to be dishonored. The court noted that
the auction company had sufficient "notice" of the manner of operation
of the buyer to know that stopping payment of its checks to the buyer
would in all likelihood result in dishonor of the buyer's checks during
the previous week to the sellers. The court held that the sellers of the
automobiles had, as between the buyer and themselves when his
checks were dishonored, rights with respect to the cars which were
then good from an equitable standpoint against the auction company's
seizure of the proceeds from the sale of the cars. The court interpreted
KRS 355.2-507(2)27 as providing such a seller a right of reclamation
of the goods upon demand within ten days after he has delivered
them to a buyer where the checks given by the buyer as payment are
dishonored.
The Ogle Buick case is of particular significance because of the
absence of authority on this subject from the other states. Apparently
no other court of appellate jurisdiction in this country has yet to apply
Uniform Commercial Code section 2-507 to the situation of a seller
887 S.W.2d 17 (Ky. 1965).
Kentucky adopted the Uniform Commercial Code in KRS ch. 855 in
1958, effective July 1, 1960,
26

27
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who, after delivery of the goods in a cash transaction, finds himself
unpaid when he discovers that the checks which the buyer gave in
payment are worthless.
The court stated that the law regarding this situation before the
adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code would have required a
judgment against the sellers. The court reasoned that at common
law and under the Uniform Sales Act, the implied lien of an unpaid
seller of personal property existed only so long as he kept possession of
the goods and did not deliver them to the buyer.28 But the court held
that the Uniform Commercial Code gave the sellers a right of reclamation against the buyer. The opinion first pointed out that when payment for goods is due and demanded on delivery, the buyer's right
to retain or dispose of the property is conditional upon his making
the payment due,*" and also that payment by check is conditional and
and is defeated as between the parties by dishonor of the check on due
presentment.3 0 After noting that the Uniform Commercial Code does
not specifically give to the seller a right of reclamation in such a
situation, the court then relied on comment 3 of section 2-507 that the
provision of section 2-702- which provides that a seller who learns
that a buyer has received goods on credit while insolvent (even though
innocently) may reclaim them on demand within ten days after the
receipt, subject to the rights of a buyer in ordinary course or other
good faith purchaser or lien creditor - also applies to the unpaid
seller under section 2-507(2) of the Code.31
The court recognized that technically the seller's right of reclamation ended when the cars were sold at the auction to good faith
purchasers. 32 However, it reasoned that the auction company had
sufficient "notice" of the manner of operation of the buyer to know
that stopping payment of its checks would probably result in dishonor
of the buyer's checks to the sellers and thus placed the rights of the
sellers to the proceeds of the auction superior to those of the auction
company. Therefore, the auction company was held to have had
2846 Am. Jur. Sales § 520 (1943); Uniform Sales Act § 56 (formerly KRS
361.560). See Hoven v. Leedham, 153 Minn. 95, 189 N.W. 601 (1922),
Annot, 31 A.L.R. 574. However, should it not follow that, even without the
Uniform Commercial Code, the sellers are entitled to the proceeds because a
seller wv.h the right to reclaim property may follow the proceeds of the goods
as long as they can be identified. See also, Parker v. First Citizens Bank & Trust
Co., 50 S.E.2d 304 (N.C. 1948); 78 C.J.S. Sales § 414 (1945).
29 KRS 355.2-507(2).
30 KRS 355.2-511(3).
31 The Uniform Sales Act did not provide for recovery of the goods upon
the buyer's insolvency; in such a situation the seller was considered a mere unsecured
creditor of the buyer. Note, 29 Ky. L. J. 275 (1941).
32 KRS 355.2-702.
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"notice" of the superior rights of the sellers to the cars when it
pushed the auction through and then claimed the proceeds in an effort
to minimize its own loss due to the buyer's insolvency.
In Corbin Deposit Bank v. King,33 a car owner executed and
delivered a valid security agreement to the Corbin Deposit Bank which
the bank then perfected.8 4 While this agreement was still in force,
the owner engaged King to make repairs and furnish materials for
repairing the vehicle. The question presented was in regard to the
priorities as between a properly recorded security agreement and a
subsequent motor vehicle repairman's lien arising under KRS 376.270.
The court held that the motor vehicle repairmen's lien arising under
KRS 376.270 should be given priority over the earlier perfected
security interest.
The Corbin Bank case changed Kentucky law because, prior to the
effective date of the Uniform Commercial Code, the court had favored
a properly filed chattel mortgage.35 The theory behind this principle
is twofold: that a recorded mortgage serves as notice to the repairman
before he does his work and that, in the absence of a statute, perfected
liens first in time are entitled to prior satisfaction. 36
The court quoted KRS 355.9-310, relating to the priority of certain
liens arising by operation of law, and stated:
When a person in the ordinary course of his business furnishes
services or materials with respect to goods subject to a security
interest, a lien upon goods in the possession of such person
given by the statute or rule of law for such materials or services
takes priority over a perfected security interest unless the lien
is statutory and the statute expressly provides otherwise.
Although not specifically citing it, the court obviously based the
decision in this case on a section of the official comment to the
Uniform Commercial Code, section 9-310, which reads: "If the
statute creating the lien is silent, even though it has been construed
by decision to make the lien subordinate to the security interest, this
section provides a rule of interpretation that the lien should take
priority over the security interest." The opinion further pointed out
that, as there is no provision in KRS 376.270 which subordinates its
statutory lien to an earlier perfected security interest, the terms of
KRS 355.9-310 make the statutory lien superior to the lien of the
83
384 S.W.2d 302 (Ky. 1964).
KRS 355.9-302.

34
35

Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Netter, 253 S.W.2d 260 (Ky. 1952); see
also, 815
6 Am. Jur. 2d Chattel Mortgages § 169 (1964).
Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d 229 (1954); Restatement, Security § 76 (1941).
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earlier perfected security interest, notwithstanding previous court
decisions to the contrary.
The purpose of KRS 355.9-310 is to insure that the liens of those
whose work has improved or preserved the value of the collateral
should be satisfied before the lien of the holder of the security interest;
this theory of priority probably rests on the notion that the latter has
protection for his interest in the more valuable collateral. The section
does not repeal statutory provisions creating liens which expressly
make these liens subordinate to a prior security interest. 37 Therefore
the effect of this section is limited to those situations where the

statute creating the lien is silent as to the question of priorities. KRS
376.270, creating a lien on a motor vehicle for repair work, fits into
this latter category.
Thus, in the Corbin Bank case, the court departed from its past
decisions to bring its interpretations of Kentucky law into conformity
with the requirement of KRS 355.9-310 that a motor vehicle repairman's lien arising under KRS 376.270 be given priority over an earlier
perfected security interest.
Wuest Bros. Inc. v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.' s presented the
question of a bank's liability to a depositor for its payment of forged
checks drawvn on the latter's account. The jury was instructed to find
for the bank if it determined that the depositor was negligent in his
examination of his bank statements. The court upheld the jury's verdict
for the bank applying the principle that the depositor loses his claim
against the bank if he fails to report any forgeries within a reasonable
39
time.
The court noted that the Uniform Commercial Code (although
not effective at the time this case arose) clearly sets forth the duty
of the depositor to examine the statement of his account and his
cancelled checks to discover forgery.4 0 By these sections, the depositor
must notify the bank within fourteen days after the statement becomes available to him in order to hold the bank liable for wrongful
payment. Thus, by acting quickly, the depositor gives the bank
opportunity to defend itself from further forgeries by the same wrongdoer.
In Campbell & Summerhays, Inc. v. Greene,41 the owner had
leased land for a period of ten years, giving the lessee options to re37 See generally, KRS ch. 876, as most statutory liens are specifically made
subordinate to prior perfected security interests.
38888 S.W.2d 864 (Ky. 1965).
'9 C.J.S. Banks and Banking § 356(d)(1) (1938).

4oKAS 355.4406(1), (2)(a)-(c), (8).
41 881 S.W.2d 531 (Ky. 1964).
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new for an additional ten years and at the end of the twenty-year
period to purchase the land at a stated price. The court faced the
problem of whether a provision in the recorded lease that a building
was to be erected by the lessee free and clear of all mechanics' and
materialmen's liens prevented enforcement of such liens against the
owner. The court held that the provision does not relieve the owner
of the liability which KRS 376.010 imposes upon him.42
The court adopted the rule applied in most jurisdictions that where
the lease requires the lessee to make improvements, the lessee has
been given "consent" or made an agent of the landlord for such purposes within the meaning of the mechanics' and materialmen's lien
statutes.43 There is authority for the opposite conclusion, particularily
where the building is primarily for the benefit of the tenant.44 This
latter proposition was not discussed by the court even though it is
obvious that the lessee would have been the primary beneficiary of
the building because of the option to purchase the land.
The Campbell case is significant because it provides a good indication of the court's present attitude toward the scope of KRS 376.010.
In support of its holding in this case, the court reasoned by analogy to
the situation of an owner who attempts by contract with a contractor
to free himself from lien liability to a subcontractor. The law seems
clear that a subcontractor-materialman is not bound by a waiver of
lien provision in a contract between the owner and contractor unless
he agrees to, or has actual notice of, the provision. 45
The court firmly supported its decision in this case by holding that
its liberal interpretation of KRS 376.010 also governs the analogous
situation where a contract of sale requires the vendee to construct an
improvement. Two Kentucky cases had previously involved the
question of the lien liability of the vendor under these circumstances:
Penney v. Kentucky Util.4 6 and Weir v. Jarecki Mfg. Co.47 The court
in the Penney case reasoned that, although authority to the contrary
exists, the general rule is that where a contract of purchase specifically
requires the purchaser to make improvements the interest of the
vendor becomes subject to a materialmen's lien.48 The Weir case
42KRS 376.010 provides that any person who performs labor or furnishes
materials for the building of a structure by contract or written consent of the
owner of the property or his authorized agent shall have a lien on the land.
4357 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 65(c)(4) (a) (1948); 36 Am. Jur. Mechanics
Liens44§ 95 (1936); Annot., 163 A.L.R. 922 (1946).
Brown v. Ward, 211 N.C. 344, 20 S.E.2d 324 (1942); Annot, 79 A.L.R.
972 (1932).
45
Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 1099 (1961).
46238 Ky. 167, 37 S.W.2d 5 (1931).
47254 Ky. 738, 72 S.W.2d 450 (1933).
4840 C.J. Mechanics' Liens § 113 (1926).
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resulted in an opposite decision, and in the case at bar, the court
overruled the Weir decision as "unsound."
Thus, Kentucky's Mechanics' and Materialmen's Lien Statute apparently guarantees materialmen and mechanics the fruits of their
labor wherever a contract between an owner and a lessee, vendee, or
contractor requires construction on the property, even though the
owner has put a disclaimer of lien liability in the contract and filed
the contract for record.
In Laundry Operating Co. v. Spalding Laundry & Dry Cleaning
Co.,49 the court held that the giving of free service to a competitors
customer with the admitted objective of getting that customer's
patronage was a violation of the Unfair Practices Act.50 Intent to
build one's business from the ranks of a competitor was considered
proof of intent to injure competitors.
A significant feature of the opinion is the court's conclusion that
the expressions in the act, "injuring competitors and destroying
competition," were intended to describe one thing rather than two.
The court rejected a recent Minnesota decision which held that the
intent to "destroy competition" is a separate element, different from
the intent to injure competitors. 51 Instead, the court pointed out that
California, the first state to enact such a law, later amended the
"and" to "or," "thus eliminating this particular exercise in semantic
g)mnastics."52 In interpreting this provision of the Kentucky Unfair
Practices Act for the first time, the court concluded that adoption of
the California rule was necessary to achieve the purpose of the law.
Kaufman s of Kentucky v. Wall53 involved a question of first impression for the court. The court applied the rule followed in other
jurisdictions: while a discharge in bankruptcy may shield a party from
liability as to a personal debt, it does not prevent a creditor from using
the debt as a set-off against any tort recovery sought by the bankrupt
debtor against the creditor.5 4 The court stated that the Bankruptcy
Act, while attempting to free an insolvent person of liability for debt,
did not intend to give a person an asset which he would not have had
without the act.
383 S.W.2d 364 (Ky. 1964).
GO
KRS 365.030(1).
U1 State v. Wolkoff, 250 Minn. 504, 85 N.W.2d 401 (1957).
52 383 S.W.2d at 366.
G3 38.3 S.W.2d 907 (Ky. 1964).
54In
re Morgan's Estate, 226 Iowa 68, 283 N.W. 267 (1939); Leach v.
Armstrong, 2,36 Mo. App. 382, 156 S.W.2d 959 (1941).
49

I. CONDEMNATION
A. DA AGEs
1. Noncompensable Factors
(a) Loss of Access and PersonalInconvenience
In Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Denny,55 appellees conceded the principle that as long as a property owner has reasonable
access to the property after the closing of an existing road by construction of a limited access highway, he has suffered no compensable
damages. The case most frequently cited for this proposition is
Commonwealth, Dep't. of Highways v. Carlisle.56 However, it was
contended that a different principle must apply when a portion of an
existing highway is converted from an ordinary highway to a limited
access facility as here. The court found no basis for the application of
another rule and reaffirmed the existing rule that limitation of access,
so long as reasonable access to the highway system remains, does not
constitute a taking by eminent domain. The use to which the property is being put at the time of the taking, as distinguished from contemplated use, is a material factor in determining whether the exercise
of police power is reasonable.
The Carlisle rule was used to reverse five other cases57 dealing
with loss of access or personal inconvenience. The landowner alleged
in Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Prewitt,5 that removal of the
main tract from direct access to United States Highway 60 resulted in
the diminution of the value of that tract because the tract was then
removed from the U.S. 60 "community" or "influence." The court, however, held that any reduction in the value of the main tract attributable
to its loss of the U. S. 60 "community" or "influence" is a noncompensable item for the same reason that impairment of access to a
public highway is noncompensable. The same principle is applicable
where a service road is taken,59 or where an approach from a new
road will tie back into an old road. 60 The court held that the trial
judge properly excluded such testimony in Jennings v. Commonwealth,
55385 S.W.2d 776 (Ky. 1964).
56363 S.W.2d 104 (Ky. 1962).
57
Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Prewitt, 890 S.W.2d 898 (Ky.
1965); Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Fancher, 389 S.W.2d 164 (Ky.
1965); Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Roberts, 388 S.W.2d 604 (Ky.
1965); Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Lawton, 386 S.W.2d 466 (Ky.
1965);
Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Yates, 383 S.W.2d 340 (Ky. 1964).
58
Supra note 57.
59
Commonwealth v. Roberts, supra note 57.
60
Commonwealth, Dept of Highways v. Callihan, 891 S.W.2d 374 (Ky.
1965).
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Dep't. of Highways,"' where appellants' land would have the same
access after the condemnation as before.
It was stated, in Commonwealth, Dept. of Highways v. Yates,62
that the jury's viev of the property would not correct an error committed by the trial court in allowing testimony relative to a noncompensable item. The court therefore, in essence, overruled three
previous cases. 3
The element of personal inconvenience or circuity of travel is also
a noncompensable item. The court handed down four cases relative
to this problem. 4 One of them simply stated that it was prejudicial
error to allow evidence which determined the damages to appellee's
land partially on the basis of the difficulty with which movement
between two severed tracts must be made. 5 In Commonwealth, Dept.
of Highways v. Roberts,0 all of the witnesses for appellees stressed
personal inconvenience to the owner in crossing the new road to
operate the farm after the taking. The court cited Commonwealth,
Dep't of Highways v. Herndon" as authority for the proposition that
inconvenience to the owners is not a proper element of damage, and
held that only as the severance affects market value of the remaining
land may it be considered compensable. This complies with the
Sherrodrequirement that factors bearing on diminution of value should
be addressed to how they will affect market value and not how they
will hurt the owner or make less advantageous the use of the property for his particular purposes." The Commonwealth objected to
evidence of circuity of travel in Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways
v. Brown, 9 but the court was satisfied that the witnesses here did not
relate their evidence to circuity of travel as such, but directed this
evidence to the destruction of the farm's unity.
A similar situation was presented in Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Burns.70 The court cited Brown and used the following
61388 S.W.2d 1.33 (Ky. 1965).
62 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Yates, 383 S.W.2d 340 (Ky. 1964).
63 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Heath, 854 S.W.2d 752 (Ky. 1962);
City of Winchester v. Spencer, 352 S.W.2d 929 (Ky. 1962); Bailey v. Harlan
County,
280 Ky. 247, 183 S.W.2d 58 (1939).
04
Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Bums, 394 S.W.2d 923 (Ky. 1965);
Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Brown, 892 S.W.2d 50 (Ky. 1965);
Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Roberts, 390 S.W.2d 155 (Ky. 1965);
Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Fancher, 889 S.W.2d 164 (Ky. 1965).
65 Commonwealth v. Fancher, supra note 64.
00 390 S.W.2d 155 (Ky. 1965).
60378 S.W.2d 620 (Ky. 1964).
08 Commonwealth, Dept of Highways v. Sherrod, 867 S.W.2d 844 (Ky.
1963).
G9 892 S.W.2d 50 (Ky. 1965).
70394 S.V.2d 923 (Ky. 1965).
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language: "the kind of circuity of travel that is a noncompensable
factor is travel from the landowner's property to other places on the
highways system-not travel from one place on the landowner's
71
property to another place on the same property."
It is submitted that this language is unfortunate because it implies
that travel from one place on the landowners property to another place
on the same property is a compensable factor. If this method of
evaluating remainders does not collide with the Sherrod and Tyree
rule, it at least liberalizes the rule to a great extent. Ironically, the
court then proceeded to restate the correct rule of Sherrod and Tyree.
In using strict Sherrod language, the court stated:
We think it should be made clear that in situations such as here presented, where a farm has been severed into separate parcels, the "after"
value should be based solely on what exists after the taking, without
regard to what existed before the taking; the question is not how much
did the taking do by way of damage to the original farm but what was
the value of the farm before the taking and what is the value of the
parcels that remain. (Emphasis added.)72

It is clear that the remainder is to be evaluated strictly on what now
remains with no concern toward what previously existed-just as if a
total stranger to the property fixes the after value. The following language in the Burns case unfortunately indicates that the non-feasibility
of operating a severed farm as a single unit has some relevance:
The fact that the separate parcels into which the farm has been split
cannot feasibily be operated as a single unit has no relevance except as
may be given as a value-affecting factor by a witness who testified that
the separated parcels would bring less on the market, sold as separate
parcels, than they would bring if they could be sold as a single unit.
(Emphasis added.)73

Since the italicized language would permit this noncompensable item
to be admitted, there is danger that a jury might consider this element
relevant as a damage factor and allow compensation for it, even in
the face of an admonition.
(b) Loss of Business
In Commonwealth, Dept. of Highways v. York, 74 the condemned
property was a motel site which had been placed in a position between a new road and an old one. The court stated the familiar
principle that regardles of how lucrative an individuals business is,
if it depends upon the flow of traffic by his property, he is entitled to
71Id. at 925.

721d. at 925-26.

7a Ibid.
74390 S.W.2d 190 (Ky. 1965).
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no recovery for loss of business or value of his property when that
traffic is diverted along another route. 75 This proposition was used to
support the court's ruling that it was reversible error for the lower court
to instruct the jury that it should visit the site and implement what
was seen, with other evidence, and that what they saw was evidence.
Since diversion of traffic was most obvious to the jury on inspection of
the premises, an instruction on diversion of traffic should have been
given. This point had never been raised in Kentucky before.
The rule that evidence pertaining to loss of business is inadmissible was held not to be violated in Commonwealth, Dep't. of Highways
v. Smith.76 Evidence that the highest and best use of the property had
been as a restaurant was held properly admissible because the evidence
addressed itself to destruction of the land's availability for the very
business admitted to be the highest and best use for which the property had been available.
It was pointed out in Commonwealth, Dep't. of Highways v.
Priesf,77 that it is not proper to present evidence as to specific types of
businesses which might use a lot, with a view to showing loss of future
profits to the owner, because a particular business may no longer be
placed on the remaining land.
Business losses resulting from construction operations are likewise
noncompensable. 78 The taking of a temporary easement for construction work does not give the owner any special right to damages
caused by the work. The proper standard is the diminution in the fair
rental value of the landowners adjacent property by reason of the
occupancy by the Commonwealth. Moreover, it is improper to introduce photographs showing construction conditions during use of the
temporary easement for the purpose of showing the disruption of the
condemnee's business. 79
(c) Adaptability-Prospective Lot Value
In Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Merrill,"° the landowner
used a map upon which different areas of his farm were shown along
7
r Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Slusher, 371 S.W.2d 851 (Ky.
1963); DeRossette v. Jefferson County, 288 Ky. 407, 156 S.W.2d 165 (1941).
76 390 S.W.2d 194 (Ky. 19M).
77387 S.W.2d 302 (Ky. 1965).
7
8

79

Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Ray, 392 S.W.2d 665 (Ky. 1965).

Commonwealth v. Ray, supra note 78. Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways
v. Staples, 388 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1965); Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v.
Fister, 373 S.W.2d 720 (Ky. 1963). The Ray case would allow the photographs
for a legitimate purpose, i.e., to show new pavement lines and the permanent
physical conditions affecting the property when the reconstructed highway is

completed. In such a case the court should admonish the jury that the disruption
may not be considered in the award for damages.
80 383 S.V.2d 327 (Ky. 1964).
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with the values which he assigned to each in his testimony. The Commonwealth objected to the designation of these areas and to the notations of value. The court held that since it was shown that the landowner's farm was reasonably adaptable for the uses shown, it was
competent for him to premise the before and after value of his land
on the value of each area. The court cited the Merrill case with approval in another case where the condemned property was suitable for
potential commercial, residential, and light industrial purposes."'
Where the highest and best use of property is in sharp dispute, a
jury question is presented. 2 Even though land is undeveloped at the
time, the jury may give credit to evidence of adaptability for commercial and residential use in arriving at before value.
83
The court, in Commonwealth, Dep't. of Highways v. Ochsner,
held it proper to assign "per lot" values to farmland, even though it
had not been developed as a subdivision, and then to compare the
lots on an "as is" basis with lots in comparable locations.
Testimony which emphasizes as a basis for valuation loss of access
and the availability of the property for commercial use must be supported by evidence that businesses are planned in the foreseeable
future or that subdivision of the property is planned soon.8 4 The court
stated: "The valuation which controls is the value at the time of the
taking-in this case, as residential or farm property unless it can be
shown that it is transitional property reasonably expected to be soon
used as business property." 5
Evidence as to the adaptability of property for particular uses is
subject to the limitation set forth in Commonwealth, Dep't. of Highways v. Gearhart,where the court stated:
Our cases have consistently observed the rule that it is appropriate to
admit testimony of the adaptability of property for particular uses, even
though the property is not then being so used. However, the rule is
subject to the qualification that if the land is reasonably adaptable to
another use, there must be an expectation or probability in the near
future that it can or will be so used.86

Testimony of prospective lot values has been rejected in two recent
cases.87 In Commonwealth, Dept. of Highways v. Lawton, the property
owners introduced a plat showing part of the farm subdivided into
81
82

1965).

Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Rhea, 386 S.W.2d 443 (Ky. 1965).
Commonwealth, Dept of Highways v. Ramsey, 388 S.W.2d 610 (Ky.

83392
S.W.2d 446 (Ky. 1965).
84
Commonwealth, Dept of Highways v. Riley, 388 S.W.2d 129 (Ky. 1965).
85 Id. at 129.
86
383 S.W.2d 922, 926 (Ky. 1964).
8
7United Fuel Gas Co. v. Clarke, 387 S.W.2d 845 (Ky. 1965); Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Lawton, 386 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1965).
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lots and then substantially based their testimony on prospective lot
values. This type of testimony was incompetent and prejudicial,
although the plat was admissible to show the susceptibility of the
land to this type of development. In United Fuel Gas Co. v. Clarke,88
the court rejected testimony that a portion of appellees' farm was
susceptible of being land off into eight building lots, each worth
1,000 dollars.
In a recent case of first impression, 9 the court applied an exception
to the rule that market value shall be determined by consideration
only of the uses for which the land is adapted and for which it is
available. The exception is that if the land is not presently available
for a particular use by reason of a zoning ordinance or other restriction
imposed by law, but the evidence tends to show a reasonable probability of a change in the near future in the zoning ordinance or other
restriction, then the effect of such probability upon the minds of
the purchasers generally may be taken into consideration in fixing
the present market value.
The Commonwealth unsuccessfully maintained, in Commonwealth,
Dep't. of Highways v. Phillips,90 that since the remaining property
could best be used for commercial purposes, the owner did not suffer substantial damage in regard to that commercial use. The land
was being used for residential purposes and the court held that before
and after value should be based on present use of land.
Although estimates of land may be based on its availability for
other uses, it is clear that a verdict may not be based on its worth by
virtue of two inconsistent uses.91 Such an example of92two inconsistent
uses is farming and strip mining the same property.
(d) Other Incompetent Factors
In Commonwealth, Dep't. of Highways v. Martin,93 the court applied the principle set forth in Graves v. Winer,94 that evidence of
offers to purchase is not competent. Likewise, personal worth, as
distinguished from market value, is an improper consideration.95. AlsS Supra note 87.

69 Chitwood v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways, 891 S.W.2d 381 (Ky.
1965). This point had been raised, but not decided in Tharp v. Urban Renewal
and Community Dev. Agency of the City of Paducah, 389 S.W.2d 453 (Ky. 1965).
00391 S.W.2d 377 (Ky. 1965).
91 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Burden, 388 S.W.2d 577 (Ky.
1965).

92 Ibid.

93 392 S.W.2d 64 (Ky. 1965).
04 351 S.W.2d 193 (Ky. 1961).
95 Commonwealth, Dept of Highways v. Martin, 392 S.W.2d 64 (Ky. 1965);
Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Darch, 390 S.W.2d 649 (Ky. 1965); and
Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Darch, 374 S.W.2d 490 (Ky. 1964).
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though the court pointed out in the first trial of Commonwealth,
Dep't. of Highways v. Darch96 that such testimony was improper,
Darch repeated his mistake at the second trial.
Following the Sherrod case, Chain Belt Co. v. Commonwealth,
Dep't. of Highways97 will be cited for the proposition that the condemnee is not entitled to compensation for removal and relocation
expenses. Under Sherrod, this is not a taking of property. Commonwealth, Dep't. of Highways v. Eaves98 cited Chain Belt as authority for
this principle.
In accord with the rule that evidence of productivity of land based
on actual income is inadmissible, the court, in Commonwealth, Dept.
of Highways v. Prater,99 held that a landowner may not use as a basis
for his opinion on market value the income derived from sale of
tobacco raised on the property.
(e) Elimination of Improper Factors
In Commonwealth, Dep't. of Highways v. Mayes,100 a professional
real estate man, as wtiness for landowner, took into consideration the
improper factor of loss of parking on the public way. Instead of
striking his testimony, the trial court admonished the jury to disregard
the testimony, since freedom to park on the highway is only a permissive privilege. The witness was permitted to "recast" his testimony to
explain away his inadvertence. Even though the witness did not alter
his figures, the court affirmed, stating that this is a matter of weight
and credibility rather than competence of his testimony. Once the
witness was permitted to recast his testimony, it is submitted that the
trial court erred in not compelling the witness to revise his figures
accordingly. If his figures are not revised, then his recast testimony
has no effect, since a portion of his figures are still based on an incompetent factor.
The court applied the Mayes rule in Commonwealth, Dept. of
Highways v. Shaw,1°1 and held that when the improper factor can be
eliminated from his calculations and the estimate revised accordingly,
the appropriate remedy is an admonition to the jury not to consider the
improper factor and a requirement of the witness that he revise his
figures and give an opinion on the correct basis. Although a blanket
motion to strike is inappropriate in such a case, the trial court could
of its own motion admonish the jury and require the witness to
96 374 S.W.2d 490 (Ky. 1964).
97391 S.W.2d 357 (Ky. 1965).
98388 S.W.2d 573 (Ky. 1965).
99 384 S.W.2d 306 (Ky. 1964).
10 388 S.W.2d 125 (Ky. 1965).
101390 S.W.2d 161 (Ky. 1965).
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eliminate the improper factor and revise his estimates accordingly.
Where the improper factor is the sole or primary basis of a witness'
opinion, it is subject to a motion to strike, but where other
proper
10 2
factors are employed the rule does not necessarily follow.
If a witness uses an incompetent factor on direct examination and
on cross-examination the appellant elicits a similar statement, a motion
03
to strike that testimony should be given effect.1
If a verdict appears execessive it reflects the overall impact of
erroneous evidence. Such trial errors are most persuasive, because the
jury has apparently been misled and the Commonwealth prejudiced.
The court, in upholding a verdict, often looks at the reasonableness
of the verdict as determinative of the fact that the jury did not
10 4
give great weight to noncompensable factors.
2. Excessiveness
An award is often subject to attack where the evidence lacks sufficient probative value, and the award is therefore excessive under the
Tyree rule. 105 Such was the case in Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Oliver,10 where expert witnesses failed to disclose a sound
basis for their opinions. In Commonwealth, Dep't. of Highways v.
Wheat,107 an opinion was made on the basis of sales of land in an
admittedly more valuable section of the community. Condemnee's
land was valued at 4.25 dollars or more per square foot, whereas
identical tracts of land to that taken had sold for 2.33 dollars and
2.93 dollars per square foot, respectively. This testimony was held not
to have sufficient probative value to support the opinion.
If there are minerals underlying condemned property, there must
be evidence adduced to show that they have commercial value, or an
award which is partly based on the value of these minerals will be set
aside for lack of probative value. 0 8
A verdict is clearly excessive where the award for the thirty acres
lo 2 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. York, 390 S.W.2d 190 (Ky. 1965);
Vest Kentucky Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways, 368 S.W.2d 788

(Ky. 1968).

103 Conmonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Napier, 387 S.W.2d 861 (Ky.

1965).

104 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Shepherd, 892 S.W.2d 58 (Ky.
1965); and Commonwealth, Dept of Highways v. Osborne, 387 S.W.2d 854

(Ky. 1965).

105 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Darch, 890 S.W.2d 649 (Ky.
1965); Commonwealth, Dep t of Highways v. Arnett. 390 S.W.2d 187 (Ky. 1965);
Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Williams, 383 S.W.2d 687 (Ky. 1964).
106 385 S.W.2d 173 (Ky. 1964).
11,7
387 S.W.2d 856 (Ky. 1965).
IoRConmon-wealth, Dept of Highways v. Gardner, 388 S.W.2d 360 (Ky.
1965).
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taken plus incidental damages is more than twice the amount fixed as
the after value of the remaining 105 acres of the farm, which have
more and better improvements and higher proportions of coal and
of bottom and hill lands with better access. 1 9
The court often employs a mathematical test to find excessiveness.
In Commonwealth, Dep't. of Highways v. Staples,"0 the court
found the value per square foot of the property, based on the highest
before value of appellee's witness. This came to 1.88 dollars per
square foot for the entire lot. At that rate the 450 square feet taken
amounted to only 846 dollars. The jury awarded 14.82 dollars per
square foot or a verdict of 6,675 dollars. The award was ruled
excessive.
A verdict will obviously be declared excessive where the Commonwealth utilizes its own right of way for extension of the highway
pavement to its right of way line and the award is based partially on
the taking of the Commonwealth's own property."'
The court upheld a verdict as not excessive in Commonwealth,
Dept. of Highways v. Vanderpool,"2 where approximately one-half
of condemnee's farm was valued at more than twice the assessed value
for tax purposes, but the Commonwealth's witnesses valued it at
seven times the assessed value.
In Commonwealth, Dept. of Highways v. Terry," 3 an award of
16,000 dollars was not considered excessive for the taking of 1.41
acres of farmland on which was located a five-room frame house with
forced-air furnace and up-to-date plumbing and wiring.
Where there is conflict in evidence as to whether minerals may
be feasibly mined, a verdict based on the merchantability of the min114
erals will not be set aside if reasonable.
The court held, in Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Vaughn," 5
that where the total amount of a judgment, which was approximately
two-thirds of the amount of estimated damage of the lowest of the
landowners appraisals and about one-half that of the others, was based
on the testimony of qualified appraisers and supported thereby by
evidence, the award was valid. Similarly, an award of 9,000 dollars has
been held not excessive where witnesses for the landowner estimated
109 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. George, 387 S.W.2d 580 (Ky.
1965).110 888 S.W.2d 874 (Ky. 1965).
1"1 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Ray, 892 S.W.2d 665 (Ky. 1965).
112 385 S.W.2d 210 (Ky. 1964).
113 887 S.W.2d 874 (Ky. 1965).
114 Commonwealth, Dept of Highways v. Tucker, 889 S.W.2d 987 (Ky.
1965).
215 390 S.W.2d 146 (Ky. 1965).
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the reduction in market value from a low of 10,500 dollars to a high
of 16,000 dollars." 1'
In Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Parker,117 the jury split
the difference and awarded a verdict of 12,305 dollars. Appellees
witnesses testified that the difference was from 17,869 to 22,500 dollars,
and appellant's testimony set the figure at 1,200 to 2,500 dollars. The
verdict was held not excessive.
3. Miscellaneous
In Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Caudill,118 the court held
that where the chief value of the taken land was its road frontage and
this factor was revealed in the amount of damages returned for the
land taken [case was tried before Sherrod], loss of the use of the
commercially usable frontage as the main factor tending to reduce
the value of the remaining land was a duplication of damages which
necessitated a reversal.
The condemnor took a bridge in Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Adams,119 and the trial court admitted evidence as to the cost
of constructing a new bridge, over the objection of condemnor, but
subsequently struck the evidence and admonished the jury not to
consider it. It was held that the trial court erred in admitting the
evidence of double damage, but the trial court's action in excluding
the evidence eliminated condemnor's argument as to double damage.
Tried before Sherrod, the court held in Commonwealth, Dep't of
Highways v. Pruitt,120 that where separate awards were made for
taking damages and resulting damages, such award could not exceed
the top limits of valuation testimony. The court, in Commonwealth,
Dep't of Highways v. Allie, 121 held that a verdict may be within the
range of evidence even if it is less than the lowest difference between
before and after values given by any individual witness. The reason
is that the jury has a right to rely on the lowest before value given
by a witness and the highest after value given by another witness. 22
In another pre-Sherrod case 2 3 it was held that where the commissioners' award itemized the damages, the landowner, although not
116 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Ward, 388 S.W.2d 119 (Ky. 1965).
117388 S.W.2d 366 (Ky. 1965).
118388 S.W. 2d 376 (Ky. 1965).
119 388 S.W.2d 569 (Ky. 1965).
120 386 S.W.2d 261 (Ky. 1965).
121391
S.W.2d 385 (Ky. 1965).
22
Chitwood v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways, 391 S.W.2d 381 (Ky.

1965).2

1 3Conmonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Dearen, 392 S.W.2d 49 (Ky.
1965).
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appealing this award, could receive an amount in excess of the
amount allocated to the value of the property taken.
Following Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Stamper,2 4 the
court, in Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Wireman, 125 applied
the principle that a before value figure cannot be based upon
itemizing separate values of existing improvements.
Although undepreciated replacement cost is an improper method
of determining damages, the court has recently held that such
evidence, even though improper, may not be prejudicial where taken
in connection with evidence concerning depreciation of the original
12
building.
7
The court held, in Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Polk,
that where the lessee of condemned property had the right to remove
a building constructed on the premises by him, the building was not,
for the purposes of a condemnation action, personal property, and
evidence of damage to the building had to be admitted.
Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Chapman128 set out the
method by which the separate estates of different owners is to be
determined. In this case, one group of heirs owned the surface and
another owned the mineral interest. The proper method, in such a
situation, is to allow evidence of separate values and submit the entire question to one jury. A verdict may be returned finding the fair
market value of the whole property with the minerals in place and a
separate verdict as to the value of the mineral interest.
B. EVDENcE
1. Comparable Sales
In Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Merrill,129 witnesses for
condemnee testified to prices paid in three comparable sales which
occurred two to four months after the taking. The court cited the
Begley rule8 0 as to comparable sales and held that the Commonwealth
did not produce any evidence of a prejudicial change in property
valuation within four months after the taking, and therefore the trial
S.W.2d 640 (Ky. 19e1).
125 888 S.W.2d 606 (Ky. 1965).
126 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Congregation Anshei S'Fard, 390
S.W.2d 454 (Ky. 1965).
127 389 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1965).
128 391 S.W.2d 367 (Ky. 1965).
129 383 S.W.2d 327 (Ky. 1964).
13oCommonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Begley, 272 Ky. 289, 114 S.W.2d
127 (1938). The court approved evidence of "sales of land of like character,
similarly situated and at a point of time not too remote."
124345
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judge had not abused his discretion in allowing the witnesses to
testify concerning those particular sales.
The court pointed out, in Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v.
Mann, 31 that great latitude is allowed a professionally qualified
witness in condemnation proceedings as to comparability of prior
sales. Refusal to permit evidence of prices recently paid in private
sales of comparable property is reversible error if prejudicial. Dissimilarities should be pointed out on cross-examination. Such re1 32
fusal to admit was held prejudicial in two other recent cases.
Comparable sales, the prices of which are based on hearsay, are
clearly inadmissible 33 The court has, moreover, recently reaffirmed
the rule that a land transaction made under threat of condemnation
is inadmissible as a comparable sale. 3 4 Such a sale does not meet the
fair market value definition."35
2. Miscellaneous
The court held, in Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Robinette,136 that the fact that the Commonwealth introduced the presence
of coal, for the purpose of showing its unmineability, did not justify
the landowners in pursuing the subject for the purpose of adding the
value of the coal to the value of the land.
On the basis of Tyree, the court, in Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Whipple,137 held that where the taken property was renting
for 1,200 dollars per month and there was evidence that a couple of
years before the condemnation the property had rented for 1,500
dollars per month, the testimony of a valuation witness that the
property had a rental value of 1,560 dollars per month was not so
outlandish and fantastic as to render his testimony completely
valueless.
C. WrrNmsEs

The court, in Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Wiman, 3 8
held that even though the landowner did not qualify under the Fister
'3'

887 S.W.2d 848 (Ky. 1965).

"'2Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Hobson, 384 S.W.2d 314 (Ky.
1964); Commonwealth, Dep t of Highways v. West, 383 S.W.2d 116 (Ky. 1964).
133 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Bond, 391 S.W.2d 692 (Ky. 1965).
134 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc.,
388 S.W.2d 574 (Ky. 1965).

13 1 Stanley, Instructions to Juries § 860 (2d ed. 1957): "The market

value is the price which it (the subject property) will bring when it is offered
for sale by one who desires to sell, but is not compelled to do so, and is bought by
one who desires to purchase, but is not compelled to have it. (Emphasis added.)

136 386 S.W.2d 719 (Ky. 1965).
137 392 S.W.2d 81 (Ky. 1965).
13s 888 S.W.2d 871 (Ky. 1964).
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rule,139 the verdict might stand if a highly qualified witness supported
it by his testimony.
In Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Rose, 140 the court affirmed an award for condemnees based upon probative value of two
witnesses whose personal experience qualified them as expert witnesses. The fact that they did not testify as to acreage, type of land,
or purchase price of the sales was not reversible error because the
Commonwealth did not challenge them on cross-examination; therefore, appellant cannot be heard to complain on appeal. Even though
witnesses do not testify to comparable sales, if it is apparent to the
court that they possess such knowledge of land values in the vicinity
as to warrant their giving evidence touching that point, their testimony
141
is of probative value.
A witness has been held unqualified to testify when he has not
bought or sold any real estate, but has "seen it"
sold, and has heard of
one sale and "just different places all up and down the road." 142 A
witness' status as an expert also becomes unreliable when he gives
opinions of the amounts of damages which are glaringly contradictory. In such a case his testimony should be stricken upon a proper
motion.

143

The court, in Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Bennett,144
held that the definition of fair market value may be read to a lay
witness, and it is not reversible error if such a witness is unable to
give such a definition.
A witness who has had wide experience in coal mining and in purchasing coal properties has been held sufficiently qualified to express an opinion regarding the value before and after the taking of
145
a strip of land underlain with merchantable coal.
The trial court, in Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Combs,146
excused a witness who had served as one of the commissioners, and
then admonished the jury to disregard his testimony. The court
139 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Fister, 373 S.W.2d 720 (Ky.
1963), substantially changed the rule that mere ownership of the property
qualified the landowner to render an opinion concerning its market value. The
owner of real estate is no longer presumed adequately qualified to express an
opinion of market value by reason of ownership alone; he must now initially
establish his qualifications.
140 384 S.W.2d 81 (Ky. 1964).
141 Commonwealth, Dept of Highways v. Merriman, 392 S.W.2d 661 (Ky.
1965).
142 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Belk, 389 S.W.2d 920 (Ky. 1965).
143 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Terry, 387 S.W.2d 281 (Ky. 1965).
144 387 S.W.2d 594 (Ky. 1965).
145 Commonwealth, Dept of Highways v. Snyder, 390 S.W.2d 659 (Ky.
1965).
146 387 S.W.2d 592 (Ky. 1965).
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ruled that the trial judge erred, thus following Commonwealth, Dep't
of Highways v. Evans,1 47 which held that a commissioner may give
valuation testimony so long as he does not indicate the amount of the
county court judgment. However, this practice is not allowed where
the circumstances are such that the commissioners, on appointment,
might anticipate employment as witnesses.148 This practice was not
shown in the Combs case.
D. PNocEDuRE
Three cases involved the jury function in condemnation cases. In
Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Hackworth,149 the trial court
refused to allow the jury to view a residence which had been located
on the property, but which had since been moved 2000 feet away.
The court held it error not to hold a preliminary hearing to determine
whether the residence was so changed as to make jury view useless.
A statement by condemnee's counsel in his closing argument
caused the court to reverse an award in Commonwealth, Dep't of
Highways v. Dowdy. 150 The court had correctly instructed the jury
to disregard loss of business as an improper element of damages.
Counsel then told the jury: "The law is an ass-a idiot," causing the
jury to indirectly award improper damages in their verdict.
Prejudice of the jury was the issue in Butler v. Commonwealth,
Dep't of Highways.151 The court granted a new trial even though the
prejudice was not brought to light until after the close of the trial.
Condemnor's witness had testified that the land was worth 850 dollars
per acre and condemnee's witness had testified to a value of 2,000 dollars per acre. While the judge was out of the courtroom hearing an
objection, one of the jurors was heard to remark, "No land out there is
worth 2,000 dollars per acre."
Four cases dealt with appeal procedure.
In Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Hatcher,152 the court
held that failure of the trial court to give plantiff notice of entry of a
dismissal order, as provided for under CR 77.04153 does not affect the
validity of the dismissal order nor toll the time limit for appeal.
147361

S.WV.2d 766 (Ky. 1962).

14SGulledge v. Texas Gas Transmission Corp., 256 S.W.2d 849 (Ky. 1953);
Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Million, 314 Ky. 137, 234 S.W.2d 158

(1950).

149388 S.V.2d 372 (Ky. 1964).

1W0
388 S.W.2d 593 (Ky. 1965).
1 1 .87 S.W.2d 867 (Ky. 1965).
152 386 S.W.2d 262 (Ky. 1965).

153 CR 77.04 states: '[thel circuit clerk shall serve a notice of the entry by
mail... (4) Failure ... of the clerk to serve such notice ... shall not affect the
valid-ty of the judgement .....
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The committee for an incompetent person was held not to be a
necessary party to an appeal in Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways
v. Harkness.5 4 Therefore, failure of the Commonwealth to name the
committee in a statement of appeal is not fatal error. CR 4.04(3), providing for service upon the committee of an incompetent, if known,
was held not to render the committee a necessary party. The court
also held a prior judgment against the incompetent voidable because
it had been rendered without proof on behalf of the Commonwealth
after the guardian ad litem reported that he was unable to make a
defense.' 55
Failure to raise objection at trial was fatal to the Department
of Highways in Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Brock. 5
The plaintiff filed suit against a construction company for damages
caused by excessive blasting and the company subsequently joined
the Department of Highways as a third party defendant. A verdict
was rendered against the department even though the complaint was
not amended until after the trial. The court, in holding that the department may not for the first time complain on appeal, cited CR
15.02, which provides that when issues not raised by the pleadings
are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be
treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.
In Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Sangalli,157 the court held
that merely filing a motion for appeal because the award was too high
was not sufficient under KRS 177.087, which requires filing of a
certified copy of the judgment, a statement of the parties and any
exceptions to the commissioners' award.
In three cases, the appellee failed to file a brief on appeal. In each
case the court gave judgment for the appellant under Rule of Kentucky Court of Appeals 1.260 [hereinafter cited as RCA].
In Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Win-Belt Co.,5 s the
court treated the failure as a confession of error under RCA 1.260159
and rendered judgment for appellant without considering the merits
of the case. Likewise, in Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Bennet,160 the court reversed without considering the merits of the case
after the appellee failed to file his brief. Similarly, in Commonwealth,
154 3883 S.W.2d 359 (Ky. 1964).
155 CR 8.04 requires affirmative allegations against a person under disability
to be proven whether denied in the pleadings or not.
156 391 S.W.2d 690 (Ky. 1965).
157 3883 S.W.2d 674 (Ky. 1964).
158 886 S.W.2d 721 (Ky. 1965).
159 RCA 1.260 states: "If the appellee fails to file his brief within the time

allowed, the Court may: ...

(3) regard the appellee's failure as a confession of

error and reverse the judgment without considering the merits of the case.
160 386 S.W.2d 733 (Ky. 1965).
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Dep't of Highways v. Martin,'6 ' the court invoked section 2 of RCA
1.260 which permits it to reverse if appellant's brief appears to
sustain such action. The case was remanded for a new trial with
instructions on errors committed at the first trial.
Two cases dealt with grounds for appeal.
In Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Miller,16 the court dismissed the Commonwealth's appeal because the sum in controversy
did not amount to the 2,500 dollars required in civil cases, under
KRS 21.060, for appeal as a matter of right. The county court had
awarded 1,885 dollars and the circuit court increased the award to
3,500 without the Commonwealth joining in the appeal. This had the
effect of making the county court award non-reducible, and therefore,
the only issue appealable was the amount of increase in circuit court.
In Price v. Commonwealth Dep't of Highways,163 the court held
that failure of the record to show that the commissioners were properly appointed and sworn by the county court was not fatal. The
court assumed proper appointment and further stated that the matter
was not material because the primary purpose of the county court
proceeding in this case was to give possession to the Commonwealth
pending trial on damages.
Two cases the court disposed of summarily. In Commonwealth,
Dep't of Highways v. Knight,164 the court found no error in the record
and affirmed without stating the case; while in Commonwealth, Dep't
of Highways v. Parsons,6 5 the court set aside an increased award
where only the condemnor appealed.
One case dealt with the penalty on appeal. The court held in
Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Whipple,166 that the Commonwealth must pay an additional ten per cent damages on the amount of
an increased award on appeal to circuit court. This reaffirmed the
holding in Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Frank Fehr Brewing
Co.167

E. NEcEssrTY
Necessary and proper public use was the issue in two cases. In
Sturgill v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways,'6 8 the court held that
the Commonwealth could condemn property to provide an access
161392 S.V.2d 64 (Ky. 1965).
1023 87 S.W.2d 297 (Ky. 1965).

163 885 S.W.2d 670 (Ky. 1965).
164 888 S.W.2d 120 (Ky. 1965).
165 8838 S.W.2d 860 (Ky. 1964).
166892

S.W.2d 81 (Ky. 1965).

167 376 S.:A.2d 541 (Ky. 1964).
168384 S.W.2d 89 (Ky. 1964).
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road for adjacent property which had been landlocked by a new
highway. Sufficient public purpose was found in the fact that the
general public would have the right to use the road.
In Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Vanderstoll,169 the owner
complained that more land had been taken than was necessary for the
highway. The Commonwealth showed necessity for use in projects
associated with the highway such as drainage, roadside parks, etc.
It was held error for the trial court to rule for the owner since he
failed to show fraud, bad faith, or abuse of discretion in the condemnation.
F. MiscE tAxous

In Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Alexander,'7 KRS
177.060(1)171 was held to require the county to indemnify the Commonwealth for all claims arising out of primary highway work where
there is no allegation of negligence by the Commonwealth. Similarly,
in Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Thacker,172 the county was
held liable under KIRS 177.060(1) for damage resulting from reconstruction of a primary road.
Power of an urban renewal agency to condemn was the issue in
Idol v. Knuckles 7 3 The court held that the trial court erred in
granting an interlocutory judgment giving the urban renewal agency
immediate possession without a hearing on the right of the agency to
condemn the land as provided in KRS 99.420(5)1 4
Hinderance of use was held to be a compensable taking in Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Williams. 7 5 The owner's testimony
that the condemnation had made it more costly to utilize the land for
its purpose as grazing land because of difficulties in moving livestock
between tracts was held admissible.
In Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. De Hart,y6 the court
held that condemnation of an awning extending from the property over
the right of way was not grounds for recission of a deed to the
property.
169
170
171

888 S.W.2d 858 (Ky. 1965).

888 S.W.2d 599 (Ky. 1965).
KRS 177.060(1) provides: "Except as otherwise provided in this section
and in K.RS 17.070, all cost of acquiring any necessary land or right of way for
primary road purposes and all damages incurred shall be paid by the county.
172 884 S.W.2d 79 (Ky. 1964).
173 888 S.W.2d 910 (Ky. 1964).
174KRS 99.420(5) states: "Any issue raised in the answer or other pleading
filed, putting in issue the right of the agency to condemn the property shall be
promptly heard and decided by the court ....
175 886 S.W.2d 722 (Ky. 1965).
176 885 S.W.2d 317 (Ky. 1964).
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A mistaken survey came under fire in Commonwealth, Dep't of
Highways v. Schmehr.1' 7 The condemned tract contained a house
which was, unknown to either party, actually located only partially on
the tract condemned. The remainder of the house was located on an
adjacent tract owned by the same person. The deeds to the Commonwealth did not purport to convey anything but the tract condemned. The court held that the Commonwealth did not acquire any
title to the part of the house on the adjacent tract, despite the fact that
it based its offer on the assumption that the entire house was on the
condemned tract and paid a correspondingly higher price.
In Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Holloman,178 a road was
built through oil-producing lands. The condemnation provided that
the owner could continue to extract oil and gas from under the road
so long as he did not enter on the right of way to do so. The trial
court admitted testimony that water flooding was required to produce
oil on the owner's adjacent land and that this would not be possible
because of the danger of rupture under the highway through improperly capped old wells. The court held that the owner could not recover
damages for the loss of his other wells because of inability to water
flood, for his own negligence in not properly capping the old wells
as required by statute, 79 caused the situation.
The required form for a jury verdict was set out in Commonwealth,
Dep't of Highways v. Priest.80 The court held that the jury should
be instructed to state in its verdict the fair market value of the
entire tract before the taking and the fair market value of the remainder not taken.
G. REVERSF CoNDEMiNATioN

In Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Widner,181 the court
allowed recovery in an action for damages on account of a landslide
due to deprivation of lateral support. Appellants argued that recovery based on negligence should not be allowed in circuit court, but
only in the Board of Claims. The court was unwilling to depart from
its decisions allowing such recovery, even though some doubt had been
expressed as to the soundness of the doctrine. 182 It is clear that
liability based on a theory of negligence in a reverse condemnation
388 S.W.2d 131 (Ky. 1965).
377
S.W.2d 666 (Ky. 1965).
179 KRS 353.180(1) provides: "No person shall abandon . . . [a well] ...
without first plugging it in a secure manner ... so that no water can pass..
180 387 S.W.2d 302 (Ky. 1965).
181
388 S.W.2d 583 (Ky. 1965).
18 2 Curlin v. Ashby, 264 S.W.2d 671 (Ky. 1954).
178 390
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action in circuit court will not be grounds for dismissing the action
because of a lack of jurisdiction.
The court followed, but did not cite, the Widner case in Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Gisborne.5 3 The Kentucky Highway
Department mistakenly cleared some right of way, and appellant
maintained that this was a negligent trespass which should have
been brought in the Board of Claims. The court said that it makes no
difference whether property is condemned and appropriated for a
public use, or is "injured or destroyed" for a public purpose, since the
owner is entitled to compensation when any of these events occur.
Although the court reasoned that this action amounted to a "taking"
(in reverse), it refused to order that a deed be conveyed to the
department. The court stated:
As the sole issue involved was the amount of compensation, if any, to
be paid for the use of or injury to the strip of land, the trial court did
not err when it refused to order that the strip be conveyed to the
Department. Admittedly there was no taking of the land itself; hence,
there was no necessity for a deed.8 4 (Emphasis added.)

Judge Stewart has apparently distinguished between degrees of
"taking." If the action of the department had amounted to a permanent
deprivation of property (whether by negligence or otherwise), the
court would have had no alternative but to order that a deed to that
property be conveyed.
The court, in Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Davidson,185
reversed an award and held that no condemnation in reverse would
lie where the Kentucky Highway Department did nothing beyond
that allowed by right of way deeds.
183891 S.W.2d 714 (Ky. 1965).
184 Id. at 716.
185 383 S.W.2d 346 (Ky. 1964).

IV. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

The Kentucky Court of Appeals considered eight cases involving
constitutional law this session. Issues involved were: illegal search
and seizure, personal immunity of members of the Kentucky General
Assembly from arrest, public utility discrimination, sovereign immunity, annexation, taxation, appointed counsel, and criminal
sentencing.
Probable cause for search and the extent of the premises subject
to search was the issue in Perkins v. Commonwealth.'"0 The court
found that a search warrant issued on the basis of an affidavit of an
Alcoholic Beverage Commission agent was not issued for probable
cause as required by Kentucky Constitution section 10187 because the
affidavit failed to state a reputation for bootlegging activity on the
premises or by the occupant. The court also indicated that even had
the warrant been valid the officers could not legally search a car
parked in front of the premises on the public highway in the absence
of any evidence that its operator was a servant or associate of the
occupant of the premises.
Arrest of a member of the Kentucky legislature was appealed in
Swope v. Commonwealth.'"8 The court found that personal immunity
from arrest granted to members of the state legislature under the
Kentucky Constitution I" does not extend to breaches of the peace in
a public place.
In Consolidated Television Serv. Inc. v. Leary' 90 the contention
was made that a public utility corporation could not constitutionally' 91
allow one cable television company to use its poles for wires and yet
deny the same privilege to a competing cable television company.
The court refused to order the issuance of an injunction finding that
denial of use of the poles was not necessarily an unreasonable or
arbitrary action by the Electric and Water Plant Board of Frankfort.
Immunity of the state from suit on civil contracts was the issue in
Wells v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways.9 2 The court followed
Foley Constr. Co. v. Ward' 93 and allowed the state to interpose the
the defense of sovereign immunity to a breach of contract suit. Failure
to specially plead the defense was held not a bar.
186883 S.W.2d 916 (Ky. 1964).
187 Ky. Const. § 10.

385 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. 1964).
1 Ky. Const. § 43.
190 382 S.W.2d 78 (Ky. 1964).
191 Neither the constitutional sections nor the theory relied upon appear in
the case report.
192 384 S.W.2d 308 (Ky. 1964).
193 375 S.W.2d 392 (Ky. 1963).
1ss
89
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The constitutionality of a statute limiting the right of appeal was
attacked in lobe v. City of Erlanger.194 The provisions of KRS
81.190(4) 195 were attacked as a denial of due process' 96 and a taking
of property without just compensation,' 9" because the statute denied
any right of appeal from annexation cases in third class cities. The
court rejected the contention that the classification under the statute
was unreasonable or arbitrary and found such a classification was
authorized under the Kentucky Constitution,'9" permitting the division of cities into classes for the purposes of organization and
government. The dissent, however, felt that this was a case of
denial of equal protection of the law under the federal constitution' 9
because of arbitrary classification. Appeals are permitted in cities of
the first, second, and fourth class and the dissent felt there to be no
reasonable relationship between right to appeal and population of
a city.

In Woolsey v. Big Reedy Creek Watershed29° a taxpayer asked injunctive relief against collection or expenditures of tax money for a
watershed work plan which had been voted in a referendum pursuant
to KRS 262.780.201 The court pointed out that the plaintiff's pleading
did not specify what grounds were relied upon but merely that his
"constitutional rights" had somehow been violated. The court proceeded to supply its own constitutional argument on plaintiffs behalf
which it then rejected as hypothetical in this case. 20 2 The court also
refused to invalidate the referendum because it was not held on the
day of a regular election as provided for under section 171 of the
Kentucky Constitution. 20 3 This section was held applicable only to
state-wide referendums on acts of the legislature classifying property
for tax purposes.
Right to assigned counsel for appeal was the issue in Eastham v.
194 883 S.W.2d 675 (Ky. 1964).

395KRS 81.190(4) states: "Any city of the third class may annex any terin the same manner . . . [as] cities of the first class with the following exceptions: . . . (4) There shall be no appeal from the judgment of the
circuit96court."
1 Ky. Const. § 14.
197 Ky. Const. § 13.
198 Ky.Const. § 156.
199 U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
200 383 S.W.2d 135 (Ky. 1964).
201K.RS 262.730 states: "Only owners of lands ying within the boundaries
of the territory as determined by such board shall be eligible to vote in the
referendum...."
202 That since each property owner gets one vote it would be possible for
many small property owners to outvote a few large property owners even though
their combined holdings were less. The court pointed out that the plaintiff was
not so situated.
203 Ky. Const. § 171.
ritory ...
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Commonwealth.204 The court held that an indigent has a right to
appointed counsel to prosecute an appeal if he so requests it of the
trial court and that a denial would deny equal protection of the law.205
Here the appeal was written by the defendant and there was no
indication that he had asked the trial court to appoint counsel. The
court did not decide the merits but remanded the case to the trial court
to appoint counsel for appeal.
A Nwrit of habeas corpus was denied in Swanness v. Thomas, 2°U over
the contention of the defendant that his confinement at Eddyville
Penitentiary was unlawful because the trial court had sentenced him
to LaGrange. KRS 196.070207 and KRS 197.065208 authorizing such
transfers by correctional authorities, were held not to be a delegation
of the power of the judiciary in violation of the Kentucky Consti'
because designation of the places where felons may be
tution,-09
confined is a purely legislative function.
204 888 S.W.2d 684 (Ky. 1964).
25 U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
203887 S.W.2d 307 (Ky. 1965).
207KRS 196.070 reads: "The Director of the Division of Institutions shall:
.... (5) Authorize the transfer of male prisoners between institutions."
20S KS 197.065(2) states: "Commissioner of Welfare is vested with the
authority to direct and compel the transfer of any prisoner from any penal
institution or reformatory, irrespective of the order of the court committing
said prisoner to any one institution....
"00 Ky. Const. §§ 27, 28, 29.

V. CONTRACTS

The court handed down several decisions involving such elements
of contracts as: the validity of a contract when the offeree fails to
sign but the subject matter is delivered and paid for; an agreement
to agree; rules of damages in construction contracts; and the sufficiency of an undelivered deed to take an oral contract out of the
Statute of Frauds.
In O'Daniel Motors, Inc. v. Handy,210 a vendee signed a purchase
order containing the provision "This Order is not Binding until
Accepted by Dealer and Approved by His Credit Department." The
purchaser made a down payment and took possession of the car, but
the order was never signed by the dealer who now seeks return of the
car. The court reaffirmed its position in holding that the contract was
not binding until it was signed by the dealer. The court pointed out
its ruling in a similar case, Venters v. Stewart,211 that the order received by a salesman with a comparable provision was only an offer
to purchase and could not be binding on either party until accepted.
The court could have used the theory of implied contract and
reached a different result. Acceptance of a contract may be implied
from the acts of the parties and "an offeree who has unjustifiably
led the offeror to believe that he had acquired a contractual right,
to assert an actual intent at variance with the
should not be allowed
212
meaning of his acts."
The court for the first time was called on to determine the validity
213
and enforceability of an "agreement to agree" in Walker v. Keith
The case involved a ten-year lease with an option to renew and the
rent to be fixed in an amount as actually agreed upon by the parties in
accordance with a comparative basis of rental values and present
business conditions as of the date of renewal.
The court had two basic theories from which to choose: first, the
conservative, orthodox view that the rental is an essential term, and
where it is not made certain or readily ascertainable, then it is not
binding and unenforceable; 214 second, the more liberal approach that
the parties' intentions should be carried out and that the determina210 390 S.W.2d 453 (Ky. 1965).
211

261 S.W.2d 444 (Ky. 1953).

212Allied Steel v. Ford Motor Co., 277 F.2d 907, 911-12 (6th Cir. 1960);
Sheridan Coal Co. v. C. W. Hull Co., 87 Neb. 117, 127 N.W.218 (1910).
213 382 S.W.2d 198 (Ky. 1964).
214 1 Williston, Contracts § 45 (3rd Ed. 1957). See also Slayter v. Pasley, 199
Or. 616, 264 P.2d 444 (1958); Moss v. Olson, 148 Ohio 625, 76 N.E.2d 875
(1947) (dissent).
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tion by the court is one of form rather than one of substance. 215 The
court, in a well written opinion, held that public policy demanded
adoption of the first view that "[A] n agreement to agree simply does
not fix an enforceable obligation."21 6
In Chaney v. Noland,217 the court considered the requirements for
making a memorandum sufficient to take the case outside the Statute
of Frauds. The court applied the existing rule that a written contract
or memorandum for the sale of land must itself furnish the means of
identifying the subject matter in order to satisfy the Statute of Frauds.
The court held that the memorandum was insufficient where it
described the real estate as "54 acres of the Nolands farm."
Another question presented was whether an undelivered deed
will satisfy the Statute of Frauds as a memorandum of the contract
of sale. The general rule seems to be that an oral contract will not
2 18
be taken out of the Statute of Frauds by an undelivered deed,
21
9
however there is authority to the contrary. Even though the court
said the memorandum was insufficient, it still lets the case turn on the
proposition that the undelivered deed did not take the oral contract
out of the statute which made it unnecessary to deal with the deed's
insufficiency.
In Robert Simmons Constr. Co. v. Powers Regulator Co., 220 the
basic question presented was whether a corporate surety was released
from liability to a claimant by reason of the claimant granting an
extension of time to the contractor. The court held that the surety is
not released wherein the extension is bona fide and not in excess of
reasonable, usual, or customary credit.
The court stated that the surety would not be released unless it
could show that such extension had damaged his position and then
221
only to the extent that he is harmed by the extension.
215See Rainwater v. Hobeika, 208 S.C. 433, 38 S.E.2d 495, 498 (1946),
wherein the court stated "it is quite true that it is not the function of the court to
make contracts between parties, but it is the court's duty so to construe their
xritten agreements as to effectuate the intention, to the end that justice may be
done." See also, Hall v. Weatherford, 32 Ariz. 370, 259 P. 282 (1927); Holiday
v. Pegram, 101 S.C. 378, 85 S.E. 908 (1915).
216 382 S.W.2d at 201.
217 387 S.W.2d 308 (Ky. 1964).
218
Annot., 100 A.L.R. 196 (1936); See also, 49 Am. Jur. Statute of Frauds §

694 (1943).

210 Peoples Trust v. Consumers Ice & Coal Co., 283 Pa. 76, 128 A. 723
(1925); Chiles v. Bowyer 127 Va. 299, 103 S.E. 619 (1920).
220

390 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1965).

Restatement, Security § 129 (1941). See also, United States Fid. & Guar.
Co. v. United States, 191 U.S. 416 (1903); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Ohio River
Gravel Co., 20 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1927).
221
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In Motley v. Vincent,222 the court held that the preponderance of
the evidence favored the building materials dealer who sued to recover for materials furnished defendant for the construction of houses,
and that the findings and judgment of the trial court would not be
disturbed.
The court decided two cases involving the proper measure of
damages for breach of contract, Ellis v. Knight,223 and Commonwealth,
2 24
Dep't of Fin. v. Miller Constr. Co.
In the Miller case, the court adopted the majority rule that,
where there are defects and omissions in the builder's performance, the
22 5
cost of remedying such may be deducted from the contract price.
This rule however is limited to "reasonable" expense to correct the
building, i.e. the expense should not exceed the difference between
market value with the defect and the market value without it.
In the Ellis case, the contractor made only partial performance.
The opinion stated that it had been proper for the lower court to include in an instruction on damages the amount of completed work
22 6
and the profit on the contract.
United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Collins227 involved the question of whether
a contract clause providing that the work would be completed within
six months, with indemnity for any loss resulting in the failure to do
so, resulted in automatic termination. The court held that the clause
was merely providing for an appropriate time of completion and was
not a condition of performance.
The court determined, in Cardwell v. Nashville Coal Inc.,22 8 that
a term in a coal lease as to the "blocks of coal" was ambigious and
and oral evidence should have been admitted to prove its intent and
22 9
purpose.
In Homan v. Lusk,230 the court determined that from the evidence
presented an oral contract had been made and the trial court's finding
of no such agreement was erroneous.
Krauss Wills Co. v. Publishers Printing Co.-3' reaffirmed the
580 (Ky. 1965).
882 S.W.2d 891 (Ky. 1964).
885 S.W.2d 211 (Ky. 1964).
226Mikkelsen v. Fischer, 347 S.W.2d 527 (Ky. 1961); Restatement, Contracts § 346 (1)(a) (1st Ed. 1932); Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 810 (1961).
222
223
224

388 S.W.2d

226Johnson v. Jackitt, 178 Ky. 406, 191 S.W. 117 (1917); Standard
Constr. Co. v. Jernessee, 140 Ky. 838, 131 S.W. 1028 (1910); Western v. Sharp,
53 Ky. (14 B. Mon.) 144 (1853).
227 389 S.W.2d 242 (Ky. 1965).
228 384 S.W.2d 880 (Ky. 1964).
229 See also, Blevins v. Riedling, 289 Ky. 835, S.W.2d 646 (1942).
230 886 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1964).
231 890 S.W.2d 132 (Ky. 1965).
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edsting law that detailed proof is necessary for any action of a
conspiracy to interfere with an employment contract. 232
In Carterv. Howerton,233 the court allowed an offset by the amount
of timber left on the land where the seller of the timber had locked out
the purchaser claiming a breach of contract.
232
Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Huffman, 340 S.W.2d 447 (Ky.
1960). See also, Withers v. Berea College, 349 S.W.2d 357 (1961).

-33 389 S.W.2d 922 (Ky. 1965).

VI. CRIMINAL LAW
A. PRmurL
Statute 234
Criminal
Indictment-Habitual
1.
The defendant in Ross v. Commonwealth235 had been convicted of
a felony in 1950, 1957, and 1960. The indictment did not charge the
crimes were committed in proper sequence. It is commission of a second felony after the conviction of a first felony, and commission of a
third felony after conviction of second that is required to be established in order to apply the Habitual Criminal Act. This holding is in
23 6
accord with prior decisions: Coleman v. Commonwealth.
B. VENU
In Taylor v. Commonwealth2 37 the court held that under KRS
452.650238 the failure to make a timely motion is deemed a waiver of
venue. The court in applying the statute pointed out that defendant
not only failed to make a timely motion, he did not raise the issue at
any time in the trial court.
The defendant in Marcum v. Bradley23 9 was indicted for murder
in Fayette County for an alleged shooting, in Jackson County, of a
man who died in Fayette County. Jackson County had not returned
an indictment prior to that returned in Fayette County, even though
their warrant was first issued. The defendant raised a point as to the
intent of KRS 452.630 which provides: "Where the venue of a prosecution is in two or more counties, the presentation shall proceed in the
county in which the process for the arrest of the defendant is first
issued, unless an indictment for the offense is pending in another county." The court interpreted the statute as meaning that the first process
county has exclusive venue only so long as the prosecution proceeds in
due course in that county. In the event that prosecution ceases before
reaching the jeopardy stage the right of exclusive venue ceases. This
240
case reaffirmed existing state and federal law.
C. RiGHT To SPEEDY TmAL
In Ruip v. Knight,241 the appellant, an inmate of a United States
penitentiary, asked that he be brought to immediate trial upon an
234KRS 431.190 (1963).
235 384 S.W.2d 324 (Ky. 1964).
236 276 K-,. 802, 125 S.W.2d 728 (1939).
237 386 S.W.2d 716 (Ky. 1965).
238 KRS 452.650.
239 385 S.W.2d 165 (Ky. 1964).
240 Carroll v. Commonwealth, 294 S.W.2d 938 (Ky. 1956); see cases collected 80 A.L.R.2d 1287, § 17.
241 885 S.W.2d 170 (Ky. 1964).
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indictment on a charge of armed robbery. The court after considering
both federal and state authorities 242 held: "That since the appellant
has never been served with process and has never submitted himself
to the jurisdiction of the court in which he seeks a speedy trial, neither
his federal nor state constitutional right to a speedy trial has been
violated."
In Barker v. Commonwealth243 the court stated that there were four
factors relevant to consideration of whether denial of a speedy trial
assumes due process proportions: (1) The length of the delay; (2) the
prejudice to the defendant; (3) the reason for the delay; (4) waiver
by the defendant. After determining the existence of a valid reason
for the delay, the court stated that defendant's failure to demand a
speedy trial constituted a waiver of that right.
A similar result was reached in Walton v. Bradley244 where the
court held: "A delay of one term of court was not unreasonable and
that appellants failure to demand a speedy trial constituted a
waiver." The reasoning behind the demand doctrine is that the right
is only for a defendant's protection and is waived if not requested.
There is a question whether this reasoning is fundamentally sound. If
defendant has the right to a speedy trial, does not the state have a
corresponding duty to hold a prompt trial, since it is within its
power to do so? Should lack of legal advice be a sufficient excuse to
presume waiver of a fundamental guaranty? These are questions that
can be answered only by the courts through the effective assistance of
the adversary system.
D. AFTER ARRIGNmENT-JuRY Vmxiicr
1. Procedure
A better understanding of the review of the cases necessitates
categorizing the procedure cases into two areas: (1) The trial judge's
action prior to trial; (2) The trial judge's conduct during the trial.
(a) Priorto Trial
In Marcum v. Commonwealth,245 the court held that where the
defendant's driver's license was revoked because he was convicted of
driving while intoxicated, where he was later arrested and convicted
for operating a motor vehicle without a license and less than a week
later was again arrested for operating an automobile without license
and while drunk, and where the punishment was made more severe by
of Yager, 138 F. Supp. 717 (D.C. Ky. 1956).
S.W.2d 671 (Ky. 1964).
S.W.2d 457 (Ky. 1965).

242 Petition
2433 85
244 386

245 390 S.N.2d 884, 886 (Ky. 1965).
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statute in case of prior offense, the charges were properly tried together. During discussion of the case, the court focused on two
considerations: First was whether the evidence of the separate
crimes was admissible for each of the crimes? The second consideration
was time, and in Marcum this consideration was satisfied because the
246
offenses were closely associated in time.
The court in Underwood v. Commonwealth247 refused to grant
separate trials to the wife of the defendant on the ground that the
mere fact that the evidence was competent as to one of the defendants, but incompetent as to co-defendant is not alone sufficient to
establish prejudice requiring granting of separate trials, for there must
be some additional factors, such as antagonistic defenses, evidence as
to one defendant tending directly to incriminate co-defendant, or ad24
missions of one defendant directly implicating the co-defendant. 8
The court in Hopkins v. Commonwealth249 held that the defendant
was not prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to grant him a continuance where the same counsel, who previously had moved successfully for a continuance, alleged as a ground for the present motion that
he was not ready to try the case in that he expected the defendant
would be tried first on a different indictment returned some time
earlier even though set for trial on the same date. The court relied on
the fact in the case that the attorney had earlier signed the papers
for the defendant which had set trial on the same date for both
indictments. The appellant's contention was that even though the
counsel signed the papers, he was not acting as counsel at the time.
Definitely, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
grant the continuance and the Court of Appeals had no alternative
but to affirm.
(b) Judge's Conduct During Trial
During the trial of the appellant in Stephens v. Commonwealth,250
the trial judge reminded the witness, the mother of the appellant, that
she was under oath. On appeal, it was held that in a prosecution for
the shooting, a violent event which was enacted in the presence or
near presence of five witnesses, including brothers, and mother and
which was thereafter covered by a pall of silence, the trial court
fulfilled its obligation when it reminded the mother she was under
Ibid.
390 S.W.2d 685 (Ky. 1965).
248 Ibid.
246
2 47
249
250

383 S.W.2d 912 (Ky. 1965).

882 S.W.2d 897 (Ky. 1964).
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oath. In so ruling the court relied upon the trial judge's formal instruction to the jury, the violence of the event and the obvious
evasiveness of the witness. Even though the trial judge did repeatedly
ask questions to the witness, it did not251 constitute unauthorized
participation in a felony trial by the judge.
In Merritt v. Commonwealth,252 however, the court held that
unnecessary discourse from the bench in front of the jury, announcing
rulings was prejudicial to the defendant and inconsistent with the right
to a fair trial. Contrary to Stephens, the witness was not evasive and
in Merritt the judge argued with the counsel and commented on
questions to the witnesses. For example, when counsel asked the
witness to how many persons he had talked, the judge interjected,
"That's silly, you can't tell how many you talked to.25 3 There is no
question that the court had proper ground for reversal.
In Wise v. Commonwealth25 4 the trial court admitted testimony that
the defendant had previously engaged in activities toward prosecutrix
which would support a conviction of attempted "consent" rape, but
the trial court failed to admonish the jury as to the limited effect of
the testimony relating to the prior incident. Held: Reversed. Failure
to admonish the jury was prejudicial error. This holding seems to be
in accord with Browning v. Commonwealth255 which indicated that
the error might be corrected if the jury had been instructed to the
testimony's limited effect.
The trial court in Underwood v. Commonwealth5 6 did give an
admonishment of the limited effect of evidence of prior transactions
involving the appellant. The Court of Appeals held that this was
sufficient even though the admonishment could have pointed out additional considerations of identity and novelty that could have been
given to the evidence. Note, however, in this case the court did
consider that the additional admonishment would have been more
257
unfavorable than favorable to the defendants.
In Taylor v. Commonwealth,25 8 the trial court promptly admonished
the jury to disregard the argument of the counsel even though the
defendant made no motion for discharge of the jury. This admonishment was sufficient to prevent defendant's prejudice according to the
251 Kinder v. Commonwealth, 262 Ky. 840, 91 S.W.2d 530 (1936).
252386 S.W.2d 727 (Ky. 1965).
'5
254

Id. at 730.
387 S.W.2d 292 (Ky. 1965).

255 351 S.W.2d 499 (Ky. 1961).
256390 S.W.2d 635, 638 (Ky. 1965).
257

Id. at 639.

258 386 S.W.2d 716, 717 (Ky. 1965).
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court relying upon Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure [hereinafter cited as RCr] 9.24 and 9.26259 and Mitchell v. Commonwealth.2 60
A similar case was Clements v. Commonwealth261 where the court
held that an admonishment of court cured any substantial prejudice
to defendant arising from witness' interjection of hearsay evidence.
E. EviDENcE
The review of the evidence cases will be divided into three primary
areas: (1) Admissibility; (2) Sufficiency; (3) Corroboration. Each
of these broad areas will be divided into more exact topics for
discussion.
The court in Eastham v. Commonwealth262 held:
Error in production of tools referred to as burglary tools was not prejudicial to the defendant in view of uncontradicted testimony of owner
and police officers that window of the store building bad been pried
open, that cash register had been broken into, that bag of burglary
tools had been found inside of building, and that the defendant had
been discovered hiding in the back of the building at about midnight.

The court evidently relied up RCr 9.26 which states:
A conviction shall be set aside on motion in the trial court or the
judgment reversed on appeal, for any error or defect, when upon
consideration of the whole case, the court is satisfied that the substantial
rights of the defendant have been prejudiced. 263 (Emphasis added.)

This rule supports the court's decision in Eastham, but it also points
up the question as to whether there should be different results in this
case and Smith v. Commonwealth.2 64 In Smith, the court held that in
cases in which the death sentence is imposed, the court will consider
any error in the record claimed to be prejudicial and upon timely
motion will direct reversal, to assure a fair trial. It does not seem
illogical to assume that eventually this type of reasoning would be
applied to non-capital punishment cases.
The appellant in Conley v. Commonwealth265 consented to submit
to a lie detector test and agreed that the test could be introduced as
evidence against him on trial. The court held that this waiver which
was signed by the defendant was not binding upon him. The court's
reasoning was not unique for it stated that the scientific trustworthiness
259
260

RCr 9.24, 9.26 (1965).

280 S.W.2d 189 (Ky. 1955).
261 884 S.W.2d 299 (Ky. 1964).
262 90 S.W.2d 136, 137 (Ky. 1965).
263
RCr 9.26(1965).
264301 Ky. 364, 192 S.W.2d 92 (1946).
265 382 S.W.2d 865 (Ky. 1964).
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of the lie detector test is still tenuous and the courts will not at the
present recognize in an unrestricted manner the results. The court is
not suggesting that there be absolute infallability, but reiterating the
holding in Colbert v. Commonwealth266 that only reasonable reliability
must be established.
In Woodford v. Commonwealth267 the court held that evidence
that defendant was questioned by several police officers for approximately thirty minutes at the scene of the automobile accident, did not
disclose that admissions made during that time were induced by hope
or fear raised by promises or threats. The court so holding interpreted
KRS 422.110(1)2 68 which reads:
No peace officer, or other person having lawful custody of any person
charged with crime, shall attempt to obtain information from the
accused concerning his connection with or knowledge of crime by
plying him with questions, or extort information to be used against him
on his trial by threats or other wrongful means, nor shall the person
having custody of the accused permit any other person to do so.

The reasoning of the court followed the reasoning in Bower v. Commonwealth26 9 and Milam v. Commonwealth2= which was that it is
not necessary that a confession be made spontaneously to be voluntary,
nor is a confession inadmissible merely because elicited by questions
addressed to accused.
271
Similar reasoning was applied in Carson v. Commonwealth
where the appellant had made a written confession to the officers
-after his apprehension. The court held that the accused's statement
was not subject to exclusion even if the appellant was not forthwith
carried before the magistrate, where there is no showing that delay
in presenting accused before a magistrate served as an unlawful
This decision is in accord with
means in coercing his statement.
2 72
Brown v. Commonwealth.
In Carsonv. Commonwealth273 the prosecution introduced a photograph that showed two state troopers and two men. The appellant
alleged that its admission was error because it showed him in an unfavorable pose. He secondly objected because the same photograph
was used by the newspapers in giving accounts of the murder. The
Commonwealth's purpose for introducing the photo was to point up
26 806 S.W.2d 825 (Ky. 1957).

'137 888 S.W.2d 871 (Ky. 1965).
268 KRS 422.110.
269 357 S.W.2d 833 (Ky. 1962).
270 275 S.V.2d 921 (Ky. 1955).
271 882 S.W.2d 85 (Ky. 1964).
272 275 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1955).
273 882 S.W.2d 85 (Ky. 1964).
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the fact that the appellant was clad in a white shirt-thus affording
corroborating testimony. The court held "that even though admission
of the photograph may arouse passion or bring to mind vividly details of a shocking crime, the picture is admissible in a criminal
prosecution if it illustrates a material fact or condition."27 4
In Marcum v. Commonwealth27 5 the court reiterated the proposition that the best evidence rule requires the most authentic evidence
which is within the party's power to produce, but in practical application the rule applies almost exclusively to documentary evidence and is
concerned with the content of a written instrument. The contention of
the appellant in this case was that the testimony of the assistant to
the commissioner of public safety was not the best evidence of the
recording of the revocation of license. The court held that since the
content was not directly in issue, but only whether the act was performed or not, then the witness was competent to testify to the act
performed.
E. Sm&Rca AND SvazuRE
1. Incidental to Arrest
In Lane v. Commonwealth2 7 6 an important qualification was placed
on the long established rule that a search may be made when incidental to a lawful arrest. It was held in this case that a search may
not be made incidental to an arrest for a minor traffic violation. Any
evidence obtained as a result of such a search is not admissible in a
criminal prosecution. The apparent basis for this decision was the
belief by the court that many arrests made for such minor traffic
offenses were only pretexts on which to base a search for evidence
of another crime.
There is another important element in this case. Prior to this
decision it was a well settled rule that only the owner of the premises
to be searched could complain. 277 However, there is strong language
by the court in this case indicating that in the future anyone who is
lawfully on the premises may complain of an illegal search where the
"fruits" of it are being used against him.
The opinion in this case does not prevent the admission of
evidence obtained where no search is necessary for its discovery.
Thus, in Clark v. Commonwealth 78 where illicit alcoholic beverages
were observed in the floor of the car, the court held that the liquor
274 Id. at 90.
275 390 S.W.2d

884, 886 (Ky. 1965).

276 886 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. 1965).
277

Brown v. Commonwealth, 878 S.W.2d 608 (Ky. 1964).

278 888 S.W.2d 622 (Ky. 1965).
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was admissible. It was stated that where the unlawful objects are
plainly visible, open, and obvious to anyone who even casually looks
about, it cannot be called a search, and such evidence is admissible.
The real question in the Clark279 case was whether the police had
the right to stop him in the first place. The police pulled him over
because the car was setting low in the back, and it weaved a little.
The court said that in the interest of safety on the highways, the police
may stop a car which, pursuant to KRS 189.780(1), appears to have
something wrong with it. The defendant tried to fit the case within
the rule of Commonwealth v. Robey.2s° However, that case held that
where there has been no adjudication of the charge for which the
defendant was pulled over, the evidence obtained thereby is not admissible in the trial of the second charge. Since there was no charge
against Clark to start with, there was no adjudication necessary to
determine the admissibility of the liquor on that charge. Therefore
Clark did not fit within that rule.
A case which did fit within the Robey rule is Stiltz v. Commonwealth.281 There the defendant was pulled over and charged with
reckless driving. Alcoholic beverages were found in the car, and he
was charged ith possession of liquor in a local option territory. Since
he was convicted of the latter charge while the former charge was
continued, the case was reversed. It was held that while the defendant
had been found guilty of the first charge, the evidence found as a
result of the first charge was not admissible in a trial of the second.
The same kind of situation occurred in Taylor v. Commonwealth.282
The defendant was charged first with a violation of the local option
laws, then a search revealed a concealed deadly weapon. A conviction on the latter charge was reversed since the defendant had not
first been convicted of the local option charge, and the evidence of
the deadly weapon was therefore inadmissible.
2. Search Warrant
The affidavit for a search warrant was held insufficient in Buckley
v. Commonwealth,S 3 and the evidence obtained through the search
was held inadmissible. The affidavit stated only that the affiant had
purchased "a half-pint on 9-15-63." Since it didn't state what the halfpint contained, it did not provide probable cause for the magistrate
to believe that a liquor violation had taken place.
79
280

388 S.W.2d 622 (Ky. 1965).
87 S.W.2d 84 (Ky. 1960).

281 890 S.W.2d 642 (Ky. 1965).
282 386 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1965).
283 38
S.W.2d 849 (Ky. 1964).
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In Conn v. Commonwealth2 84 a search warrant was issued by the
county judge pro tempore at a time when the county judge was within
the county and available. Since a county judge pro tempore has no
authority to issue warrants while the county judge is within the
county, the warrant was held invalid by the Court of Appeals.
A search was made in Trevathan v. Commonwealth285 which was
neither incidental to an arrest nor under a search warrant. The sheriff
had arrested the appellant and made a futile search on the day prior
to the day in question. Going back the next day, he continued his
search and found a knife on the appellants premises. The court held
that all reference to the finding of the knife should be omitted. It
could not be called a search incidental to an arrest, since the search
was too remote in time from the arrest. Therefore a search warrant
was necessary, and since the sheriff had none it was an illegal search.
G. SUFFICImNCY OF EVIDENCE
The discussion of this topic will be primarily in relation to the
sufficiency of circumstantial evidence with some notice of what
constitutes reasonable doubt in criminal cases.
The court in Merritt v. Commonwealth286 stated that a "reasonable
doubt" is a substantial doubt, a real doubt, in that the juror must ask
himself not whether a better case might have been proved, but
whether after hearing the evidence, the juror himself actually doubts
that the defendant is guilty. This holding is in accord with Collins v.
Commonwealth287 which held that a reasonable doubt does not mean
a fanciful, whimsical or capricious doubt. It seems that the definition
in Merritt is more definite and easily understood than the vague
definition in Collins.
The court in Brown v. Commonwealth288 held that a conviction
may be had upon circumstantial evidence, but the circumstances
shown must be so unequivocal and incriminating in character as to
exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. This holding serves
as the basis for conviction upon circumstantial evidence. The following
cases will be considered in two primary groups: (1) Those cases where
the evidence was not sufficient to meet the standard set out in
Brown; (2) The cases where the evidence did meet the standard.
The court in Barrett v. Commonwealth28 9 held that circumstantial
284 387

S.W.2d 285 (Ky. 1965).

285384 S.W.2d 500

286357
2873 86
288 295
299 340

S.W.2d
S.W.2d
S.W.2d
S.W.2d

(Ky. 1964).

333 (Ky. 1982).
727, 729 (Ky. 1965).
797 (Ky. 1956).
471 (Ky. 1960).
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evidence of possession was insufficient to sustain the conviction of the
appellant. The prosecution only presented evidence that five onegallon jars of moonshine whiskey were found buried 150 feet behind
the appellants house on property not owned by him. The court
followed the reasoning of Lorman v. Commonwealth290 in that mere
possession did not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence,
but was as reasonably consistent with innocence as with quilt.
The appellant in Rose v. Commonwealth291 was present when her
son killed his father. There was no other evidence connecting the
appellant with the killing except an alleged threat and the court held
that the evidence, including evidence of a threat did not sustain a
conviction. This holding was in accord with Holman v. Commonwealth2 2 which held that mere presence at the scene of the crime is
not evidence that he committed it or aided in its commission.
In Matney v. Commonwealth293 the court held that evidence by
witnesses that they could not see the gun prior to its use by the appellant was sufficient to sustain a conviction of carrying a concealed
deadly weapon even though other witnesses testified that they saw
294
the gun. The court was in accord with Kelly v. Commonwealth
which had stated that it was a jury question which of the testimony to
believe.
The court in Clements v. Commonwealth 95 held that evidence
including some corroboration of the prosecuting witness' testimony was
sufficient to sustain conviction for incest. The evidence consisted
mainly of testimony by the prosecutrix and her mother. Note that
there is no doubt here for uncorroborated testimony of the prosecuting
296
witness being sufficient to sustain a conviction for incest.
In Hines v. Commonwealth,297 the court held that the following
evidence sustained a conviction: The dwelling house involved was on
a farm owned by appellant's wife and was heavily insured; appellant
had driven out to get something he did not pick up; he returned to
the house alone to lock up; fifteen minutes later the fire was discovered; appellant did not try to put it out or investigate.
The appellant in Taylor v. Commonwealth298 during the night of
the alleged crime stated he had driven through a police roadblock
290 390 S.W.2d 654 (Ky. 1965).

291 385 S.V.2d 202 (Ky. 1964).
292 269 S.W.2d 243 (Ky. 1954).
293 291 Ky. 622, 165 S.W.2d 167 (1942).
294 387 S.W.2d 586 (Ky. 1965).
295 232 S.V.2d 1022 (Ky. 1950).
29
0 Browning v. Commonwealth, 351 S.W.2d 499 (Ky. 1960).
297390 S.V.2d 152 (Ky. 1965).
298 386 S.W.2d 716 (Ky. 1965).
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that afternoon and had registered under a ficticious name right before
the robbery. When arrested, he had about 2,000 dollars on him and
a knotted stocking in the car. The point here is that the appellant was
not accused of participating directly in the robbery act, rather he was
alleged to be the driver of the get-away car. The court held that the
evidence sustained a conviction. This result of guilty is very questionable, because it is as reasonable to assume that he was telling the
truth about where he got the money, the amount of which was only
one-third of the total amount stolen. The case of Hoskins v. Commonwealth2 9 9 which the court relied upon was much stronger than
Taylor, for the defendant in that case had made several false statements to a number of witnesses.
H. COIBORATION OF TEsTnmONY
To better understand the court's rulings concerning corroboration
it is necessary to first be familar with the criminal rule involved,
RCr 9.62: "A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an
accomplice unless corroborated by other evidence tending to connect
the defendant with the commission of the offense."30 0
The court in Clark v. Commonwealth30 ' defined an accomplice as
one "who knowingly, voluntarily, and with common intent, unites with
the principal in perpetration of crime, either by being present and
joining in the criminal act, by aiding and abetting in its commission,
or, if not present, by advising and encouraging performance of the
act." In Howard v. Commonwealth0 2 the court held that the fact of
joint indictment does not establish that the defendants were accomplices so as to require corroboration of testimony of co-defendants for
conviction of appellant where charge as to one defendant is dropped
and each asserts full responsibility of the other. In the Howard case,
the court also pointed out that even though the witness might be an
accessory after the fact it did not make him an accomplice so as to
require corroboration of his testimony for conviction.
The court in Barker v. Commonwealth=3 held that evidence is
sufficient to corroborate accomplice's testimony if it tends to connect
defendant with the commission of the offense, but is not sufficient if
it merely shows that the offense was committed and the circumstances
thereof. In Barker the court stated that the statement by the appellant
that "if anything has happened to those old people I know who done
299 374 S.W.2d 839 (Ky.
300
RCr 9.62 (1965).
301 386 S.W.2d 458 (Ky.
302 387 S.W.2d 578 (Ky.

1964).
1965).

1965).

303 385 S.W.2d 671 (Ky. 1964).
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it" plus other incriminating circumstances was sufficient to corroborate

the testimony of an accomplice. This is in accord with what the court
in Harris v. Commonwealth304 stated was required, i.e., that the
evidence must only tend to connect some fact. The court held in
Harris, that the rule requiring corroboration of accomplice is met if
corroborated evidence is of such quality that a reasonable and unprejudiced mind could conclude that it tends to establish some fact
that links the accused with the principal fact of the commission of the
offense. In Flora v. Commonwealth3 5 the court also applied this test
when they held that the testimony of a friend of the appellant connecting the appellant with the theft of tobacco together with the
defendant's admission that he was in the neighborhood where the
theft took place was sufficient to present a jury question as to whether
there was sufficient corroboration of accomplice to sustain the conviction.
The appellant in Hart v. Commonwealth3 6 stated prior to trial
that "he didn't know anything about breaking into the store and didn't
remember anything about it." The court held that this was equivalent
to remaining silent and was insufficient to corroborate testimony of
convicted store-breakers and to link appellant with the break-in
307
charge. This holding is in accord with White v. Commonwealth
where the defendant stated, "I neither admit nor deny the charge."
I. INSTRUCrIONS

In Harris v. Commonwealth30 8 the defendant was charged with
murder. His defense was that he was not even present. The evidence
in the case consisted of one witness who testified that he saw the
defendant merely walk forward, shoving his hand into the stomach of
the deceased. He didn't see the knife in the defendant's hand, but it
was there because the victim died. A conviction was reversed on the
ground that an instruction should have been given on voluntary
manslaughter.
Wly was this instruction necessary? The rule is that where there
is enough evidence to support a conviction for a lesser offense than
murder, an instruction should be given on the lesser offense. 309 Here
the court said that the jury could reasonably infer that the striking was
preceded by a verbal, and perhaps a physical, exchange. Of course, it
would appear just as reasonable to infer that it was done in self de304 285 S.WV.2d 489 (Ky. 1956).
305 387 S.W.2d 15 (Ky. 1964).
306 389 S.W.2d 939, 940 (Ky. 1965).

292 Ky. 416, 166 S.W.2d 873 (Ky. 1942).
389 S.W.2d 907 (Ky. 1965).
'Suttrell v. Commonwealth, 250 Ky. 334, 63 S.W.2d 292 (1933).
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fense. This reasoning would go something like this: The jury infers
that the deceased reached for a cigarette; they infer that the defendant
thought he was reaching for a knife or gun; they then infer that the
defendant, petrified with fear, stabbed the deceased to protect himself. Thus, there would be an acquittal on the ground of self defense.
Yet, why stop with instructions on voluntary manslaughter and self
defense? Why not give the jury a copy of Stanley's Instructionsand let
them choose their own, to match whatever inferences the twelve men
might come up with?
In Piper v. Commonwealth310 and Koenzig v. Commonwealth,3 1'
the court reaffirmed the rule that objections must be made at the
time the instructions are given or in a motion for new trial. The appellant in Stewart v. Commonwealth312 did not object at the time the
instructions were given, but in his motion and grounds for new trial
he stated "the court erred in its instructions." The Court of Appeals
found this statement insufficient to appraise the trial court of the
nature of the alleged error.
In Ramsey v. Commonwealth, 13 the instructions were timely objected to. In reversing the case, the court condemned an instruction
which required the jury to believe appellants testimony beyond a
reasonable doubt in order to find him not guilty. The lower court in
Shanks v. Commonwealth,314 gave an instruction on murder, voluntary
manslaughter and self defense. Appellant argued that involuntary
manslaughter should have been included since his stabbing of the
victim could have been unintentional. The Court of Appeals stated
that an involuntary manslaughter instruction is warranted when the
killing is unintentional and when the facts exclude the inference of an
intentional killing. The use of a knife, a deadly weapon, to defend
one's self in a brawl does not warrant an instruction on involuntary
manslaughter because an intentional killing is inferred from the facts.
The court concluded by stating another reason for not reversing, that
the five-year penalty fixed by the jury for voluntary manslaughter was
within the range permitted for involuntary manslaughter.
J. CONSTUTONAL IN'EPRETATION

A. Interpretation Of Section 43 Of The Kentucky Constitution 313
The members of the General Assembly shall in all cases except treason,
felony, breach of surety of the peace, be privileged from arrest during
310 387 S.W.2d 13 (Ky. 1965).
311 390 S.W.2d 648 (Ky. 1965).
312 89 S.W.2d 910 (Ky. 1965).
313 383 S.W.2d 134 (Ky. 1964).
314 391 S.W.2d 888 (Ky. 1965).
3 15

Ky. Const. § 43.
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their attendance on the sessions of their respective Houses and in going
to and returning from the same; and for any speech or in debate in
either House they shall not be questioned in any other place.

The court in Swope v. Commonwealth 16 had occasion to interpret this
provision for the first time. The court after interpreting the legislative history of the privilege and upon examination of English history, held: "Exception of cases of treason, felony, breach of surety of
the peace from the parlimentary privileged from arrest enjoyed under
the constitution excluded all crimes from the operation of the privilege,
17
so that the appellant could be found guilty of breach of peace."
Upon reviewing the facts, there is some doubt as to whether this case
was appropriate for such consideration. The appellant Swope was
arrested at a ball game for disturbance of the peace. He was not going
and coming from the General Assembly which seems to be required
by the statute. No decision was found that interpreted "going and
coming" as applied to this statute; but, considering what is believed
to be the purpose of the privilege, it is difficult to see how it would
apply in a case where the appellant was in no way concerned with
the General Assembly at the time.
K. DoTIEU JEoPAmy
In Rice v. Commonwealth l8 the court held that a defendant may
not complain of double jeopardy when he procured the setting aside
of the former judgment. Appellant had been granted a writ of
habeas corpus and was convicted under the same indictment on
which the former conviction was based. He alleges that the subsequent trial should be reversed on grounds of double jeopardy. The
Court of Appeals, which had granted the writ, stated that although it
was not expressly made a part, the granting was made pursuant to
KRS 419.120,311 which contemplates a new trial. The court reasoned
that since the judgment of the lower court had been set aside by the
voluntary proceedings of the appellant, the next step must be that
of a new trial. The parties were then in the same position as if there
had been no trial.
Lindsey v. Commonwealth32 established the proposition that re310 385 SAV.2d 57 (Ky. 1964).
317 Id. at 58.

318 387 S.W.2d 4 (Ky. 1965).
310 KRS 419.120-Removal of Person to Another Court.
If the evidence at the hearing shows probable cause that the detained person is
guilty of an offense that is within the exclusive jurisdiction of another court, or
that was committed in another county, the court shall order that he be taken
immediately before the court having jurisdiction or remand him to the custody
of an officer to be taken to the proper county for new proceedings against him.
320 383 S.W.2d 333 (Ky. 1964).
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ceiving stolen goods is an offense separate and distinct from that of
stealing the same property; therefore, a dismissal on the merits of one
would not be a bar to a conviction on the other. In an unusual display
of strategem the defendant, in his trial on a charge of knowingly receiving stolen goods, testified that he had stolen the goods. He had
hoped that the two crimes were so interrelated that they would be
controlled by the test, "part of the same criminal act, transaction, or
ommission," set forth in Arnett v. Commonwealth.321 This test, if
applicable, would have prevented the subsequent indictment on the
grounds of former jeopardy. The court upheld the state's action of
dismissing the first indictment and re-indicting and convicting defendant on two counts of felonious theft of the same property. The
court reasoned that since appellant had sold stolen hogs, he had either
stolen them himself or had received them from someone else. He
could not have done both. The court considers these offenses as
mutually exclusive, but is it not possible that one who received could
also conceive, plan, and aid the perpetrators to such a degree that
their acts are imputed to him? In a case such as that, one could be
guilty of both crimes.
L. ETApmmTr
In Gordon v. Commonwealth322 the court held that where the crime
was conceived, planned, and perpetrated by appellant, the fact that
the public authorities provided an opportunity did not constitute an
entrapment. The court reasoned that the criminality of the act depends
on whether the criminal intent originated in the minds of the
accused or his entrappers, and where it originates in the accused, the
fact that the opportunity is furnished does not constitute a defense.
M. POST-CONVICrION RE

Es

1. Probation and Parole
In Adams v. Ferguson,3 23 the court held that "parole is a matter
of legislative grace." Where the prisoner had been committed under a
twenty-one year sentence and later had two-year and seven-year convictions, and where he had been paroled a number of times between
the three convictions, the parole board did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to parole. This is in accord with Willard v. Ferguson.324
In Gossett v. Commonwealth,325 the lower court ordered that ap321 270
322 887

Ky. 835, 109 S.W.2d 795 (1937).
S.W.2d 13 (Ky. 1965)."

323 386 S.W.2d 462 (Ky. 1965).
324 358 S.W.2d 516 (Ky, 1962).
325384

S.W.2d 308 (Ky. 1964).
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pellant's motion and grounds for new trial be sustained and his indictment for false swearing be dismissed provided that he absent himself
from the county and obey the law for one year. The Court of Appeals
construed this order as being a postponement of judgment. This in
effect made it a one year probation under KRS 439.260. This statute
permits the circuit court to postpone the entering of a judgment and
the imposing of a sentence and to place the defendant on probation.
Since the terms of the probation had not been broken the lower court
could not impose the original sentence.
2. RCr 11.42.
(a) Scope: A major portion of the petitions brought under RCr
11.42 have been brought under a misapprehension of the purpose and
nature of the remedy offered by the rule.326 An overwhelming
majority of these cases were brought by prisoners filing their briefs pro
se. It is interesting to note that of all the motions brought under RCr
11.42 during the last term, this writer has not found a single case
wherein the petitioner succeeded in having his judgment of conviction
327
vacated.
Many of the cases involved various allegations of errors committed at the trial. However, RCr 11.42 does not authorize relief from
a judgment of conviction for errors committed at the trial, unless it is
shown that there was a violation of a constitutional right, a lack of
jurisdiction, or such violation of a statute as to make the judgment
328
void and thereby subject to collateral attack.

In Lee v. Commonwealth32 9 it was held that alleged errors committed in the trial court must be a violation of due process, before
they are appropriate bases for relief under 1Cr 11.42.
Even if the grounds alleged for the motion are not errors at the
trial, the allegations must still be such that if true, the judgment
would be void. 330 Otherwise, the petitioner is not even entitled to a
hearing on his allegations. Apparently, however, word has not reached
the prison lawyers of the rule of stare decisis. They continue to
allege grounds which, even if true, would not invalidate the judgments.
In Collier v. Commonwealth331 it was alleged that evidence
was admitted which was obtained through an illegal search.
306

King v. Commonwealth, 387 S.W.2d 582 (Ky. 1965).

327 Except in Wedding v. Commonwealth,-S.W.2d - 1965, decided in the
last term
328 but not final until the next term.
Warner v. Commonwealth, 385 S.W.2d 62 (Ky. 1964).
329 389 S.W.2d 241 (Ky. 1965).
330
Maye v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.2d 731 (Ky. 1965).

331

.387 S.V.2d 858 (Ky. 1965).
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In Hicks v. Commonwealth3 2 the allegation was that the
trial judge erroneously imposed the sentence in a case where
death was a possible penalty.
3
In Warner v. Commonwealth=
the petitioner claimed insufficiency of proof of venue; that the testimony at his trial was
too conflicting to understand what the evidence was; that it was
error for the trial judge to inquire in the presence of the jury as to
whether counsel for the defense would consent to a separation
of the jury during recess; and a bare assertion that the sheriff had
entered the jury room while it was considering the verdict.
In Maye v. Commonwealth3 3 4 the allegations made were that
there was improper admission of evidence of prior convictions;
failure of the court to instruct properly and in writing; insufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction and the
verdict was against the law and the evidence.
In Lee v. Commonwealth"35 it was argued, inter alia, that it
was error not to call as the first witness the officer who obtained
the warrant of arrest; that he was denied a fair trial by being
tried jointly with an accomplice; and that the Commonwealth's
Attorney conversed with the jury.
In Walker v. Commonwealth338 the claimed errors were: illegal
arrest, failure to be taken before a magistrate, failure to recognize
witnesses, errors in indictments, and failure to instruct properly.
In Jones v. Commonwealth337 the petitioner alleged a failure
to endorse the names of the witnesses on the indictment.
In Davenport v. Commonwealth33 8 one of the grounds alleged
was that the court didn't comply with KBS 203.340, which requires a mental examination for any person indicted as a twice
convicted habitual criminal.
In Perkins v. Commonwealth33 9 the grounds alleged were that
there was newly discovered evidence which was pertinent to the
case.
In all of the above cases the Court of Appeals held that the
petitioners were not entitled to a hearing on those allegations. Even
if the alleged errors are true and would have been reversible error if
332
333
334

388 S.V.2d 568 (Ky. 1965).

385 S.W.2d 62 (Ky. 1964).

386
389
336 386
337 388
338 390
3-9 383
335

S.W.2d
S.W.2d
S.W.2d
S.W.2d
S.W.2d
S.W.2d

731
241
452
601
662
916

(Ky. 1965).
(Ky. 1965).
(Ky. 1965).
(Ky. 1965).
(Ky. 1965).
(Ky. 1964).
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raised on appeal, they aren't sufficient to invalidate a judgment
Therefore, no hearing is required.
Where the allegations may be controverted by looking at the
record, no hearing is required either.340 Further, where the alleged
errors are of previous convictions the petitioner is not entitled to a
hearing. In Sipple v. Commonwealth,3 41 it was held that RCr 11.42
does not provide, expressly or by implication, for the review of any
judgment other than the one pursuant to which the movant is being
held in custody.
Mere allegations of errors are not sufficient, either. 42 There must
be facts shown which support the claims.
(b) Right to Counsel
Where the petitioner's allegation is such that if true it would
invalidate the proceeding, he is entitled to a hearing and, if a pauper,
to the appointment of counsel for the hearing. This is true no matter
how unfounded the claim may be, and even though the court knows
it is untrue. 343 The movant should state in his petition that he is
financially unable to employ counsel. However, if he doesn't so allege
and appears at his hearing without counsel, the court should conduct
a sufficient preliminary hearing to determine if he is able to secure
counsel. The court should then make a finding of fact determining
the question. In Coles v. Commonwealth,344 no such finding of fact
was made, so the Court of Appeals could not determine whether the
movant was entitled to have counsel at his hearing. The court said that
it was probable that the movant was a pauper at the time of the
hearing and thus entitled to the appointment of counsel for both the
hearing and the appeal therefrom.
Of course, where the movant is not entitled to a hearing because
of the nature of his allegations, neither is he entitled to the appointment of counsel. This is true, even if he desires to appeal from the
order denying his petition without a hearing.345
The majority of cases brought under RCr 11.42 during the last
term contained allegations of either no counsel at all at the trial, or
that the counsel was ineffective.
As everyone knows, the right to counsel is absolute. 346 This is true
even if the defendant pleads guilty at his trial. 3 7 However, it can
340 King v. Commonwealth, 387 S.W.2d 582 (Ky. 1965).
384 S.W.2d 332 (Ky. 1964).

341

342
343

Coles v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.2d 465 (Ky. 1965).

ibid.

344386 S.W.2d 465 (Ky. 1965).
345 Gideon
346

v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Sipple v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.2d 332 (Ky. 1964).
347 Davenport v. Commonwealth, 390 S.W.2d. 662 (Ky. 1965).
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be waived if the waiver is made "intelligently, competently, under349
standingly, and voluntarily." 348 In Davenport v. Commonwealth,
petitioner was held to have waived counsel. When the trial court asked
him if he wanted counsel, he replied that he did not. He had had
enough experience from former trials to know what he was doing
when he refused counsel, and his refusal was therefore a waiver.
In Yates v. Commonwealth,350 the movant did not have counsel at
his examining trial before the police court judge. This was held not
to be a deprivation of due process in the absence of a showing that
anything prejudicial to the movant occurred because of his lack of
counsel at such stage.
If the court does appoint counsel to represent the defendant, the
defendant may try to show that the counsel was inadequate. However, there must be facts shown to substantiate the claim before a
hearing is required.
In lones v. Commonwealth,352 the defendant argued that courtappointed counsel had refused to defend him unless he pleaded
guilty, and had pointed out the lack of pay. He also argued that his
plea of guilty was made under duress. The Court of Appeals reversed
a denial of a hearing, saying that the petitioner was entitled to a
hearing on these allegations. However, in Lawson v. Commonwealth,353 the petitioner argued inadequate counsel to no avail. He
had pleaded guilty, received a minimum sentence, and did not argue
that his plea was coerced.
In Curry v. Commonwealth,354 it was held that the grounds alleged
by the petitioner had prima facie substance and thus he deserved a
hearing. He alleged that his court-appointed counsel had refused to
appeal or to move for a new trial.
In Yates v. Commonwealth,355 the petitioner alleged ineffective
assistance of court-appointed counsel, and was given a hearing by the
lower court. His only ground was that the attorney failed to consult
him until the day of the trial. Here it was held that where all the
testimony at the hearing was to the effect that the counsel for defendant had made a strong and vigorous defense, the judgment could
not be vacated.
In Uwaniwich v. Commonwealth,356 the mere allegation that the
848 Ibid.
349 Ibid.

356386 S.W.2d 450 (Ky. 1964).

S.W.2d 927
353 386 S.W.2d 734
354 390 S.W.2d 891
355 386 S.W.2d 450
356390 S.W.2d 658
352 389

(Ky. 1965).
(Ky. 1965).
(Ky. 1965).
(Ky. 1964).
(Ky. 1965).
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defendant was arraigned, tried and convicted on the same day does
not show that court-appointed counsel was inadequate. In the absence
of a motion for a continuance, the court presumed that counsel did
not think one was needed. The mere failure to ask for a continuance
357
is not sufficient to show inadequate counsel.
In Maye v. Commonwealth,3r8 warning was given to trial courts
to be cautious in appointing an attorney for one defendant who is
representing the co-defendant. There is a possibility of conflicting
interests between the two, and only separate counsel could protect
each from possible advantage of the other. However, in Lee v. Commonwealth,319 decided one month after the Maye case, the appointment of the same attorney for both co-defendants was held not sufficient to show a denial of a fair trial.
The counsel in the foregoing cases were court-appointed. Would
it make any difference if the attorney is chosen by the defendant instead of being court-appointed?
This question was answered in King v. Commonwealth.3 60 It was
held that the petitioner was estopped to complain of ineffective assistance of counsel, since it was not court-appointed. The decision was
based on a federal case 301 which discussed the problem thoroughly.
It was pointed out that there is a vast difference between lacking the
effective assistance of counsel and being denied the right to have the
effective assistance of counsel. It is the latter only for which the state
is responsible. The state cannot be charged with the errors of counsel
who is chosen by the defendant.
However, the court didn't seem so adamant in Whack v. Commonwealth.3 62 Here the court said only that the defendant ordinarily
waives the right to complain of his chosen attorney. Then in Bivens v.
Commonwealth,0 3 decided the same day, the court did not mention
waiver or estoppel. The defendant had counsel of his own choosing
and complained of inadequate assistance. It was argued that his
counsel didn't know that the defendant had been in a mental institution a few years before the trial. The court treated the case on its
merits and concluded that these circumstances were not such as to
shock the conscience of the court.
It is suggested that this case was not meant to change the rule
of waiver, discussed above. The court probably thought the novel
357 Jones v. Commonwealth, 388 S.W.2d 601 (Ky. 1965).
3s 386 SAV.2d 731 (Ky. 1965).

-19389 S.W.2d 241 (Ky. 1965).
3G0

387 S.W.2d 582 (Ky. 1965).

363

390 S.W.2d 149 (Ky. 1965).

361 United States v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407 (3d Cir. 1953).
302 .390 S.W.2d 161 (Ky. 1965).
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circumstances deserved some comment, since the decision was going
to be the same either way. This is similar to the situation in Collier
v. Commonwealth 64 where the court could have dismissed the appeal
because it was not timely. However, citing a Supreme Court case,365
the court merely declined to do so. The case was then treated on its
merits and decided against the petitioner, anyway. The claim in the
case concerned illegally seized evidence, and the court undoubtedly
thought it warranted discussion. It is suggested that if either of these
cases had valid grounds for a reversal, the technical ground would
have prevailed and the cases would still be affirmed.
See the discussion of Hobbs v. Stivers,36 6 under "Mandamus," and
Langdon v. Thomas, 367 under "Habeas Corpus."
3. Habeas Corpus
In Langdon v. Thomas0 8 the court again showed itself to be
master of the unorthodox, by declining to dismiss on a technical
ground. However, here there was a perfectly valid reason, and it
was stated in the opinion. This was a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. It should have been brought under RCr 11.42, and the lower
court dismissed it on that ground. This was consistent with the many
cases decided in the prior term of the Court of Appeals, led by Ayers
v. Davis.869 However, the Court of Appeals looked closer and saw
that the grounds alleged would not be sufficient even under RCr
11.42. (The alleged ground was error in the instructions.) Therefore,
in order to avoid the circuity of dismissing the appeal; requiring
petitioner to bring the same action under RCr 11.42; and then holding
on an appeal of that action that the grounds were insufficient, the
court merely said now what they would say later. It was held that
the alleged error in the instructions was not a sufficient ground for
relief either under habeas corpus, or RCr 11.42. It is suggested that
this same reasoning would apply to the situation in Collierv. Common70
wealthY.
There, if the appeal were dismissed because it was not
timely, the petitioner would simply make another motion under RCr
11.42 on the same ground and then make a timely appeal. Thus, the
question of illegally seized evidence would ultimately be before the
Court of Appeals anyway. (On the question whether a second motion
364387 S.W.2d 858 (Ky. 1965).
365 378 U.S. 139 (1964).
366 385 S.W.2d 76 (Ky. 1964).
367 384 S.W.2d 508 (Ky. 1965).
868 Ibid.
369 377 S.W.2d 154 (Ky. 1964).

870 387 S.W.2d 858 (Ky. 1965).
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under RCr 11.42 could be brought in this situation, see Schroader v.
Thoma.

3 1

' )

Another somewhat unique situation was brought about in Schroader
v. Thomas.3 72 It might be said that the petitioner lost the battle but
won the war. He had previously been denied a hearing under RCr
11.42, but didn't perfect his appeal. He then switched to habeas
corpus, and was denied that by the lower court. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the dismissal of the habeas corpus petition but remanded
the record to the circuit court. They directed that it be treated as a
motion to vacate the judgment under RCr 11.42, and that the petitioner
be given a full-dress hearing, complete with counsel. You might say
that the Court of Appeals is trying its best to be fair to the prison
lawyers of Eddyville and ignoring those technicalities with which
regular attorneys are faced.
In Baker v. Davis373 the technicalities were not overlooked, even
though it was a petition for a writ of habeas corpus by a prisoner.
This petition was dismissed because a prior petition by the same party
on the same ground had previously been decided against him on the
merits, and he had the benefit of appellate review of the prior decision
The court could have granted a hearing, since this situation is within
its discretion. However, it decided not to since the "ends of justice
would not be served" by doing so. (Here the ground alleged was that
Kentucky had forfeited its jurisdiction to reconfine him on a parole
violation, since prior to the reconfinement he was released to federal
authorities for trial and sentence on a federal charge. This ground
was treated on the merits in Baker v. Commonwealth.3 74 )
4. Mandamus
In Hobbs v. Stivers3 75 the petitioner asked for a writ of mandamus
directing the circuit court to rule on his motion to vacate judgment.
The Court of Appeals said that ordinarily mandamus would lie, but
here the petition showed on its face that ultimately the "relief sought
would prove fruitless." Therefore, in order to obviate the useless
circuity of forcing the petitioner to appeal again to get the message,
the court merely denied the mandamus.
In Wilson v. Jefferson Circuit Court3 76 a copy of the petitioner's
motion to vacate the judgment under RCr 11.42 was not included in
-71 387 S.W.2d 312 (Ky. 1965).
372

Ibid.

373 383 S.W.2d 125 (Ky. 1964).

S.W.2d 616 (Ky. 1965).
375385 S.W.2d 76 (Ky. 1964).
376 384 S.W.2d 305 (Ky. 1964).
374378
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the mandamus proceeding to compel the circuit court to grant a
hearing. The court decided to overlook that fact, since the petitioner
was without counsel. However, without the motion the court couldn't
say whether he was entitled to a hearing or not. Therefore, the writ
was granted to the extent that the lower court was directed to grant
a hearing if a valid claim was stated, and to deny a hearing if the
motion showed on its face that it was invalid. Since the circuit court
had already denied a hearing, and the law is well settled on when, and
when not, to grant a hearing, it seems peculiar for the Court of Appeals
to direct the circuit court to go through the motions again. It appears
that judicial notice was here taken that the circuit court did not
consider the law when it first denied the hearing.
Of course, where the circuit court has not ruled on a motion,
mandamus will lie to compel a rling.377 Since some circuit courts
have been neglecting to notify the petitioners of their order, the time
for appeal does not begin to run until the petitioner has received a
2 78
copy of the circuit court's order.
Mandamus will also lie to compel the circuit court to furnish the
petitioner with the record of the proceedings in order to perfect his
appeal.37 9 His time for appeal doesn't begin to run until he has
received a copy of the record.
A petitioner is not entitled to a record where he is not appealing
from something at that time. Thus in Bauer v. Pound38 0 the petitioner
was denied a copy of the record of his original trial, where he was
not seeking judicial review. The grounds for asking for the record
were that it was needed "to substantiate" certain claims the petitioner
must make in seeking legal redress. The Court of Appeals called it a
"fishing expedition" in denying it. In Moore v. RopkeA8' the same type
of request was called a "sort of game which is beginning to try the
patience of the court." It was said that the only time an indigent is
entitled to a copy of the record is when he is then taking an appeal.
Thus, he is not entitled to a copy of the record of a former conviction
382
until after he has had a hearing on his collateral attack.
Schumaker v. Wright38 3 was a mandamus proceeding challenging
the trial court's authority to make a sentence run consecutively with a
prior judgment entered by another court within the state. The court
77
378

Helton v. Stivers, 385 S.W.2d 172 (Ky. 1964).
Kraus v. Ropke, 385 S.W.2d 162 (Ky. 1964).
879 Davenport v. Winn, 385 S.W.2d 185 (Ky. 1964).
380 385 S.W.2d 167 (Ky. 1964).
881 385 S.W.2d 161 (Ky. 1964).
82
3 Allen v. Wolfinbarger, 385 S.W.2d 160 (Ky. 1984).
3

883 390

S.W.2d 887 (Ky. 1965).
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861

held that RCr 11.01 doesn't limit itself to judgments rendered by the
same court at the same time. Therefore the relief sought was denied.
Dublin v. Osborne3 8 4 was a mandamus proceeding challenging the
trial court's authority to amend a judgment eight months after it was
entered. The amending order made the judgment run consecutively
with a prior judgment, rather than concurrently as the judgment
originally stated. It was held that the amending order was void since
it was not made with approval of the Court of Appeals. Also, since
it had such a substantial effect on the rights of the defendant, it was
held to be an unreasonable delay. The defendant had already been
released from jail on the first sentence when the amending order on
the second judgment was made. This had the effect, then, of placing
the defendant back in jail. This did not seem quite fair to the court.
384 388 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1965).

VII. DOMESTIC RELATIONS
During the past year the Court of Appeals decided twenty-four
cases in the field of domestic relations, but of these, only fifteen merit
attention. Concerning the question of emancipation of a minor child,
the court in Carricatov. Carricato85 said that the intention of the father actually controls as to an express emancipation. In this case, the
father, mother and minor daughter all testified that the daughter was
in fact emancipated; owned and paid for her car; was independent
and had been working since high school; asked no consent from her
parents for anything she did; had a bank account; took trips without
asking permission and did other acts indicative of complete independence, except that she continued to live at home and took her
meals there. The court, in holding that the daughter, age twenty
years and ten months, was emancipated, said that nowhere does any
opinion require that the minor child leave home and not eat there. In
so holding the court distinguished Thompson v. Thompson38 6 since
there the only witness testifying was the mother who sought the
damages and, because she was an interested witness, her testimony did
not have to be believed. The Carricatocase is important not because
of any major revisions it produces in the law, but in the requirements
it sets forth as to what the Court of Appeals considers necessary to
prove the fact of emancipation.
In the area of child custody, the court decided two cases that
should be discussed. In Schwartz v. Schwartz387 the court held that
if a child is found to be a qualified witness in an action for divorce or
for modification of custody or visitation provisions of a divorce decree,
his testimony should be given in the presence of the parties or their
counsel, and if testimony of the children is to be used as a basis for
the chancellor's decision, it should be reported so that it might be
preserved for appellate review. In so holding the court expanded those
requirements that it had set in York v. York,388 that the testimony of
the children should be in the presence of the parties or their counsel.
It may be assumed that in any case where there is a possibility that
the chancellor might use the testimony of the children in his descision
such testimony must be reported, in order to preserve it for appellate
review.
In Nicol v. Conlan,38 9 another custody battle, the court said that
where the father has custody, and the welfare of children is shown
85
886
887
888

384 S.W.2d 85 (Ky. 1964).

264 S.W.2d 667 (Ky. 1954).
382 S.W.2d 851 (Ky. 1964).

280 S.W.2d 553 (Ky. 1955).
889 385 S.W.2d 779 (Ky. 1964).
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to be well served, the chancellor may allow the father to retain custody
rather than risk that their welfare will be equally well served in the
custody of the mother. In this case the fitness of the parents was not
in issue, and the court said that since children of ten and twelve years
are not of "tender years" within the meaning of that term, that the
fitness or unfitness of the mother was not determinative. The court
based its decision on what would serve the best interests of the children, and said that it would not be in their best interest to chance that
their welfare would be equally well served in a different environment.
In the case of Richey v. Richey390 the court had before it the
question whether the trial court had the power to adjust the amount of
periodic alimony payments agreed upon in a property settlement agreement which was incorporated into the judgment divorcing the parties.
The court found that the agreement was intended by the parties to
be final, and was in fact an adjustment of the parties' property rights
as distinguished from a provision for a mere right of support, and held
that the lower court had no authority to reduce the amount of
periodic alimony being paid by the husband, because to do so
would abrogate a substantial contractual right of the wife. Because
no agreement of the parties can deprive the court of jurisdiction in
regard to the maintenance of a child the court allowed a reduction in
child-support payments to stand.
In Gartin v. Gartin,391 the complaint by the husband alleging cruel
and inhuman treatment, and the counterclaim by the wife on the same
grounds were dismissed; the husband appealed and the court affirmed
the dismissal. In so doing the court said that the chancellor simply
found that the parties were truthful in their denials of each others'
claims, but were not truthful in their own affirmative claims.
392 where the husband sued for divorce and
In Carter v. Carter,
the wife counterclaimed, the Court of Appeals affirmed the chancellor's decision awarding the divorce to the husband only, and held that
since there was substantial evidence to support a finding that the wife
was wholly at fault, and that no estate was accumulated during the
marriage, the wife was not entitled to alimony as a matter of right.
The court distinguished the case of Heustis v. Heustis,393 relied upon
by the wife, by saying that since there was no estate accumulated
here, the Heustis principle did not apply. The court had held in the
Heustis case that regardless of who is at fault in the divorce, if the
wife does not have a sufficient estate in her own right, and has made
390 389 S.W.2d 914
391 384 S.W.2d 298
3029382 S.W.2d 400
393 346 S.W.2d 778
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a substantial though indirect contribution, through performing her
duties as a housewife, to the estate accumulated by the husband
during the marriage, she should be compensated for it in the form
of alimony. The court found the Cartercase easily distinguishable in
light of the husband's testimony that during the marriage it cost more
for them to live than they both earned and that his net worth was
no more then (at the time of the divorce action) than it was at the
time of the marriage.
The question of fraud in procuring the divorce was before the court
at least two times during the last year, but in completely different
factual situations. In McDaniel v. McDaniel,39 4 the divorce decree
was procured by fraud and perjury as to residence on the part of the
mother who was ultimately awarded custody of the child. The father
attempted to set aside that portion of the divorce judgment granting
custody to the mother by collateral attack on the divorce decreee.
The court, in affirming the lower court's refusal to set aside the
judgment, relied on the rule that the welfare of the child should
control, despite the "unusual circumstances" that were presented. The
lower court had in effect treated the matter as a reconsideration of
the custody order and decided to make no change in it in view of the
changed conduct on the part of the mother since the divorce action.
The Court of Appeals thought that the ruling may have been induced
by the rule that courts favor granting the custody of young female
children to the mother.
In the other "fraud" case, Hanshew v. Mullins,3 95 the court refused
to give full faith and credit to a judgment of divorce in Georgia
because the wife had been enticed to return there for service of
process. This refusal to recognize the Georgia judgment, which had
awarded the divorce and custody of five infant children to the
husband, was based on an assumption by the court that a Georgia
court of equity would not allow fraud to be perpetrated on it by the
enticement of the wife into the state to obtain jurisdiction over her.
The divorce and custody of the children was awarded to the mother
in an action in the Laurel Circuit Court, and was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals. The court, in affirming, cited Williams v. North Carolina396 and said that the jurisdiction of sister states to render a divorce
decree is always subject to inquiry by the courts of this state, and
that since there was a denial of jurisdictional due process in the
S.W.2d 344 (Ky. 1964).
385
895S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1964).
396325 U.S. 226 (1945).
394383
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Georgia proceeding, that decree would not be entitled to full faith
and credit in Kentucky.
Lebus v. LebusP97 contains interesting dictum affecting the matter
of procedural divorce law. There the husband attempted to appeal
an order of the chancellor awarding 374 dollars and thirty cents per
month alimony and child maintenance pendente lite to the wife. Since
the order appealed from was an interlocutory one, the court denied
the appeal and refused to decide the case on the other issue raised by
the appellee, namely that there was not a sufficient jurisdictional
amount under KRS 21.060 to entertain the appeal. However the court
noted that (had the order been otherwise appealable) there existed a
dilemma, since one must appeal within thirty days from the entry of
judgment under CR 73.02 and one could not wait to appeal until sufficient additional contested installments had become due under the
judgment. By way of dictum the court solves (or will solve) this
dilemma by finding the jurisdictional amount in the projected ultimate
liability under the judgment. The court said:
In final orders awarding alimony and support payments in installments,
the right to and the obligation to make future payments is fixed. It is
not realistic to say that the amount in controversy is the amount which
has accrued under the judgment at the time of taking an appeal. The
contested amount of future payments is certainly in controversy. If
under ordinary circumstances and in due course the installments in
dispute will reach the sum of $2500.00, a sufficient amount is involved
to give this court jurisdiction under KRS 21.060 . . . [and] to authorize
an appeal as a matter of right.39s

The question whether credit for alimony and/or child-support
payments pendente lite should be allowed as a credit against total
lump-sum awards came before the court three times last year. In
Heustis v. Heusis" 9 the court held that the lump-sum award could
not be reduced by the amount of the pendente lite payments where
the chancellor took such payments into consideration and expressly
disallowed them as a credit.
In Hickey v. Hickey,400 the court expressly overruled Wheeler v.
Wheeler"0 ' and Oldham v. Oldham40 2 where credit for payments pendente lite had been allowed on appeal. In both of these overruled
cases, however, the court found that the amount of the lump-sum
07 382 S.WV.2d
'98 Id. at 874.
Z39981 S.W.2d
400 383 S.W.2d
401 238 S.W.2d
402 259 S.W.2d

873 (Ky. 1964).
533 (Ky. 1964).
114 (Ky. 1964).
1001 (Ky. 1951).
42 (Ky. 1953).
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award was unreasonable and had allowed the credit for pendente lite
while adjusting the total award. The decision in the Hickey case
which was followed in Brodia v. Brodia,403 appears to be the current
law on the matter. It is that where the lump-sum award is reasonable,
it will be presumed that all proper factors, such as payments pendente lite, were considered by the Chancellor and no credit will be
allowed for alimony and/or child-support payments pendente lite.
403 388

S.W.2d 617 (Ky. 1964).

VIII. ETHICS
The major case in the field of ethics during the past year was
probably In re Shumate. 4 4 There it was held that where an attorney
is convicted of embezzling money which came into his charge as trustee in bankruptcy of the United States District Court and knowingly
and fraudulently concealed money from the trustee in bankruptcy
and from the creditors in the bankruptcy proceedings, in violation of
18 U.S.C.A. sections 152-53, he may be disbarred on the ground of
"moral turpitude" without inquiring into the merits of his guilt or
innocence because such an inquiry is foreclosed by the judgment
of conviction. The court said, "It may not be debated that 'moral
turpitude' is inherent in the felony conviction of this respondent."40 5
This case was distinguished from Kentucky State Bar Assn. v. McAfee 4 6 and Kentucky State Bar Assn. v. Brown4r07 on the basis of
the presence of "moral turpitude." There it was held that a conviction for failure to pay income taxes did not involve "moral turpitude." In both of these cases the Kentucky court relied upon the decision of the California case of In re Halliman,40 8 which held that an
intention to defraud the United States government is not an essential
element in the offense for which the respondent there was convicted
and that such offense does not involve moral turpitude.
In re Porter40 9 involved an attorney who induced his youthful
female secretary to make a false affidavit in which she accused a
former client of his of a criminal offense against her in an effort to
obtain a warrant which would be used by way of a threat to deter
the client from pursuing a monetary claim that the client was asserting against the attorney. The attorney was disbarred. The court also
determined that the taking of the secretary's deposition by the trial
committee only two days subsequent to the filing of the charge did not
constitute the premature holding of a trial in violation of RCA 3.340.
In the disciplinary proceeding of In re Ray4 10 the owner of a piece
of mortgaged real estate was seeking legal aid when in fact he needed
financial aid. The owner transferred his interest to the attorney
under a trust arrangement. After the dealings with the attorney had
been completed the client had nothing and the attorney had 1,300
dollars. In ordering that the attorney be suspended from engaging in
404

382 S.W.2d 405 (Ky. 1964).

405 Id. at 406.
406 301 S.W.2d 899 (Ky. 1957).
407302 S.w.2d 834 (Ky. 1957).
40843 Cal. 2d 243, 272 P.2d 768
409 390 S.W.2d 897 (Ky. 1965).

410 390 S.W.2d 899 (Ky. 1965).
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the practice of law in Kentucky, the court pointed out that they were
not convinced that there was any fraudulent conduct but only that
the "offense was attributable mainly to his failure to appreciate fully
the high trust responsibilities that rest upon an attorney in a financial
411
transaction with his client.
411

Id. at 900.

IX. INSURANCE

State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Martin4 involved a suit by the
appellee against her alleged insurance carrier to recover the amount
of judgment plus an attorney fee arising out of an automobile accident case in which she had been the defendant. The insurer asserted
that the policy in question was canceled because of a "material" misrepresentation in her application where she answered that there had
been no cancellation or refusal of any other insurance company to
issue a policy to her or any member of her household. KRS 804.656
provides substantially that misrepresentations in application for insurance policies will not prevent recovery unless they are material
or fraudulent. The trial judge found as a matter of fact that the testimony of an employee of another insurance company that its records
showed appellee's policy with them had been sent by unregistered
mail, but that the file containing the said policy was lost, was rebutted by the testimony of the appellee and her son that they had
received no notice. The Kentucky Court of Appeals then held that
since there had been no cancellation because of the failure to give
notice, there was no misrepresentation in the application for insurance.
The rule that one who is entrusted by an insurance company
with the apparent power to adjust a loss ordinarily has the authority
to waive notice or proofs of loss was reaffirmed in Fidelity & Guar.
Ins. Underwriters,Inc. v. Gregory.413 In this case another factual situation was merely fitted within the general rule.
With respect to the duty of a liability insurer to settle or compromise a claim made against its insured, Kentucky has adopted
the rule followed by the majority of states. That rule is liability will
be imposed in excess of policy limits only when the insurer acts in bad
faith, thus in Harrod v. Meridian Mut. Ins. Co.4 1 4 evidence showing
that the failure of the insurer to settle a claim was the result of error,
inaction, or mistake supported the trial court's finding that no issue
of "bad faith" was raised.
Rudder v. Ohio State Life Ins. Co. 1r- held that it was error to
deny a directed verdict where the insured introduced evidence showing that he was wholly and continuously disabled from following his
regular occupation as well as any occupation for which he was suited
by education, training, and experience when the insurer's only medical
expert was merely speculative and conjectural. This case in no way
412 382
413 387
414 889
416 389

S.W.2d 83 (Ky. 1964).
S.W.2d 287 (Ky. 1965).
S.W.2d 74 (Ky. 1964).
S.V.2d 448 (Ky. 1965).

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

subtracts from Prudentialv. Johnson4 16 which held that permanence
of disability is a jury question. It merely reaffirms the rule that the
submission of an issue to a jury is improper when determination of
an issue would be based upon speculation or conjecture.
In Marsh v. Ashley, 417 the insurance policy on a horse provided
that the policy did not include intentional slaughter of the animal
except in one of the following circumstances: (1) where a veterinary
surgeon appointed by the underwriters shall first give a certificate
that destruction is necessary to terminate incurable suffering; (2)
where the underwriters consent to the destruction of the animal; or
(3) where a certificate is given by a qualified veterinary surgeon appointed by the assured that the suffering is incurable and so excessive that immediate destruction is imperative for humane reasons
without waiting for the appointment of a veterinary surgeon by the
underwriters. The court concluded there was no probative evidence
that the insurer arbitrarily withheld its consent to the destruction of
the animal simply because the animal was not killed until eleven
months after the injury. The third alternative above was not met
despite this eleven month delay, even though two veterinarians
stated within six weeks after the injury that the animal ought to be
killed. The delay merely shows that the owner hoped that the injury
was not of such a serious nature as to warrant the destruction of the
horse.
It was held in Louisville Auto. Club v. Commonwealth, Dept of
Ins. 418 that a public hearing was not necessary in order to provide for
a raise in insurance rates. The statute 419 here did not require a public
hearing, but there was a regulation which purported to so require.
The special deputy commissioner took the view that there was a conflict between the two provisions thereby giving him discretionary
power over a public hearing. The court took the view that such a
conclusion would be contrary to Becker v. Yeary, 420 which had held
that the regulations of the Division of Motor Transportation setting
forth the circumstances under which a hearing would be had, required a hearing under those circumstances even though discretionary under statute.421 But the court was able to resolve the apparent conflict by another part of the insurance regulations which
in fact made the granting of a public hearing discretionary under
the regulations as well as under the statute.
265 Ky. 767, 97 S.W.2d 793 (1936).
417 381 S.W.2d 628 (Ky. 1964).
418 384 S.W.2d 75 (Ky. 1964).
419
416

420

421

KRS 304.627(6).
278 S.W. 2d 632 (Ky. 1955).

KBS 281.210.

X. LABOR LAW
One of the two labor law cases decided by the Court of Appeals
this term was Local 227, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Union
4 22
AFL-CIO v. Fleischaker.
Defendant union had represented plaintiffs employees since 1945. In 1952, a disagreement arose between
the defendant union and plaintiff over plaintiffs refusal to cease supplying a company which the union was attempting to organize. After
plaintiff's refusal, the union told plaintiff, in substance, that he would
regret his decision. Therefore, relations between plaintiff and defendant union became progressively worse. The union refused to discuss
the terms of renewal contracts with plaintiff, but it did negotiate contracts with competitors of plaintiff, which gave these companies a substantial competitive advantage in lower resultant labor costs. On at
least one occasion, defendant union disrupted plaintiff's work schedule by calling a union meeting during working hours. In 1959, during
a strike and picketing of plaintiffs plant, non-union workers were
intimidated with threats and acts of personal violence, and acts of
violence were committed against plaintiffs business property. Although plaintiff's profits had steadily risen prior to his disagreement
with the union, after the disagreement profits and sales declined
sharply, and plaintiff ceased business operations in September 1960.
Plaintiff instituted this action under KRS 437.110-.120 to recover
damages. KRS 437.110(2) provides that, "no two or more persons
shall confederate or band themselves together and go forth for the
purpose of molesting, damaging or destroying any property of another person, whether the property is molested, damaged or destroyed or not." KRS 437.120 provides for actual and punitive damages for violation of K.RS 437.110(2). In the circuit court, judgment
was entered on a verdict awarding plaintiff 30,000 dollars compensatory damages and 20,000 dollars punitive damages.
The Court of Appeals held that, from the evidence, the jury could
reasonably conclude that the union and its officials unlawfully conspired among themselves to force plaintiff out of business, and, in
pursuance of that objective, caused damage to the plaintiff's business.
In answer to the union's contention that the National Labor
Relations Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board) had exclusive
jurisdiction over the controversy since it involved unfair labor prac3
tices, the court pointed out that the National Labor Relations Act,4
as amended in 1959, provides that the Board may, in its discretion,
decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute where, in the
884 S.W.2d 68 (Ky. 1964).
42329 U.S.C. §§ 164(c)(1)-(2) (1935).
422
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opinion of the Board, the effect of the labor dispute on commerce
is not sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction,
and that where the Board so declines to assert its jurisdiction, nothing
in the National Labor Relations Act shall be deemed to bar state
courts from assuming jurisdiction over the dispute. Therefore, since
the Board has established a 50,000 dollar annual inflow or outflow
4
standard for asserting its jurisdiction over non-retail enterprises,
and a 500,000 dollar annual gross sales standard for asserting its
jurisdiction over retail enterprises, 425 and since plaintiff's business
fell below either of these standards, the Court of Appeals held that
the Board had declined jurisdiction, and that the trial court could
properly assume jurisdiction over the controversy.
The court further held that, since the acts in question were found
by the jury to be in furtherance of a conspiracy to damage plaintiffs business, the union's contention that the acts were committed to
achieve a legitimate purpose of the union was without merit.
In Cabe v. City of Campbellsvile,426 the Court of Appeals held
that, where a finding of the Prevailing Wage Review Board was supported only by hearsay evidence, although better evidence was readily
available, and the finding was in conflict with the testimony of several
local contractors, the finding was not supported by substantial evidence, and, therefore, could be modified by the circuit court. This
case is merely a restatement of the "residuum rule,"427 which is, in
essence, that the admission of hearsay evidence before an administrative board is not prejudicial, but that the hearsay evidence alone
will not support a finding-that is, there must be some reliable and
substantial evidence, according to the common law rules of evidence,
upon which a finding may rest.
424
425
426

427

Siemons Mailing Serv., 122 N.L.R.B. 13 (1958).
Carolina Supplies & Cement Co., 122 N.L.R.B. 17 (1958).
385 S.W.2d 51 (Ky. 1964).

Valentine v. Weaver, 191 Ky. 37, 228 S.W. 1036 (1921).

XI. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

The Kentucky Court of Appeals decided seventeen cases concerniag municipal corporations during the last term. Most of these decisions involved specific municipal ordinances or state statutes governing the various classes of cities and were therefore limited to statutory
construction and interpretation.
A. GmrvRALLY
e5
One of the most important decisions, Commonwealth v. Beasy
raised the question of the validity of an ordinance of the city of Louisville prohibiting discrimination in service, in places of public accommodation, on account of race, color, religious beliefs, ancestry or
national origin. The owners of two local restaurants were brought
before the police court on warrants charging them with violating the
ordinance in refusing to serve food to Negroes. The police court
dismissed the charges and the Commonwealth appealed both cases.
The Jefferson Circuit Court held the ordinance unconstitutional and
the Commonwealth again appealed. In reversing Court of Appeals
held that the antidiscrimination ordinance did not violate constitutional rights of property or contract.
In answer to the contention that a Kentucky municipality does
not have the power to enact penal legislation prohibiting discrimination in places of public accommodation, the court said that Louisville had adequate police power under the general charter for cities
of the first class, particularly KRS 83.010, to enact a penal discrimination ordinance. The court pointed out that in Fowler v. Obier,4s9
it had been held that the police power granted by charter to cities of
the first class is as broad as the police power of the state.
The contention was also made that the ordinance was invalid because it provided that the city director of law shall prosecute violators
of the ordinance; whereas KRS 69.430, which creates the elective
office of prosecuting attorney of the police court, states that in all
cases coming before the police court the prosecuting attorney shall
represent the Commonwealth or the city. The court held that under
the statute the prosecution must be conducted principally by the
prosecuting attorney or his assistant, and that to the extent that the
ordinance purported to exclude the prosecuting attorney from his
prosecuting authority, it was invalid. However, the court said the
invalidity of that portion of the ordinance did not require that the
entire ordinance be held void. Applying the test of severability set
428

386 S.W.2d 444 (Ky. 1965).

429 224 Ky. 742, 7 S.W.2d 219 (1928).
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forth in KRS 446.090, the court found that the remaining portions
of the ordinance were not so essentially and inseparably connected
with and dependent upon the invalid part, or so incomplete and incapable of standing alone, as to make it apparent that the board of
aldermen would not have enacted the remainder without the invalid
section.
In another major case, Ridings v. City of Owensboro,430 Owensboro annexed three tracts of land located on two public highways and
ranging from one-half to two miles from the city boundary. The
ordinances also annexed the highways themselves from the city limits
to the tracts. The action was brought by two citizens to enjoin the
enforcement of the ordinance. The circuit court dismissed the action
and the plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed holding
that the annexation of two highways for the sole purpose of providing contiguity for the three annexed tracts of land was a mere
subterfuge which could not supply the necessary contiguity for the
three tracts to which they led. The court made clear that although
the Kentucky annexation statutes (except for KRS 81.280 relating
to annexation of industrial plants) do not in terms limit annexation to
contiguous territory, such a limitation is inherent in the statutes.
The court carefully considered whether territory may properly be
considered to be contiguous if its contiguity exists only through a
corridor or finger. It held that the proper contiguity should not be
found to exist unless the corridor or finger itself has a municipal value,
unless it alone serves some municipal purpose. Otherwise, the use
of the corridor must be considered a mere subterfuge. The court
stated that the impropriety of a corridor annexation would not render
the annexation void, but only make it subject to being set aside as an
abuse of discretion. Thus the court concluded that the annexations
should have been set aside as abuses of discretion since the three
annexed tracts had no contiguity to the city other than through the
highways, and the highways themselves had not been shown to be
of any municipal value or to serve any municipal purpose.
A second Owensboro case, City of Owensboro v. Smith,431 is an
action wherein the Daviess Circuit Court rendered a judgment holding a city ordinance prohibiting licensing of pinball machines for
which federal gaming stamps had been secured ultra vires. On appeal,
the court held that the city, both under its inherent police power and
under statute applicable to second class cities, was fully empowered
to enact the ordinance, notwithstanding KRS 137.84 through 137.410
430 883 S.W.2d 510 (Ky. 1964).
43' 883 S.W.2d 902 (Ky. 1964).
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which provides a state license for such machines upon payment of a
ten dollar annual fee. The court held that the Commonwealth had
not preempted the field of licensing of coin operated amusement machines. The court said that statute which set up the excise tax on the
operation of amusements goes no farther than stating the Commonwealth's interest in receiving ten dollars per machine from the
owner and does not purport to remove coin operated devices from
regulation by cities.
The court also emphasized that KRS 84.190(2) expressly gives
second class cities authority to license, tax, regulate or suppress instruments used for public amusement. The court noted that pinball
machines can be easily converted to gambling purposes, and that it
is an established principle of law that articles which lend themselves
to illegal uses are subject to police powers of the state and municipalities.
Norrell v. Judd43 2 is an action by a taxpayer and by a private
corporation for furnishing television cable service, of which the taxpayer was president and chief stockholder, against the Municipal
Housing Commission of Frankfort and another corporation furnishing television cable service to have the companies put in an equal
competitive position. The court, in a previous ruling,43 3 had held that
the contract between the municipal housing commission and the company furnishing television cable service, which contract allowed the
company to use electric poles, was void and enjoined the company
from furnishing any service due to a conflict of interest created by
an officer of the commission being on the company's board of directors.
In the instant case the court ruled that it was not necessary for
the company to remove its facilities in order to put all television
companies in an equal competitive position because taxpayers could
have no interest in or benefit from requiring the company to remove
facilities which it would have an immediate right to replace. The
commission had adopted uniform regulations which had placed all
television cable companies on an equal footing, except that one
corporation's equipment was already in place and its customer relationship established.
The court reiterated that a taxpayer need not show that the public
will be damaged if the relief is denied, 434 but there must be some
reasonable relationship between the particular relief sought and the
public interest. Here the public purpose was achieved when the con432
387 S.W.2d 7 (Ky. 1965).
433
Norrell v. Judd, 374 S.W.2d 192 (Ky. 1964).
434 Kentucky Util. Co. v. Ginsberg, 255 Ky. 148, 72 S.W.2d 738, 741 (1938).
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tracts were stricken down. The court stated that only the personal
interests of the individual plaintiffs had come up short of full requital.
In O'Bryanv. City of Louisville,435 taxpayers instituted proceedings
challenging the validity of the city's proposed zoo operation. The
Court of Appeals held that the city and the James Graham Brown
Foundation could form a non-profit corporation for the purpose of
establishing and managing a zoo. On the question of whether Louisville was authorized to operate a zoo the court found that KRS
97.010(1) afforded ample statutory basis for the activity although
not specifically authorizing a zoo. The court said a zoo qualified for
inclusion in the statute's authorization of "parks, playgrounds and
recreation centers."
On the question of the legality of the method of operation the
court also found for the city. The zoo was to be operated by a commission subject to the advice and direction of the city. The court
followed several Kentucky cases 43 6 in holding that it is appropriate for
a municipal corporation to use others in the performance of certain
administrative or ministerial functions.
In Griffin v. City of Paducah,437 taxpayers of a second class city
challenged the validity of an ordinance creating the position of director of public safety and prescribing duties of the office. The Court of
Appeals held that the ordinance did not violate KRS 89.580(1) enabling the board of commissioners to create by ordinance administrative boards reasonably necessary, or KRS 89.580(2) providing that
enablements of KRS 89.580(1) do not apply to police and fire departments in second class cities, or KRS 95.430 vesting in the city
legislative body the control of police and fire departments. The court
pointed out that the board did not abrogate its own duties, but
retained full authority. The court emphasized its recognition and approval of the delegation of ministerial or administrative functions to
subordinate officials, even, though nominally, all administrative pow438
ers are vested in the municipal legislative body.
Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist. v. Kirk4 3 9
is an action by a property owner against the county metropolitan
sewer district for damage to plaintiffs residence resulting from breach
of an easement contract by failing to properly maintain a sewer
beneath the residence. The court held that confining the jury's in882 S.W.2d 386 (Ky. 1964).
Jefferson County v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 220 Ky. 678, 299 S.V.
209 (1927); Board of Trustees of House of Reform v. City of Lexington, 112
Ky. 171, 65 S.W. 350 (1901).
437
382 S.W.2d 402 (Ky. 1964).
438
Kohler v. Benekart, 252 S.W.2d 854 (Ky. 1952).
439 390 S.W.2d 182 (Ky. 1965).
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spection to the residence damaged as the alleged result of the breach
was not reversible error on the ground that it forced the jury to disregard the sewer district's evidence relating to alleged subsidence in
other areas away from the sewer.440 The trial judge had determined
that it would be impractical to permit the jury to view other property merely because it was mentioned in the testimony of witnesses.
The court held that this was a reasonable exercise of the discretion
given the trial judge.
City of Nicholasville v. Scott441 adjudicated an action for damages
for personal injuries suffered in a fall on a city sidewalk. The court
held that where a portion of a sidewalk was raised about one inch
and the plaintiff had no knowledge at any time of such defect, was
unfamiliar with the street and her ability to see was impaired by mist
and fog, the evidence was sufficient to establish the city's negligent
maintenance of the particular sidewalk. The city's contention that
the defect in the sidewalk amounted to nothing more than a condition of unevenness in its surface and therefore was not such a hazard
as to impress the mind of a reasonably prudent person that the sidewalk was dangerous was rejected on the basis of several Kentucky
cases4- 2 in which the court had refused to instruct that such defects
were too trivial to render a sidewalk unsafe for pedestrians who exercised ordinary care.
In another personal injury action, Burton v. Somerset City Hosp.443
a patient sued to recover for injuries sustained in the city hospital
when he fell from his hospital bed. The Court of Appeals, following
Haney v. City of Lexington,444 held that the city was not immune
from liability for any injuries sustained by a patient in a city hospital
caused by the negligence of the hospital.
B. EiEcnoNs
The Court of Appeals handed down six decisions in the field of
elections last term, two of which were departures from previous
case law and four of which were only supplements.
Both changes were the result of new legislation. In Stewart v.
Burks,4"4 the court held that the amendment of KRS 118.080, making it
read: "the signer of more than one petition shall not be counted on
410 KRS
441
442

29.301.
388 S.W.2d 612 (Ky. 1965).

Louisville v. Verst, 308 Ky. 46, 213 S.W.2d 517 (1948); Louisville v.
Wheeler, 301 Ky. 222, 191 S.W.2d 386 (1945); Cynthiana v. Sersion, 261 Ky. 667,
88 S.W.2d 672 (1935).
443 388 S.W.2d 134 (Ky. 1965).
444 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1964).
445 384 S.W.2d 316 (Ky. 1964).
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either," applies to a school board election and prevents a candidate
from being entered on the ballot whose petition had been signed by
people who also signed his opponent's. Striking the names of duplicate signers had left the petition in question with less than the minimum number of signatures. The court also ruled that the action
to enjoin the county clerk from entering the name on the ballot
could be brought by three electors: "the public interest in the subject
matter is such that any voter or citizen who would be affected, though
not specifically, has standing in court to question the sufficiency of the
nominating petition involved in this area." 44 The procedural question raised in the case was before the court for the first time. The
447
amendment of the statute superseded the doctrine of Huie v. Jones
that a person signing more than one petition would be counted only
on the first filed.
Amendments to KRS chapter 126, absentee voting law, also came
into consideration by the court. The title of KRS 126.145, "An Act
Relating to Absentee Voting," was held, in Hallahan v. Cranfill,448
to sufficiently express the subject of the act to comply with the requirement to that effect in Kentucky Constitution section 51. Also, to
prevent nullifying ambiguities, the same KRS section was construed
to be limited on its terms to members of United States services. The
court held further that KRS 126.225(1), requiring public examination
of applications for absentee ballots to be conducted by the County
Board of Election Commissioners and county clerk beginning on the
nineteenth day before the election, was not void merely because the
Board of Commissioners working alone could not complete the job
in the allotted time. The court noted the job could be completed if
the officers would employ deputies for assistance, as provided by KRS
61.035. The fourth point ruled on by the court was that KRS
126.225(1) impliedly amended KRS 117.725 in that the new statute
clearly intended that City of Louisville registration records be made
available to county election officials. Finally, the court decided the
statutes were valid despite the absence of provision for protest or
review, because absentee voting is a privilege granted by the legislature and not a constitutional right. In 1960 another similar set of
absentee voting statutes had been declared void by the court in
Queenan v. Russell. 44 9 That case was distinguished in the Cranfill
opinion on the ground it had designated an examination date five days
closer to the election.
446 Id. at

318.

447 362 S.W.2d 287 (Ky. 1962).
448 383 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1964).
449 339 S.W.2d 475 (Ky. 1960).
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Until this year there had been no cases in Kentucky dealing with
the issue of the validity of combining two different propositions within the same question on a ballot. In Hulbert v. Board of Educ. of
Louisville'4 50 the court, in a declaratory judgment action, held valid
the presentation to the voters, by the Board of Education of Louisville and Jefferson County, of the combined propositions of an additional ad valorem property tax and the imposition of business, trade,
occupational, etc. license fees on the same ballot. The court reasoned
that the combination presented an essentially unified scheme, all parts
of which were reasonably related. Furthermore, no volid reason appears why the voter should have a right to reject part of a program
which the proposing authorities deemed essential to the whole.
Another piece of recent legislation, KRS 118.040, extended general
election voting hours to 6:00 p.m. and fixed voting on Standard Time.
The court, in Hallahan v. Sawyer,4 51 handed down a ruling that the
time requirements set up in chapter 118 would not amend by implication chapter 119, which designates the closing time for primary elections as 5:00 p.m. The court noted there is a long standing rule that
"before a statute shall be considered amended by implication by a
later statute, the two statutes must be repugnant to each other and
be irreconcilable,
or the later act must cover the whole subject of the
42
earlier act." G
In Ausmus v. Slusher,453 the court ruled that a petition for a local
liquor option election which contained 1,125 names in addition to
the required 875 and which showed a "good faith attempt" by the
signers to comply with KRS 242.020(2)'s specification of date and
post office address after each signature would not be dismissed because some slight discrepancies appeared, such as ditto marks indicating identical information. The case followed an earlier decision
by the court that the statute requiring the information after the
signature is merely directory and the omission of a few dates and
454
addresses would not invalidate the petition.
The final case in this area, Secrest v. Wellman,45 5 concerned an
action for an election recount in a county school board race. The
court held that eye-witnesses' evidence produced by the contestant in
the action which showed that ballot boxes were not tampered with
during a five-minute period when the commissioners were absent
82 S.W.2d 389 (Ky. 1964).
S.W.2d 664 (Ky. 1965).
452 Id. at 665.
43 382 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1964).
454 Cassidy v. jewell, 105 Ky. 810, 268 S.W. 643 (1937).
43587 S.W.2d 290 (Ky. 1964).
451390
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from the counting room satisfied the contestant's burden of establishing the integrity of the ballots, and therefore the recount must proceed.
C. Punuc UTI

=s

There were two public utilities cases decided last term by the
Court of Appeals. The first, Weller v. McCauley,456 was a taxpayers'
action against the governing body of Middlesboro and the electric
plant board of the city to prevent further proceedings for purchase
or condemnation of the electrical facilities of Kentucky Utilities
pursuant to KRS 96.550. The circuit judge dismissed the complaint
on the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted. It was alleged that the board had not negotiated in good
faith for the purchase of the property as required under KRS 96.580
and 96.590.
The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court in holding that
the question of good faith negotiations was put in issue by a complaint which alleged that the board was content to send only a notice
of intent to purchase, did nothing during the sixty-day negotiation
period, and then sent a letter appointing an appraiser. The court also
held that while payment from an existing fund would be proper in
connection with acquisition of an electric plant by the electric plant
board of the city, use of the city's credit as a method of lending money
to the electric board was improper under KRS 96.730.
In the second case, City of Bardstown v. Louisville Gas & Elec.
Co.,4 57 Bardstown brought an action to set aside the public service
commission's order denying its application for an order compelling
the Louisville Gas and Electric Co. to furnish natural gas to the city
from its nearby transmission line. The court held that the application
was properly denied because the duty of a public utility is to render
efficient service within the scope of that service as provided in its
certificate of convenience and necessity, and here the gas company's
certificate provided only for transmission of gas, not wholesaling.
The court also ruled that the certificate issued to Bardstown for operation of a municipal gas system was conditioned upon obtaining
an allotment of gas, and failing this, expired on its terms. A previous
case had held that an electric company must render service to a
community from a distribution line, 458 but other Kentucky and
Supreme Court cases dealing with transmission lines speak only of the
duty of the public carrier to accept transports from producers seeking its service.
456 383 S.W.2d 856 (Ky. 1964).
457

458

383 S.W.2d 918 (Ky. 1964).
Smith v. Kentucky Util. Co., 233 Ky. 68, 24 S.W.2d 928 (1930).

XII. PROCEDURE

The procedure cases decided during the last term of the Court
of Appeals may be classified into four general categories: (1) PreTrial Procedure, (2) Trial Procedure, (3) Post-Trial Procedure, and
(4) Appellate Procedure.
A. PBE-TnrwA
The cases decided in the last term dealing with pre-trial procedure
involved discovery requests, statutes of limitation, and service of
process.
1. Discovery
In the case of Gregorich v. Jones,459 an action for personal injuries arising out of an automobile accident, plaintiff agreed during
the course of taking discovery depositions to furnish information concerning insurance, medical expenses, and days lost from work. Everything requested was furnished by plaintiff prior to the trial except
information concerning insurance. Since plaintiff's deposition revealed
that she had little knowledge concerning the insurance, the Court of
Appeals held that refusal of a continuance was not clearly erroneous.
In view of the information revealed by depositions, there was no
showing of prejudice to any substantial rights of defendant.
2. Statute of Limitations
In Turner v. Rust,460 the appellant sued the appellee, a physician,
for alleged malpractice in failing to properly place appellants hip in
socket. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the
action was barred by the Statute of Limitations since the complaint was
filed two years after the doctor had last examined appellant. In upholding the dismissal, the court reaffirmed the existing rule in Kentucky that the Statute of Limitations in a malpractice suit begins
to run at the time the cause of acion accrues, i.e., at the time of the
alleged negligent act or injury, and not when the plaintiff discovered
the result of the alleged negligence. 46 ' Since the appellant here failed
to disclose an affirmative act or a fraudulent misrepresentation by the
doctor, which prevented him from filing the action within the required time, there was no basis for appeal.
459 386 S.W.2d 955 (Ky. 1965).
4G 385 S.W.2d 175 (Ky. 1964).
461 Philpot v. Stacy, 371 S.W.2d 11 (Ky. 1963).
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8.

Service of Process
In Williams v. Carters"Bros. Co.,46 2 the court was called upon for
the first time to decide the validity of Kentucky's "non-resident
motorists" statute as amended by the 1954 legislature.463 This enlargement provided that service on the Secretary of State as agent of a
non-resident motorist's personal representative conferred jurisdiction
over the non-resident's personal representative. The court upheld
this statute, KRS 188.020, as a valid exercise of police power by the
state. Relying on the "implied consent" doctrine of Hess v. Pawloski,46
the court reasoned that the personal representative should also be
bound by the non-resident motorist's consent, and that a non-resident
motorist's death should not terminate the rights of third parties and the
Commonwealth of Kentucky which is attempting to safeguard its citizens from the negligent driving of non-residents. This decision reflects the overwhelming weight of authority. A similar statute was
previously upheld in the United States' Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.4 5 Prior to the enactment of KRS 188.020, a personal representative was limited to his own state either to sue or to be sued.
Another procedural point in this case involved CR 13.01 which
allows joinder of actions. The court held that the trial judge properly overruled defendant's motion to dismiss an independent action
brought by plaintiffs "when there was already pending in the same
court an action between the same parties arising out of the same
occurrence." The court reaffirmed that the purpose of CR 13.01 is to
avoid multiplicity of trials.
B. Tnw. PocxomE
The cases decided during the last term concerning trial procedure included: (1) timely objective; (2) admissions; (3) voir dire
examination of juries; (4) expert opinion; (5) jury's request for deposition; (6) a lunacy inquest; and (7) a directed verdict.
1. Timely Objection-Inconsistent Verdict
In Phipps v. Bisceglia,466 appellant brought an action for injuries
sustained in an automobile accident. At trial appellant introduced
evidence that he had suffered permanent injury from a broken neck.
The jury awarded him 1,000 dollars. Two grounds on which ap462 390 S.W.2d 87 (Ky. 1965).
463 KRS 188.020.
464274 U.S. 852 (1927).
465

Parrot v. Whistler, 313 F.2d 245 (6th. Cir. 1958).
466 383 S.W.2d 367 (Ky. 1964).
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pellant urged reversal and a new trial were: (1) that the jury was
improperly selected; and (2) that the verdict was erroneous. With
respect to the first contention appellant claimed that after his counsel
had struck three names from the jury list, the clerk changed the list
by substituting an unacceptable juror for an acceptable one. The
court held that the selection cannot be challenged where the objection is not timely. A motion made for the first time in the motion
and grounds for a new trial is too late. 467 With respect to the second
contention, appellant insisted that the jury's 1,000 dollar award was
not sufficient to cover damages for pain and suffering and permanent
injuries. In reversing, the court reaffirmed the rule in Kentucky that
where uncontroverted evidence as to elements of damages and the
court's instructions in regard thereto are disregarded by the jury, a new
trial will be awarded because of the inconsistency of the verdict.4 8
2. Admissions
In Fletcher v. Indianapolis & Southeastern Trailway, 46 9 plaintiff
brought an action for injuries sustained in an accident allegedly
caused by the negligence of defendant's driver. Plaintiff, a passenger
on defendant's bus, stated at the scene of the accident that defendant's
driver was not at fault; he later reaffirmed that statement in a pretrial deposition. The lower court treated plaintiff's statement as a
judicial admission absolving defendant of any negligence and granted
summary judgment for defendant. In reversing, the Court of Appeals
held that in this type of case a determination of negligence must be
based upon all the facts given by a party and not his judgment as to
whom he thinks may or may not have been at fault. All the statements in the pre-trial deposition must be read together. Plaintiff's pre-trial statement created a sufficient doubt as to whether a
genuine factual issue was present in the case. The court pointed out
that this decision does not affect Bell P. Harmon which held that
"statements under oath in a pre-trial deposition constitute a judicial
47 0
admission.... "
3. Examination of Jury-Voir Dire
In Farrow v. Cundiff,471 an action for personal injuries arising out
of an automobile accident, plaintiff was prohibited from asking the
jury on voir dire if any of them had any scruples or objections against
467
40 8 Crosthwaite v. Crosthwaite, 151 Ky. 364, 151 S.W. 945 (1912).

Smith v. Webber, 282
264 (Ky.
812 (Ky.
119 (Ky.

469 386 S.W.2d
470 284 S.W.2d
471383 S.W.2d

S.W.2d 346 (Ky. 1955).
1965).
1955).
1964).

KENTUcKY LAW JOuRNAL

[Vol. 54,

returning a verdit for the full amount asked for if justified by the law
and evidence. The Court of Appeals held that the lower court did not
err in refusing counsel permission to ask this question. In an earlier
case, however, the court upheld the lower court's discretion in permitting counsel to ask essentially the same question. 472 Yet, the two
cases can be reconciled on the ground that the court is given wide
discretion in permitting a voir dire examination in civil cases. It appears that the nature of this particular question here is immaterial
since the whole record revealed the court's efforts to obtain a fair
trial before an impartial panel of jurors.
In the case of Clemons v. Harvey,473 defendant appealed from an
adverse judgment awarding damages to plaintiff for injuries received
when he was hit by an automobile driven by defendant. On voir dire
examination all the jurors had replied that they did not know the
plaintiff. During a recess, however, one of the jurors was seen patting
plaintiff on the head and talking with him. The juror had recognized
the plaintiff as a relative of her son-in-law. Defendant's motion to set
aside the swearing of the jury was overruled. In reversing, the Court
of Appeals held that the relationship wasn't close enough to be inherently prejudicial, but when coupled with the show of affection, the
trial judge should have concluded that there could not have been a
fair trial. This decision reflects an application of existing law.4 74
4. Expert Opinion
In Wells v. Gonleyy,47 5 an action arising out of an automobile collision, the lower court permitted a state trooper to offer expert opinion
as to the paths of two vehicles leading up to the collision and their
point of impact. This opinion was based in part upon: (1) gouge
marks in the highway; (2) the position of the vehicles after the accident; and (3) the nature of the damages to the vehicles. Yet from
the trooper's testimony it was apparent that his opinion was based
primarily on the assumption that the vehicles moved only a few feet
after the collision. The trooper presented a diagram showing that
the vehicles must have collided a few feet from the point where the
gouge marks were located. Plaintiff and defendant, the only surviving
eyewitnesses, each testified that the other was in the wrong lane.
The trooper's opinion placed the defendant's car in the wrong lane.
Judgments on the jury's verdict were for plaintiffs. In reversing, the
Court of Appeals held that the trooper's opinion was based on an
47 2

Temperly v. Sarrington's Adcm'r, 293 S.W.2d 863 (Ky. 1956).
473885 S.W.2d 496 (Ky. 1964).
474 Stanley v. Brown, 303 Ky. 481, 198 S.W.2d 35 (1946).
475 384 S.W.2d 496 (Ky. 1964).
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assumption that the vehicles moved only a few feet after colliding
and was purely conjectural. This case is to be distinguished from
existing law which permits an expert to testify as to the point of impact based on skid marks 476 There the expert's assumption is based on
observed fact, while in the present case the assumption is based on
conjecture. It appears that the real distinction should not be between
fact and conjecture, but at what point do assumptions based on fact
become conjectural?
In Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Mayes,477 a professional
realtor, testifying for property owner, erred in basing his determination of the property value on a non-compensable factor. The Court
of Appeals held that the witness should not be dismissed if he is able
to revise his figures by eliminating the improper factor, even though
the determination remains the same.
5. Request for Depositions
In Little v. Whitehouse,479 a medical malpractice suit, the lower
court refused to comply with the jury's request to take a deposition
into the jury room. Appellant maintained on appeal that the judge
erred in failing to tell the jury that portions of the deposition could
be reread to them in the courtroom. Appellant's contention was based
upon KRS 29.804, which permits a jury which disagrees as to testimony to be brought back into court "where the information required
shall be given." The Court of Appeals held that rereading of the
deposition was "information required" within the meaning of KRS
29.804 even though the jury had asked only to take the depositions
into the jury room. Yet the trial judge's failure to advise the jury of
this was not reversible error, since appellant's counsel made no objection or attempt to present the error. The decision reflects a rather
liberal interpretation of KRS 29.304. It also reemphasizes application
of a basic rule of civil procedure that a party may not raise an error on
appeal if he does not call the error to the attention of the trial court.479
6. Lunacy Inquest
Denton v. Commonwealth4s° involved a lunacy inquest at which
defendant was adjudged to be mentally ill and incompetent to manage her own affairs. The only evidence introduced concerning defendant's mental condition were the affidavits of two examining physi476

Sellers v. Cayce Mill Supply Co., 349 S.W.2d 677 (Ky. 1961).

477388 S.W.2d 125 (Ky.

1965).

384 S.W.2d 503 (Ky. 1964).
479CR 46; CR 51.
460 383 S.W.2d 681 (Ky. 1964).
478
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cians who were not present. That evidence was admitted over the
objections of defendant's counsel. In reversing, the Court of Appeals
held that the lower court erred in admitting that evidence. It held
that a lunacy hearing is a quasi-criminal proceeding, 48' and as such,
the rules of evidence should be the same as those in any criminal proceeding. The court noted that KRS 202.140 has attempted to shift
the burden of proof from the Commonwealth to the defendant in a
lunacy inquest. Since a lunacy inquest may result in depriving the
defendant of his personal freedom and his property, the court reasoned
that the defendant should be given the same constitutional protection
afforded the accused in a criminal proceeding. 482 More specifically,
it held that the defendant in a lunacy inquest is guaranteed the right
of confrontation. This decision clearly rejects the assumption that
48 3
the examining doctors need not appear at a lunacy inquest to testify.
7. Directed Verdict
Gullion v. Ewry48 involved an action for damages sustained in an
automobile collision. The case was submitted to the jury and judgment was for the plaintiff. On appeal defendant maintained he should
have been granted a directed verdict. In affirming the lower court's
decision, the court held that where testimony was in conflict as to
how the collision occurred, there was no basis for a directed verdict
and the facts were properly submitted to the jury for their determination. This restates existing law.
C. PosT-Tm.

PlocEDuR

Several cases were decided during this term of court dealing with
appellee's failure to file a brief, allowance of interest from date of
original judgment, and an appeal from a redocketing order.
1. Failure to File Brief
In Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Bennett, 48 5 a right-ofway condemnation case, appellee received an award for the land and
improvements condemned. The Commonwealth appealed, but appellee failed to file a brief. The court held that upon failure of appellee to fie a brief pursuant to RCA 1.260 (c) (3), the judgment
481

Cadden v. Commonwealth, 242 S.W.2d 409 (Ky. 1951).
Const. § 11.
Att'y Gen. Rep. 37.777.
S.W.2d 315 (Ky. 1964).
S.W.2d 783 (Ky. 1965).

482 Ky.
483 Ky.
484 384
485 880

1966]

CouRT oF APPEAxs Rvmw

would be reversed without considering the merits and a new trial
would be granted. This decision restates existing law.
2. Judgments
In the case of Elpers v. Johnson,486 a multiple action arising out
of an automobile collision, judgment was entered in plaintiff's favor on
March 22, 1960. On that same day the trial court entered judgment
n.o.v. for defendants. Plaintiffs appealed and the judgment n.o.v. was
reversed with directions to enter judgment in accordance with the
original verdict. Pursuant to that opinion the trial court entered judgment for plaintiffs on May 22, 1963, and allowed plaintiffs to recover
the judgment with interest at 6 per cent per annum from March
22, 1960. Defendant appealed urging reversal of the allowance for
interest from the date the judgment was originally entered. Defendant
relied on KRS 860.040, which provides that "a judgment shall bear
interest from its date." In affirming, the Court of Appeals adopted
plaintiff's contention that the effect of the court's holding that the
trial court erred in granting judgment n.o.v. was to hold that the
original judgment "was never effectively lost but always in fact existed." This decision establishes a precedent in Kentucky case law;
the question had never before been raised in our courts. The court
relied in part on a Missouri case cited by plaintiff.48 7
3.

Redocketing Order
In Evans Elkhorn Coal Co. v. Owsley,488 the circuit court entered
an order allowing redocketing of the case for further proceedings.
From this order an appeal was taken. The court refused to allow an
appeal since the order to redocket was in no way final and was not
a final adjudication of all the rights of the parties to the action. The
court applied the existing rule in Kentucky that tests the appealable
character of an order on whether it grants or denies the ultimate
relief sought. 489 An order redocketing a case clearly requires that
further steps be taken before the parties rights can be determined.
D. APP=rTE PNocaumx
The cases decided by the Court of Appeals during the last term
involving appellate procedure are best separated into two categories:
486.386
S.W.2d 267 (Ky. 1965).
487

Reihners v. Frank B. Comett Lumber Co., 273 S.W.2d 348 (Mo. 1954).
488.388 S.W.2d 130 (Ky. 1965).
489 See, IKS 21.060 (1); CR 54.01.
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(1) those involving original proceedings in the Court of Appeals; and
(2) those involving appeals from lower court decisions.
1.

Original Proceedings
Moore v. Pound90 was an original petition for a mandamus to
compel the circuit judge to grant a hearing on petitioner's motion to
vacate a judgment sentencing him to prison. Petitioner asserted that he
had filed his motion pursuant to RCr 11.42, "nearly five weeks ago"
and that no action had been taken. The respondent judge was notified
to make a response within ten days after this petition, but he failed
to do so. The Court of Appeals granted the petition and directed
the respondent to consider petitioner's motion. This restates existing
491

law.

Carrier v. Gardner492 was an original petition for writ of mandamus to require respondent judge to assign a date for hearing the
motion ified in his court to vacate the judgment under which petitioner had been convicted. The respondent stated that the motion
had been sustained and that a date for a hearing on the motion had
been set. The Court of Appeals held that as a result of the fact set out
in the response the petition became moot; the petition was dismissed.
In Christoff v. Downing,493 a petition was filed in the Court of
Appeals seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent, judge
of the Jefferson Circuit Court, to set aside his order which stayed further proceedings on petitioner's personal injury claim against a dry
cleaning concern. The order had been entered pursuant to CR 37.03494
when petitioner refused to authorize the Veterans Administration
to disclose by deposition his medical records and history; a Veterans
Administration regulation prohibited disclosure of medical records
without consent of the person concerned. In dismissing this petition,
the court held that petitioner's medical records were competent and
material to a personal injury action and not protected from discovery. Petitioner had relied on Bender v. Eaton4 95 which the court
pointed out was not a parallel case. In that case the c~urt granted
mandamus requiring the lower court to proceed with the trial because the party was not required to produce writings prohibited by
CR 87.02 which were "writings obtained or prepared by the adverse
490

491

395 S.W.2d 159 (Ky. 1965).

Wahl v. Simpson, 385 S.W.2d 171 (Ky. 1964).

492 385
493 390
494 CR

S.W.2d 153 (Ky. 1964).

S.W.2d 153 (Ky. 1965).
37.03 provides, in part, that

a court may enter an order staying fur-

ther proceedings where a party fails to comply with an order made under CR 34
to produce a document for inspection.
495 343 S.W.2d 799 (Ky. 1961).
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party, his attorneys, surety, indemnitor, or agent in anticipation of
496
litigation or in preparation for trials."
Shelby County Bd. of Educ. v. Wright4 97 was an original proceeding
in the Court of Appeals in which petitioner sought to prohibit the
respondent judge from allowing a new trial in a tort case. Petitioner
had been through three trials and had recovered a favorable verdict
in the last. This proceeding was brought under section 110 of the
Kentucky Constitution which allows resort to the Court of Appeals
as a substitute for appeal in cases where great injury, irreparable by
appeal, would result. In denying relief, the court reaffirmed the
existing rule in Kentucky that vexation, delay, and expense that would
result from the granting of a new trial do not constitute "irreparable
injury" under the constitutional provision giving the Court of Appeals
power to control inferior courts by issuance of writs.498 The court
also reaffirmed that the granting of a new trial in a tort action is not
409
an appeal order.
2. Appeals From Lower Courts
In Warner v. Commonwealth,500 a prisoner appealed from the
lower court's judgment overruling his motion to vacate judgment.
Appellant had been convicted as an habitual criminal approximately
twenty years ago and had been sentenced to life imprisonment. Appellant's motion to vacate judgment had been fled pursuant to RCr
11.42 on the ground that the indictment under which he was tried
contained fatal defects. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that
any defects had been waived by appellant's "failure to question the
indictment in a proper and timely manner." 5°1 Even if there had been
no waiver, the court stated that a defective indictment will not support a collateral attack upon a judgment of conviction. This decision
902
restates existing law.
Turner v. Thomas 90 3 was a habeas corpus proceeding brought in
the lower court against the warden by a prisoner who maintained he
was illegally restrained when brought back to Kentucky for completion of his sentence, after having been released to the supervision of
Illinois parole authorities. The prisoner appealed from the lower
court's adverse judgment. In considering for the first time the ap496 Ibid.
497

890 S.W.2d 654 (Ky. 1965).

49 8 Ison v. Bradley, 838 S.W.2d 784 (Ky. 1960).

See Clay, Kentucky Practice, CR 59.01, comment, and CR 73.01, comment.
GOO
385 S.W.2d 77 (Ky. 1964).
G01
Davis v. Commonwealth, 129 S.W.2d 1030 (Ky. 1952).
02
5
Harrod v. Commonwealth, 253 S.W.2d 574 (Ky. 1952).
G03 383 S.V.2d 379 (Ky. 1964).
409
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plication of the Uniform Act for Out-of-State Parolee Supervision,
KRS 439.560, the court held that Kentucky parole officials had not,
by placing appellant under supervision of Illinois parole authorities,
relinquished their power to revoke his parole and return him to Kentucky. The court noted that only Kentucky had jurisdiction over appellant as a parolee. Illinois had jurisdiction over appellants status
as a parolee only as an agent of Kentucky parole officials. This decision is to be distinguished from Jones v. Rayburn,504 where the parolee
was allowed to reside in another jurisdiction without statutory authorization.
504 846 S.W.2d 748 (Ky. 1961).

XIII. PROPERTY
A. WILLs

We are presented with three cases in which wills have been attacked on the basis of lack of mental capacity and undue influence.
The cases are very similar, with the first of them, Roland v. Eibeck,50 5
being cited in the two subsequent cases. In the Roland case, the
deceased, Mrs. Eadie Eibeck, had led an active life up until her last
years, when she was unable to walk and required assistance in being
moved. During the period from 1958 until 1960, she had lived with
one of her sons, Johnnie, in a home on her farm. Prior to that time,
in 1957, she had written a vill and deposited it with the county court
clerk. In 1960, Mrs. Eibeck moved to the home of her daughter
and son-in-law, Mr. and Mrs. Howard Roland, and continued to reside
there until her death in September of 1961. Shortly after moving in
with her daughter, Mrs. Eibeck withdrew her 1957 will, and on October 15, 1960, executed the will in question. The lower court
found that the will should be held invalid and the case appeared
before this court on appeal.
In regard to the evidence, the Court of Appeals stated that the
testimony given by the witnesses appearing in support of the will
was much the superior evidence on the issue of mental capacity.
It stated that it was made distinctly aware of the possibility that the
jury usurped Mrs. Eibeck's right to make a will. However, the court
went on to cite Hines v. Price0t3 where it was held that: "As undue
influence is peculiarly a question for the jury, this court has been
reluctant to upset the finding of the jury where there is more than a
scintilla of evidence to support it."
Thus the court upheld the long established rule of supporting a
jury's conclusion, unless it be completely unfounded.
In addition to the preceding point, the court cited further from
the Hines case and stated: "When a contest is pitched on both mental
incapacity and undue influence, evidence that tends to show both
need not be as convincing as would be essential to prove one or the
other alone."
This case was affirmed in regard to the wills question, and reversed on a question involving an answer given by a juror on voir dire.
The other two cases involving substantially the same points as
r and Ward v. Norton.50 8
Roland, were Blankenship v. Blankenship 07
55 385 S.W.2d 37 (Ky. 1965).
G06 310 Ky. 758, 221 S.W.2d 673 (1949).
507389 S.W.2d 933 (Ky. 1965).
G08885 S.W.2d 193 (Ky. 1965).
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Both of these cases essentially reaffirmed the Roland case in regard to
(1) will contests being peculiarly a question for the jury, and (2)
that amount of evidence necessary when mental incapacity and undue
influence are both involved, being less than that needed if either is
alleged alone.
In Tapp v. Reynolds,50 9 there was a joint will made by husband
and wife. This was an action wherein legatees under the sponses
joint will sought judgment declaring their rights against the executor
of the estate of the spouse who had survived his wife and thereafter revoked the joint will. The will stated in the first clause that
each spouse wills to the other for life, with power of encroachment
for living expenses, all of his or her estate and in the fourth clause
stated that the wife alone wills 2,000 dollars to a beneficiary in trust
for her education. The court held that the bequest took effect immediately upon the wife's death and it was to take precedence over the
general bequest of all her property to the husband for life. In addition, the court said that it was of no significance whether the husband
had the right to revoke the joint will as to his estate. The beneficiary
was considered to take from the wife's estate.
Moving from the more clearly defined areas of law found in the
previous cases, we now encounter Fairweather v. Nord.5 10 In Fairweather, the deceased had used as a will a form to which he had
added or filled in words in his own handwriting. The court held that
an instrument which contained both printed words and words handwritten by the decedent was sufficient as a holographic will where the
printed words were surplusage. In reaching this decesion, the court
cited the Kentucky case of Blankenship v. Blankenship1 '- which had
struck down an attempt at a holographic will. But in so doing, the
court in Blankenship had stated: "The instrument itself may still properly be said to be wholly written by the testator where the intent is
clear and the instrument is complete in itself."
The court was of the opinion that the printed words were surplusage and that the written portion, without the printed words, was
sufficient to constitute a testamentary disposition of all her property.
512
Page, in his treatise on wills states in regard to this problem:
Whether the printed portion of a blank on which testamentary provisions have been filled in, in the handwriting of the testator, may be rejected if the printed provisions are complete in themselves, is a question upon which there is conflict of authority.... It is generally held
509 383 S.W.2d 334 (Ky. 1965).
510 388 S.W.2d 122 (Ky. 1965).
511 276 Ky. 707, 124 S.W.2d 1060 (1939).
5121 Page,

Law of Wills § 20.5 (1960).
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that the filling in of spaces on a blank will form is insufficient to be
valid under a statute requiring that the will must be entirely in the testator's handwriting ....
However, the key is in the wording of the statute
-i.e., must be entirely in the handwriting of the testator.

Going to the Kentucky Statutes,5 13 we find the wording "wholly in
vriting" which would seem to indicate that Kentucky's court has
made hash of the statute. But since there are only nineteen states
which allow holographic wills, it is hard to state how Kentucky
stands in regard to a majority of states. It would seem that where it
is relatively clear what a person's intent was, and there is no chance
for fraud, a man's wishes as to the disposition of his accumulations
should be given cognizance whenever possible.
B. FurrutE INTEEs
Perhaps the most logical point of entry when dealing with future
interests is with a case involving the rule against perpetuities. Mounts
v. Roberts,5 14 as decided by the court, is such a case. It is this writer's
contention, however, that the case was decided incorrectly, and that
there actually is no violation of the rule. The problem arises out of
a deed of conveyance from Anderson Mounts to his wife, Rebecca.
According to the terms of the deed, the property was to go to Rebecca
so long as she remained the wife or widow of the said Anderson
Mounts. After her death or re-marriage, the property was to convert to her "lawful male" children by Anderson Mounts and after
the death of the male children, then said land was to convert to their
lawful heirs. The court construed these provisions as creating life
estates in both the wife Rebecca, and the male children by Anderson
Mounts. This should not be the case. When the deed provided that
after the death of the male children the land was to go to their lawful
heirs, it was simply re-iterating the normal disposition of land as
follows the death of one who owns a fee in property. The male
children owned a fee in the land and at their death, the land would
go to their lawvful heirs. This plainly creates a fee subject to partial
divestment in the seven male children alive at the time of the deed,
and not a life estate. This is even more true when you consider the
decision in light of the settled rule that you will construe a fee simple
rather than a lessor estate whenever the language is ambiguous.
But, for the sake of discussion, let us assume a life estate in the
male children. The court goes on to say that the deed violates the
rule against perpetuities, since after the successive life estates the
394.040.
388 S.W.2d 117 (Ky. 1965).
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remainder would go to the heirs of the sons, some of whom could be
"born" more than twenty-one years and ten months after the death
of persons living when the deed was executed. This, of course, is an
incorrect statement of why the rule would be violated. It is of no
consequence when an heir might be born. Rather, it is the fact that
a child might be born of one not a life in being at the time of the
deed, that causes the violation.
It would thus seem that the case was incorrectly decided on two
counts. However, a proper interpretation of a fee simple instead
of a life estate in the male children would have rendered the second
interpretation question moot.
McGiboney v. Board of Educ. of Middlesboro5 5 presented an
opportunity for the court to reaffirm a principle of law that they had
stated earlier in Holbrook v. Board of Educ.516 In the Holbrook case
the court said: "The law does not favor forfeitures and a deed will
not be construed to create a conditional estate unless the language
clearly evidences such an intent." The McGiboney case involved a
successor in title to a grantor bringing action to quiet title to realty.
The original deed recited consideration of six hundred dollars and
provided that the grantee erect a school building within two years or
the realty should revert to the grantor and the sum of six hundred
dollars be repaid to the grantee. The plaintiff claimed a determinable
fee where title would automatically revert to the grantor without
necessity of re-entry. The court held that no determinable fee existed. Instead, the deed merely provided that the grantor may buy
back the property by returning the consideration. The court held that
had it not been for that provision, the deed clearly would have
created a determinable fee.
The last two cases in this area of future interest deal with the
vesting of interests. The first of these is Ashland Oil & Ref. Co. v.
Rice.5 71 In that case there was a will devising the residue of an estate
to the testators wife for life. At her death the estate was to go to
three named children and in the event any of the children should
die without issue then to the heirs of the testator's body. All three
of the children outlived the wife. This was an action to determine
whether the language of the will meant that the interests vested at
the wife's death or when the three named children had issue. The
court interpreted the instrument to mean the former. In so holding
515 887 S.W.2d 869 (Ky. 1965).

5168300 S.W.2d 566 (Ky. 1957).
517 883 S.W.2d 369 (Ky. 1965).
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the court reaffirmed an earlier holding in Atkinson v. Kern,518 where
the court stated:
The rule applicable where there is an intervening life estate, and a gift
over upon death of the remainderman without issue, is that the limitation with reference to death without issue is restricted to the death of
the remainderman before the termination of the life estate.
The second case dealing with the vesting of an interest is Graham
v. Jones.19 There a well gave property to the testators wife for life
and at her death to his nearest blood relative under the laws of the
State of Kentucky. The case was decided following the generally
accepted principle that the time of vesting of remainder interests is
the date of the testator's death.5 20 The trial court, in deciding contra,
relied on White v. White,5 2 ' which held that nearest blood relatives
indicated an intention to have the property pass to persons most
directly proximate in degree of relationship. The Court of Appeals in
reversing, held White distinguishable, stating the expression, nearest
blood relative, when measured by the modifying phrase under the
lavs of the State of Kentucky must be held to relate to proportionate
shares (i.e. per stirpes, not per capita) rather than immediate or
mediate relatives as considered in White.
C. ESTATES
The first case, and a controversial one, which we shall consider
under this section is Givens v. Givens.5 22 One co-remainderman obtained a forty year lease on coal rights from the life tenant nine days
before her death. This court held that the lease was valid since the
life tenant had the power to encroach upon the corpus, despite the
fact that the lease would result in depletion of the remainder of the
estate. The court went on to say, however, that the same fiduciary
relationship that exists between joint tenants and tenants in common
applies to co-remainderman so that a single co-remainderman who
acquires outstanding interest in the remainder acquires the interest
for all co-remaindermen.
This case is of particular interest in regard to both points. To
begin, the power of a life estate holder to give a lease which lasts
beyond the period of the life estate is in the great minority in the
United States. The only case the court could find in support was a
618 210 Ky. 824, 276 S.W. 977 (1925).
519 386 S.W.2d 271 (Ky. 1965).
520 Stallard v. Lambert, 236 Ky. 651, 335 S.W.2d 682 (1930).
521 365 S.W.2d 732 (Ky. 1962).
522 387 S.W.2d 851 (Ky. 1965).
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1926 Missouri case of Holland v. Bogardus-Hill Drug Co. 523 This
writer was able to locate one other case of even earlier vintage, from
Ohio, it being O'Harav. Perrano.5 24 But as stated, this decision is rather
desolate at this time.
Secondly, in regard to finding that there is a fiduciary relationship existing between co-remaindermen similar to that existing between co-tenants, while not being without support, is new in Kentucky and there are outside this state many cases both pro and con
for the proposition.525 The main thing of importance, however, is that
this is the first time this result has been reached in Kentucky. The
reason for the courts having reached this decision would seem to be
that the court's notion of justice prevailed over the lack of precedent.
In Pendleton v. Strange,526 the court was involved with proceedings
to settle partnership affairs. The question involved was whether certain
land belonged to the partnership or the deceased's heirs. In holding
that the land was not to be included as partnership property, the
court echoed what it had stated earlier in Sandefurv. Gauters52 7 "There
is a presumption against including as partnership assets real estate
owned by a partner which can be rebutted only by clear manifestation of partnership intent."
In Ladd v. Overcast5 2 8 the court interpreted chapter 413, section
210, of the Kentucky Revised Statutes. In that case there was a contract in which a debtor was to convey property to his creditor for the
creditor to sell and apply proceeds to the debt. The agreement provided that in the event there was any surplusage, the creditor would
hand it over to the debtor's family. This action was brought by the
family of the debtor against the family of the creditor, for said surplusage, nine years, three months, and seven days after the date the
action accrued. The court in interpreting the statute stated:
It is obvious that the Legislature intended to require creditors to bring
their actions on claims against the heirs and devisees of a decedent
jointly with decedent's personal representative, or against his heirs and
devisees alone, within seven years of the death, if his personal representative has made final distribution and has been discharged.

The court denied recovery on the basis of this interpretation.
523314 Mo. 214, 284 S.W. 121 (1926).
524 8 Ohio N.P., N.S., 581 (1903-1913).

525 See, e.g., Wilson v. Linder, 21 Idaho 576, 123 P. 487 (1912); Harrison
v. Harrison, 56 Miss. 174 (1878). Contra, Crawford v. Meis, 123 Iowa 610, 99
N.W. 186 (1904); Jinkiaway v. Ford, 93 Kan. 797, 145 P. 885 (1915).
520 381 S.W.2d 617 (Ky. 1965).
527 259 S.W.2d 15 (Ky. 1953).
528386 S.W.2d 949 (Ky. 1965).
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In Robertson v. Surgener129 the original testator had left a life
estate to his wife, and upon her death, the estate was to be held in
trust for his grandson. This was an action between the grandson's
widow and the heirs at law of the grandfather. The question was
whether the testator intended to leave to the grandson a remainder
in fee, subject to control by a trustee of expenditures during his lifetime, or intended only to leave to the grandson an equitable life
estate. The court held that the grandson took a fee and the estate
passed according to his will. The mere fact that the property was
placed in the control of a trustee did not require that the devise be
construed as creating only a life estate, 30
Curtis v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co. 531 decided several issues pertaining to payment of trustees for services rendered. Most of these
merely involved decisions on the evidence. One issue, however, is
relevant as an interpretation of chapter 886, section 180, sub-section
1, of the Kentucky Revised Statutes, applying to the payment of trustees. The statute, in essence, states that the trustee may take a choice
between an annual commission of one fifth of one per cent of the
fair value of the real and personal estate, or in lieu of the commission,
a commission which shall not exceed five per cent of principal, distributed, payable at the time the principal is distributed. The trustees
had made their election of the latter method, presuming that they
could take the entire five per cent. The court, however, decided
that this was merely the maximum the trustee could take and the
actual amount was to be decided on a basis of a reasonable fee under
the facts of each particular case. In so doing they reaffirmed an earlier
5 32
Kentucky decision of Baker's Heirs v. Dixon Bank & Trust Co.
In this particular case of Bakers Heirs, the court concluded that the
bank was not entitled to the entire five per cent.
E. SAVINGS AccouNrs
In this section we will be dealing with two cases somewhat related
in result, but not entirely in fact. In the first, Saylor v. Saylor,533 we
are faced with an action for declaratory judgment to determine ownership of a bank savings account. In this case there was a passbook
which was made out in the names of husband "or" wife. The decision
386 S.W.2d 463 (Ky. 1965).
0o Drye v. Cunningham Midley Co., 24 Ky. Law Rep. 2500, 74 S.W. 272
(1903).
G313 84 S.W.2d 328 (Ky. 1965).
532 292 Ky. 701, 168 S.W.2d 24 (1943).
533 389 S.W.2d 904 (Ky. 1965).
3
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of this case was that such a situation raises a rebuttable presumption
of intent that the balance on hand should become the property of the
other party. The court went on to say that to the extent that this
decision differed from heir opinion in Hays v. Hays' Admr'r, 34 the
Hays case was to be considered overruled. The applicable point in
Hays, was that a gift must be proven when the owner of money deposits it to a joint bank account. The court, in Saylor v. Saylor, in
overruling that part of the Hays decision, held that the rebuttable presumption was based upon the fact that such a right gratuitously conferred on the other party is recognized and is enforceable on the
theory of third party beneficiary contract law.
The second case in this section was Hoffman v. Russell Fed. Say.
& Loan Assn.535 This case is also an action to determine the rights to
a joint savings account. The mother turned over 20,000 dollars to her
son and in addition had repeatedly expressed the intention that he
have the money. He had deposited the money in an account in both
their names. The lower court, basing its decision on Hays v. Hays,
found insufficient evidence to prove a gift. Of course, in regard to
that part of the Hays opinion requiring proof of a gift, it had been
overruled by the Saylor case. But, here, since Mrs. Hoffman did not
participate in the creation of the account, the transfer to the son
of the money could be upheld only on the gift theory. The Court of
Appeals decided that there was enough evidence to justify the finding
of a gift and so overruled.
F. Om AD GAs
In Collins v. Inland Gas Corp.,r86 we have a proceeding for the
determination of proper distribution of royalties arising from two
producing gas wells. The facts here are that forty acres of the parents'
200 acre tract were conveyed to each of five children with the parents
retaining a life interest in the oil and gas. Upon the termination of
the life estates, the owner of each tract succeeded in proportionate
right to share in the royalties. The court held that a successor to three
of the children's shares was entitled to three fifths of the royalties
and the two other children's successor was entitled to two fifths of the
royalties although all wells were located on the latter's property. In
this area there are two main Kentucky cases. One is Mclntire's Adm'r
v. Bond.5 37 This case supports an apportionment of the royalties on
an acreage basis, which would seem to be in harmony with the
290 S.W.2d 795 (Ky. 1956).
586 882 S.W.2d 194 (Ky. 1965).
537227 Ky. 607, 18 S.W.2d 772 (1929).
534

535 890 S.W.2d 644 (Ky. 1965).
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Collins case. The other case is Hurst v. Paken Oil Co.,53 which entitled each owner to the oil and gas royalties produced on his own
tract. It is interesting to note that the Hurst case reached this seemingly opposite result from the McIntire case, and yet without expressly overruling McIntire. In order to avoid solving this contradiction, the court in the Collins case stated that rather than undertake a reconciliation of the McIntire and Hurst cases, they would
instead seek a construction of the deeds looking toward determination of the intention of the grantors, and in so doing the court reached
the result as indicated above.
Another case dealing with an oil and gas problem was Salisbury
v. Columbian Fuel Corp.539 This was an action to establish the rights
to free gas from a well. The lease involved provided that the lessor
was to have gas free of cost from the well for all stoves and all inside
lights in the principle dwellings on the land, and if the estate of either
party was assigned, the covenants hereof shall extend to their heirs,
executors, administrators, successors or assigns. The court held that
the lease ran with the land instead of being personal. The rule is that
a lease runs with the land unless language clearly creates a personal
right. Here, a recitation in a conveyance, and repeated in a subsequent conveyance, in favor of a grantor, his heirs and assigns indicates a covenant running with the land. This case follows previous
Kentucky law.540
G. MIscELLANEous
The first case in this section is Blair v. City of Pikeville 541 and
deals with the use of easements. The defendant, through its contractor, constructed a sewer line over the plaintiffs property on its
easement and damaged the plaintiffs property. The defendant claimed
that the work was done without negligence, according to plans and
specifications. The court held that the defendant was liable in absence of any showing that the plans and specifications were in furtherance of reasonable use of the easement. Reasonable use must be
considered in light of existing use of the property by owners, i.e.,
demolition might be deemed necessary by the plans and specifications, but whether this would be reasonable use must be determined
by other evidence. In short, the appellant need not be proven
negligent in the construction. All the plaintiff must show is that the
damage to his lot was not essential to fair use of the easement by the
538 287 Ky. 257, 152 S.W.2d 981 (1941).
039 387 S.W.2d 864 (Ky. 1965).
540 Maynard v. Ratliff, 297 Ky. 127, 179 S.W.2d 200 (1944).
541384 S.W.2d 65 (Ky. 1965).
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defendant. This decision adds to Kentucky law in that it now does
not matter whether the damage was to an adjacent property owner
or to property to which the torifeasor had a right to use. Under
either there would be a taking within the purview of section 242,
of the Kentucky Constitution.
In Hall v. Elk Horn Coal Corp.,5 " a mining company subdivided
and sold lots in a mining town and limited the use to residential
purposes only. The company, at the time, operated a commissary
and continued to do so for some time before leasing it to another.
This was an action by the coal company to enforce by injunction
the provisions in the deeds, relating to the restriction of use to residential purposes only. It was proposed that since the coal company
had leased its land, it no longer had enough interest to enforce the
restrictions. The court stated the fact that the defendant formerly
operated a company commissary and now leases it out is not a
sufficient change in conditions to affect the defendants right to enforce the restrictions in the deed, since the defendant still benefits.
Commonwealth, Dept. of Highways v. Turner, 43 was an action
by landowners to quiet title to certain realty. The Commonwealth
had acquired title from the plaintiffs to property for use as a highway,
but had not built the highway. Plaintiffs sought return of title to the
property claiming it to be abandoned. The court, in following Turk
v. Wilson's Heirs, 44 stated that title to real property in fee simple
may not be divested except by writing or adverse possession. It
cannot be abandoned.
Our last case, in this section, involves a failure to comply with
chapter 355, section 9-402, of the Kentucky Revised Statutes, by not
signing a recorded chattel mortgage, with a subsequent attaching
creditor filing a lien. In Alloway v. Stuart545 the court held that since
a financing statement merely serves notice of, and warning to, third
parties that the creditor has some interest in the property which is
in the physical possession of another, no potential creditor could fail
to understand the mortgagee's position as debtor in view of the detailed nature of the chattel mortgage filed. The court continued to
be indulgent of minor errors as lawyers educate themselves with the
Uniform Commercial Code. In the transition period the Uniform
Commercial Code has been liberally construed to prevent injustice
caused by unfamiliarity.
386 S.W.2d 258 (Ky. 1965).
543386 S.W.2d 726 (Ky. 1965).
544 266 Ky. 78, 98 S.W.2d 4 (1936).
542

545

385 S.W.2d 41 (Ky. 1965).

XIV. TAXATION

Harlan County Bd. of Supervisors v. HilI5 46 holding that the circuit
court of the county has jurisdiction to try and determine a tax appeal
where the county board ruled on a tax assessment made by a county
tax commissioner resolving what was thought to be a statutory ambiguity 47 is of little value today in view of the statutory changes of
procedure for appeal in tax assessment cases. It is now provided
that one must protest first to the department of revenue in writing and
then to the Kentucky Board of Tax Appeals.54 8 Then one may appeal
within thirty days after the decision of the Kentucky Board of Tax
Appeals except for appeals from the county board of supervisors to
either the Franklin Circuit Court or to the circuit court of the county
in which the aggrieved party resides or conducts his place of business.
Appeals from the board of supervisors go to the circuit court of the
county in which the appeal originatedr 4 9 Another case dealing with
procedure of tax appeal is Department of Conservation v. Co-De Coal
. ', There
CoY
it was held that an independent action could not be
maintained in the Franklin Circuit Court to compel the refund of
taxes where the taxpayer had made no attempt to follow the prescribed
5 51
procedure for review of a decision of the department of revenue.
A state tax of ten cents per proof gallon was held to be collectable
from a manufacturer of whiskey who had contracted to manufacture
whiskey for a Mexican customer in absence of a showing that the
whiskey could be produced and manufactured within the physical
boundary and confines of a class six United States Customs Bonded
Manufacturing Warehouse. The court did not feel that the whiskey
would be committed to the export stream until placed in a class
six bonded warehouse. 52
It was determined in Kentucky Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Motel,
IncY1.3 that a leasehold interest, even though a contract right, may be
subject to an ad valorem tax where the lessor is tax-exempt. This is to
be distinguished from the case of a non-exempt lessor. In that instance the fee and the leasehold interest can not be separated because
there the lessor passes the tax on to the lessee through the rental
346882
S.W.2d 859 (Ky. 1964).
KRS 131.120(1) and 183.120(4).
548 KRS 131.110.
549 KS 131.370.
5 388 S.W.2d 614 (Ky. 1965).
G51
IRS 134.580, 131.110 and 131.120.
5 52
Department of Revenue v. Stitzel-Weller Distillery, 387 S.W.2d 602 (Ky.
1964).
553 387 S.V.2d 293 (Ky. 1965).
54 7
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rate.r5 4 The tax as to this particular lessee though was held to be
discriminatory because he was assessed on the basis of the leasehold
whereas the prevailing way of assessment was to assess on the value
of the improvements.
554 Fayette County Bd. of Supervisors v. O'Rear, 275 S.W.2d 577 (Ky. 1955).

XV. TORTS
A. AUTOMOBIE LrrIcA I N

The law concerning tort actions involving automobiles was little
affected by the decisions of the court during the past term. Although
some changes were made, the court's primary accomplishment was
the clarification of existing law.
The law concerning negligence of an automobile operator who
loses control of his car on a slippery road, thereby causing an accident, was far from clear prior to the decision in Jones v. Car. 555
The comprehensive and detailed opinion rendered in that case clarified the existing law to a great extent. The issue in the Jones case
was whether the alleged negligence of a motorist who, knowing the
hazardous condition of the highway, lost control of his automobile
was a question for the jury or could be decided as a matter of law
by the court. The Court of Appeals held that it was a question for

the jury, and quoted the following language from Tente v. Jaglowcz556
557
as "eminently sound law."
But it cannot be held as a matter of law that the operator of a car is
necessarily negligent when the car skids or slides on an icy street. The
proper inferences from that fact are to be drawn by the jury ....
In
this case, the sliding of the car was explained by the slippery condition
of the street, and it was for the jury to say whether it was superinduced
or accelerated by the negligence of the driver.558

In the course of the opinion the court criticized, but did not overrule,

two cases;59 which had held as a matter of law that one driver was,
and the other was not, negligent, under similar circumstances, solely
on the basis of the speed of their vehicles at the time of the skid.
The court held that there is no hard and fast rule fixing the speed
at which a slippery road becomes dangerous for travel. Usually a
skid is the result of a combination of many factors, and all must be
considered. The court did make clear, however, that the act of skidding itself, under known natural hazardous conditions which results
in injury to others, constitutes circumstantial evidence of negligence.
In a closely related case, Sloan v. Iverson,10 the court stated that:
Under the principles enunciated in Jones v. Carr, Ky., 382 S.W.2d 858,
there clearly is no merit in Sloan's contention that, because of the evi65 382 S.W.2d 853 (Ky. 1964).
556 241 Ky. 720, 44 S.W.2d 845 (1931).
657 882 S.W.2d at 855.
558 241 Ky. at 725, 44 S.W.2d at 847.
S50 Atlantic Greyhound Corp. v. Franklin, 801 Ky. 867, 192 S.W.2d 758
(1946); Risen v. Consolidated Coach Corp., 274 Ky. 342, 118 S.W.2d 712 (1938).
560 335 S.W.2d 178 (Ky. 1964).
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dence that his car skidded into the other, he is entitled to a directed
verdit ....561

Under the authority of the Jones and Sloan cases, it may be concluded that it will be more difficult to obtain a directed verdict against

the motorist on the theory that the skidding, in itself, is prima facie
proof of negligence. On the other hand, it will also be very difficult
to obtain a directed verdict in favor of the motorist on the theory

that the skid was unavoidable, which would completely absolve the
driver of any negligence. It will take a very clear case for the court
to find negligence, or lack of same, as a matter of law in this type
situation, and the surrounding circumstances other than the skidding
alone will have to be considered.
The Sloan case, also involves the question of whether an unavoid-

able accident or sudden emergency instruction should have been
given where the driver, who knew of the hazardous condition, swerved
sharply to miss an oncoming vehicle and then slid into it. The court
not only held that the instruction should not be given, but went on
to say that "actually we entertain serious doubt whether an unavoidable accident instruction should ever be given in an automobile
collision case." 5 2 However, the court held in Van Hoose v. Bryant 5 3
that an unavoidable accident instruction was proper where there was
testimony to the effect that just before a head-on collision, two
automobiles, one in each line, were bearing down upon defendant's
automobile, resulting in a collision.
In Collett v. Taylor,564 plaintiff attempted to make a left turn
when he was hit by defendant who had started to pass. Defendant
denied plaintiff's contention that he signalled, and plaintiff denied
defendant's contention that he sounded his horn. The defendant

moved for a directed verdict under the authority of two prior cases, 65
which held negative evidence presented by a witness to the effect
that they did not hear a sound signal, was not sufficient to present a
jury question against positive testimony that such a signal was given.

The court overruled the above two cases, and laid down the following rule:
Whether a jury issue is presented by so-called "negative" testimony must
depend on the facts of the particular case; including the preponderance
of the positive evidence; the liklihood that the witness or witnesses,
561Id. at 178.
502 Id. at 179.
563 389 S.W.2d 457 (Ky. 1964).
564 383 S.W.2d 692 (Ky. 1964).
565 Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Galloway's Adm'rx, 267 S.W.2d 90 (Ky.
1954); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Burkes Adm'rx, 299 Ky. 851, 187 S.W.2d. 295

(1945).
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giving the negative evidence, would have heard and noticed the signal,
had it been given; and the interest or disinterest of the respective witnesses.G66

In Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Warfield," 7 plaintiff attempted
to pass defendant and a collision ensued when plaintiff started to
pull back into the right lane. Each contended the other swerved into
him. The court sustained a verdict for the plaintiff, even though the
testimony of the only witness corroborated defendant's story that he
had come to a stop with his right wheels a foot or two off the side
of the road, and even though broken glass and debris were found in
the right hand lane. The court stated that "the debris in the road,
and the testimony of disinterested eyewitness are not conclusive." 88
Physical evidence, such as the position of debris in the highway, is a
less probative circumstance than tire marks, which may be held conclusive."O The court went on to say that even if it were assumed
that the passing automobile was to the right of the center line it would
not have been negligence, since KRS 189.340(1) only requires the
overtaking vehicle to pass to the left, the operators of both vehicles
having a duty of "reciprocal assistance" in so doing.
Two interesting opinions were handed down by the Court of
Appeals concerning automobile and train collisions. In the first case,
Gibson v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co.,5 70 the plaintiff's vision
was obscured by a cloud of dust caused by another automobile. The
lead automobile noticed the train, and swerved off the road in time to
avoid a collision, but, due to the limited vision caused by the cloud
of dust, plaintiffs vehicle was unable to avoid the train. The only
warning sign in the immediate vicinity was located on the other side
of the track from the plaintiff and was therefore, not visible to him.
The court held the railroad was not negligent for two reasons:
the train occupying the crossing was an adequate warning in itself,
and the fact that the automobile preceding plaintiff observed the train
in time to avoid the accident established that the obstructed vision,
not defendant's negligence, was the primary cause of the accident.
In Blair v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co.,57 1 the engineer of the
train, who was injured when defendant's truck collided with the train,
brought suit against the estate of the deceased truck driver on the
theory that there is strict liability on the part of a driver who runs
into the side of a moving train. The court rejected the appellants
660 383 S.W.2d 692, at 695.
67 386 S.W.2d 453 (Ky. 1965).
U5s Id at 454.
69 Thornberry v. Smith, 346 S.W.2d 727 (Ky. 1961).
570 382 S.W.2d 568 (Ky. 1964).
571 390 S.W.2d 178 (Ky. 1965).
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strict liability theory on the ground that, since the train and the truck
arrived at the crossing simultaneously, the train could not have constituted notice in itself as it did in the Gibson case.
Two cases were considered by the Court of Appeals concerning
contributory negligence of infant pedestrians, who were struck by
automobiles while attempting to cross streets at places other than a
crosswalk or intersection. In Couch v. Holland,572 the court held that
a fourteen year old pedestrian, who walked blindly into the path
of a moving vehicle, was contributorily negligent as a matter of law
for failing to exercise that standard of ordinary care which could be
expected of a normal child of her age, experience, and intelligence.
The second case, Willoughby v. Stilz, 573 is more complex. An epileptic,
nine year-old boy ran against a red light into a stret beyond a crosswalk at a busy intersection where he was struck by an automobile.
The court held that since there was testimony to the effect that this
particular child had been taught the safety rules to be followed
by pedestrians and that he had responded well to this advice, he could
be held responsible for his negligent acts as a matter of law. This
is a close case, because there is a well settled rule in tort law that
there is a rebuttable presumption that a child between the ages of
seven and fourteen can not be guilty of negligence, and the court
recognized it as such in the opinion. Yet, the court held that safety
instructions from his teacher and mother, coupled with the fact that
he was of average intelligence and discretion, was sufficient to rebut
the presumption against his negligence. Is it not arguable that every
average intelligent nine year old child has been instructed as to safety
precautions followed by pedestrians? If this is all that is needed to
rebut the presumption, the rule, at least in this particular situation,
has very little weight.
B. Ormi DEcisIoNs
The important decisions in other areas of tort law this year can
be placed in four distinct categories: (1) libel and slander; (2)
municipal immunity; (3) contribution and indemnity between codefendants; and (4) relevancy of a company's safety rules to a negligence action.
1. Libel and Slander
There were two cases in this area last term, and they both involved an application of the recent Supreme Court case of New York
57 4
Times Co. v. Sullivan.
572 385 S.W.2d 204 (Ky. 1964).
573 387 S.W.2d 10 (Ky. 1965).
574376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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The first of these two cases was Tucker v. Kilgore,5 75 a libel action
brought by a Louisville city police officer against a local civil rights
worker named Bishop Tucker. A fraternity was holding its annual
national convention in a Louisville hotel. Kilgore, the police officer,
and also a member of the fraternity, had been assigned to duty at the
hotel by the police department. Bishop Tucker came to the hotel
and entered a room where one of the meetings of the organization
was taking place. Not being a member, Bishop Tucker was asked to
leave. When he refused, Kilgore, who had been summoned, escorted
Tucker from the hotel.
Kilgore's complaint had as its basis about 2,000 copies of a handbill which Bishop Tucker distributed a week or so later. These handbills ridiculed the members of the fraternity and said it "operates on
the theory of the exclusion of what they term the 'common people"571
The handbills made more specific mention of Kilgore:
Among them Robert Kilgore-of limited training, no culture and a professional moocher, who strikes you for 50 cents or a dollar every time he
meets you on the streets. This man was used in an attempt to embarrass
me at the . . . [hotel]-without justification or warrant of law-illegally
using his temporary authority as a policeman, and acting at the behest
of his masters-in this phony race organization.
I asked him to arrest me
5 77
but he did not have the nerve to do so.

One of the issues Bishop Tucker raised on appeal concerned the
first amendment of the United States Constitution, which was held in
New York Times v. Sullivan578 to require proof of actual malice before a state may award damages for libel in actions brought by
public officials against critics of their official conduct. The Court of
Appeals had this to say about Kilgore's "official conduct":
That Kilgore was a policeman, however, was no more than a coincidental
circumstance in the attack made upon him by the bishop. That attack
was directed not at Kilgore's official conduct as a policeman, but at his
fitness and character as a man, exemplifying the low quality of... [the
fraternity], the real object of the tirade. It is obvious from the contents
of the pamphlet that it was not aimed at governmental oppression. Its
object was to vilify a rival organization, and this purely personal attack
on Kilgore was a handy means to that end. The freedom of "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate on public issues guaranteed by
the First Amendment cannot sensibly be turned into an open season to
shoot down the good name of any man who happens to be a public
servant 579
575

888 S.W.2d 112 (Ky. 1964).

576Id at 114.

577 Ibid.
578376 U.S. 254 (1964).
579 388 S.W.2d 112, at 116.
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The second libel case, Wells v. Morton, 8 0 involves the question
whether the Supreme Court's decision in New York Times v. Sullivan581 changed the form or content requirement of the complaint
in a libel action under Kentucky's Rules of Civil Procedure. In Wells,
plaintiff sued for 100,000 dollars in damages arising from statements
made in the newspaper which plaintiff claimed were libelous. The
lower court dismissed plaintiff's camplaint as amended for failure
to state facts showing that he was entitled to relief, and plaintiff
appealed the lower court's order.
The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment dismissing plaintiff's
complaint, holding that New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 8 2 does not
require the plaintiff in a libel action to allege actual malice in his
complaint. The Court of Appeals noted that at no place in the
New York Times Case "did the court pass on the sufficiency of the
pleadings in the case; hence, the statement in appellees brief to the
effect that 'actual malice' must be alleged is erroneous." 8 3 Thus
the "actual malice" required in the New York Times Case need only be
proved in court, not alleged in the pleadings.
2. Municipal Immunity
The Court of Appeals held in Stephenson v. Louisville & Jefferson
County Bd. of Health584 that the Board of Health, created by KRS
212.350, is a municipal corporation, placing it squarely under the
recent decision of Haney v. City of Lexington,5 85 in which the Court
of Appeals repudiated the doctrine of governmental immunity as it
applied to municipal corporations. The lower court in Stephenson had
dismissed plaintiff's complaint on the ground that defendant Board of
Health was not suable for damages resulting from personal injuries
plaintiff allegedly suffered while undergoing treatment in Louisville
General Hospital (which had been transferred to the Board by
KRS 212.360) as a paying patient.
The Board contended that KRS 67.186586 establishes the immunity
of a county or county operated hospital. The Court of Appeals dismissed this argument by saying that this was not a suit against a
county or a county operated hospital.
580 388 S.W.2d 607 (Ky. 1965).

581876 U.S. 254 (1964).
582 Ibid.
583 388 S.W.2d 607, at 609.
584 389 S.W.2d 637 (Ky. 1965).

585 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1964). See also, Burton v. Somerset City Hosp.
388 S.W.2d 134 (Ky. 1965).
586 KRS 67.186(3) provides in part:

This section shall not be construed as waiving the ...

immunity of the

(Continued on next page)
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3. Contribution and Indemnity

In Lexington County Club v. Stevenson5s7 the Court of Appeals
commented on the sharp distinction between contribution and indemnity, two concepts which in the past may have caused confusion
because of intermingling of the terms:
The theory of contribution is that a party required to pay more than
his pro rata share of a common liability to an injured party has a right
of recovery for one-half the amount paid against a joint tort feasor
in pari delicto, that is, one equally at fault from the standpoint of concurrent negligence of substantially the same character. [Citations omitted.] On the other hand, a right to total indemnity may exist if the joint
tort feasors are not in pari delicto and the party secondarily negligent
asserts a claim against the one primarily negligent. [Citations omitted.15 88

4. Safety Rules
In Felix v.
the Court of Appeals was asked to decide
whether it was error for the lower court to direct a verdict for defendant due to plaintiffs contributory negligence. Plaintiff was loading
defendanfs trailer with a forklift; when the plaintiff backed the forklift out of the trailer, the truck lurched forward, causing the forklift
Stavis 5 0

to fall to the ground, and pinning plaintiff against a wall. Plaintiff
died of his injuries. Plaintiff was employed by Westinghouse. Westinghouse had a printed safety regulation warning its forklift operators
to chock the wheels of any truck before driving the lift into it. The
wheels of defendant's truck were not chocked. Defendant hinted in

its brief that plaintiff's failure to heed Westinghouse's safety regulation made him contributorily negligent as a matter of law. The Court

of Appeals said:
It is our opinion that Westinghouse's safety regulation cannot be accorded the statute [sic] of an absolute standard of care, such as a statute,
the violation of which would convict an employee ipso facto of a failure
to exercise ordinary care even in respect to his relationships with strangers. However, we believe the regulation at the least has the effect of a
warning, the existence of which is a circumstance to be considered in
determining whether under all the circumstances the employee exercised the care of an ordinary prudent man. [Citation omitted.]5 8 9
(Footnotes continued from preceding page)

county or county operated hospital from suit only to the extent of the
policy limits, and in judgment may be enforced or collected against the
county, fiscal court, the members thereof, or such hospital, but shall only
measure the liability of the insurance carrer [authorized in KRS 67.186(1)1.
587 390 S.W.2d 137 (Ky. 1965).
688 Id. at 143.

689 385 S.W.2d 72 (Ky. 1964).
590 Id. at 75.
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InCurrent v. Columbia Gas of Ky.,59 1 the Court of Appeals held
that it was error for the lower court to grant judgment as if a motion
for a directed verdict had been sustained when the jury failed to
reach a verdict, because the question whether defendant negligently
lit an improperly vented space heater, causing injuries to plaintiff,
was properly one for the jury.
The appellants sought to introduce in evidence the safety rules
of appellee gas company relating to standards of care as to inspection
and venting of gas appliances. The Court of Appeals had given apparently conflicting decisions on this point. 59 2 Holding that the rules
in this case were admissible, the Court of Appeals said:
In the instant case it is shown that the rules were effective before and
at the pertinent periods in the case; the rules were known to the appellee's employees, and, in substance, the employees testified that the
same conduct prescribed by the rules constitutes safe practice. There
is no showing that any requirement of the rules exceeds the standard
of ordinary care under similar circumstances. Clearly the rules related
to the situation at bar, and were evolved for safety purposes. Under
these circumstances we decide the instant rules sholud have been admitted. To the extent, and only to the extent, that the contra Kentucky
cised the care of an ordinary prudent man. [Citation omitted.159 o
591 383 S.W.2d 139 (Ky. 1964).
592For admissibility: Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Gregory, 130 S.W.2d 745
(Ky. 1939); Southern R.R. Co. v. Adkin's Adm'r., 117 S.W. 321 (Ky. 1909).
Opposed to admissibility: Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Stidham's Adm'r,
218 S.W. 460 (Ky. 1920); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Vaughan's Adm'r,
210 S.W. 938 (Ky. 1919); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Byer, 153 S.W. 194
(Ky. 1913); Southern R.R. Co. v. Stewart, 132 S.W. 435 (Ky. 1910); Louisville R.R. Co. v. Gaugh, 118 S.W. 276 (Ky. 1909).
593 383 S.W.2d 139, at 143.

XVI. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
KRS 341.860(1) provides that employes on strike or engaged in
a bona fide labor dispute are not eligible for unemployment compensation benefits, but it also provides that a lockout is not considered
to be a strike or dispute for the purposes of unemployment compensation. In the past year there have been two cases in Kentucky concerned with the question of whether a labor dispute was to be properly
called a strike or a lockout. In the first of these cases 594 the bargaining
agreement authorized termination on sixty days notice and the employer gave notice that two months thereafter "the following contract
vill be in effect." The employes refused to report for work. Although
it would be deemed a "lockout" if the employer on termination of the
contract announced that he would not continue to furnish employment unless the employes agreed to a contract with a fixed period of
duration, here there was some ambiguity in the notice, despite the
fact that the notice sounded very much like an ultimatum. "It was
incumbent upon the employes to test out the situation by offering
to continue work on the new terms under a reservation of the right
to negotiate for a new fixed-term contract." 95 Consequently, this was
held to be a strike. In the second case 596 the notice also contained an
offer to meet with the union representative, recognition of employes'
rights to belong to a union, a proposal of certain provisions for the
new agreement, and an offer of continued employment under terms
and conditions to be worked out under the new agreement if none
were forthcoming from negotiations before the old contract expired.
It would seem that a fortiori this would be a strike, and it was held
to be.
It is provided by statute that when a worker has left voluntarily
without good cause his most recent suitable employment, he is to be
denied unemployment insurance benefits. 597 In a recent case it was
decided that if a worker were compelled to retire at sixty-five under
a worker-approved retirement plan, which had been adopted by the
company, on acquiescence of a workers' committee two years before
the worker's retirement, such worker when retired at age sixty-five
did not leave work "voluntarily" under KRS 341.370(2) (c).598 In
594D. J. B. Colleries Co. v. Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 385

S.W.2d 772 (Ky. 1965).
595 Id. at 775.

596 Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n. v. South-East Coal Co., 389

S.V.2d 929 (Ky. 1965).

597 KRS 341.370(2)(c).
5

gs Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n. v. Young, 389 S.W.2d 451 (Ky.

1965).
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doing so two cases had to be distinguished. Kentucky Unemployment
Ins. Comm'n. v. Reynolds Metal Co.599 was distinguished on the basis
that the employes were represented by a union under collective
bargaining, and there was a pension plan. Kentucky Unemployment
Ins. Commrn. v. Kroehler Mfg. Co.601 was distinguished on the basis
that the employee had a privilege of applying to the company for
permission to continue work. Both distinctions seem tenable.
599 360 S.W.2d 746 (Ky. 1962).

600 352 S.W.2d 212 (Ky. 1961).

XVII. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
The most significant decision of the Court of Appeals this term

in the area of workmen's compensation was the case of Corken v.
Corken Steel Prods. Inc. 0 1 In that case the court held that, where a
salesman was deliberately shot and killed by a stranger, acting without provocation, when, after the salesman had taken a lunch break,
he attempted to get back into his automobile to make further calls
on his customers, the death of the salesman arose out of his employment..
The court overruled the case of Lexington Ry. Sys. v. True,60 2 in
which it had held that the death of a street car motorman who was
struck by a stray bullet did not arise out of his employment because
this was not a hazard peculiar to the streets, thus not within the
"street risks" doctrine. Although the court could have reached the
same result in the principal case by overruling True on narrower
grounds, and holding that the hazard of being shot by a madman
or by a stray bullet is within the "street risks" doctrine, it apparently
chose instead to adopt the "positional risk" doctrine as evidenced by
the following language: Corken's employment was the reason for his
presence at what turned out to be a place of danger, and except for
his presence there he would not have been killed. Hence, it is our
603
opinion that his death arose out of his employment.
The court further stated that, in order for the death or injury
to "arise out of' the employment, "casual connection is sufficient if
the exposure results from the employment," 60 4 and that it is not necessary that the death or injury be "incidental, or the hazard peculiar,
to the nature of the employment."60 5
The "positional risk" doctrine regards an injury or death as "arising out of' the employment whenever the employment brings the
employee to the spot where he was injured or killed. Thus, if the
court continues to apply the "positional risk" theory, it has, in effect,
done away with the "arising out of' requirement-that is, if the
injury or death occurs "in the course of" employment, then it "arose
out of" the employment. However, the "positional risk" test is generally considered to be applicable only where the risk which causes
the accident is "neutral"-that is, when it is peculiar neither to the
employment nor to the employee. 60 6
601 385 S.W.2d 949 (Ky. 1964).
602
603

276 Ky. 446, 124 S.W.2d 467 (1939).
Corken v. Corken Steel Prods. Inc., 885 S.W.2d 949, 950 (Ky. 1964).

604 Ibid.
605
Ibid.
60 6
Malone & Plant, Workmen's Compensation 215 (1963).
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Another case which involved a "course of employment" problem
was United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Easley.6 7 Deceased, who was
a salesman engaged on a profit-sharing basis, had no expense allowance, regular schedule, or working hours. Although he frequently
reported into the office in the morning to pick up the names of prospects he had no regularly assigned office or other duties. On the
date in question, deceased was in the employer's office early in the
morning, and killed in an automobile accident between 4:80 and 5:00
o'clock p.m., approximately forty-five miles from his employer's offlce. Although the accident occurred within his extensive sales area
there was no evidence as to his destination when the accident occurred. The Court of Appeals held that the evidence was not sufflcient to support the Board's finding that the death arose out of and
in the course of the salesman's employment. The court pointed out
that since deceased had no regular working hours there was no reason
to infer that the trip was for business purposes, and, accordingly, the
court held that claimant had failed to sustain the burden of showing
that the death arose out of and in course of deceased's employment.
In Ratliff v. Epling 08 the court held that the death of a coal
miner as a result of a cave-in, which occurred approximately one-half
hour after he quit work, while he was gathering loose coal for
his personal use on premises adjoining those of his employer but
which were leased to another mining company, did not arise out of
and in course of employment. The opinion observed that the accident occurred (1) a substantial time after the employer had quit
work; (2) on premises which were wholly unconnected with the
place of employment; and (3) while the employer was engaged upon
an enterprise unrelated to his work. This case would appear to be
merely a restatement of existing law.60 9
Another case in which the court held that an employee's death did
not arise out of his employment was Whitehouse v. R. R. Dawson
Bridge Co. 10 The foreman dismissed the construction crew for the
day, but told deceased to wait at the construction site to assist a
mechanic who would arrive later. While waiting, deceased jumped
into a flooded creek and attempted to ride a large log, which tipped
him into the water, resulting in his death. In sustaining the Board's
order denying compensation, the court stated that the facts established that deceased was not performing, or about to perform, any
607 385 S.W.2d 215 (Ky. 1964).

608384 S.W.2d 508 (Ky. 1964).

609 Harbison-Walker Refractories Co. v. Brown, 296 Ky. 629, 178 S.W.2d 39
(1944).
6108382 S.W.2d 77 (Ky. 1964).
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duties for his employer when he drowned, but that instead he had
departed from his employment to such an extent that compensation
was precluded.
Five cases("' decided by the Court of Appeals this last term
restated the well established rule612 that in workmen's compensation
cases the court does not have the power to weigh the evidence or
pass anew upon the board's finding of fact where the finding is supported by substantial evidence. However, this rule is based on KRS
842.285 as it stood before the 1964 amendment, and, although none
of the workmen's compensation cases decided this term arose after
the amendment became effective, it might be worthwhile to consider the effect of the 1964 amendment.
Prior to the 1964 amendment, by virtue of KRS 842.285, the court
was bound to follow the "substantial evidence rule" as to the board's
findings of fact. However, after the 1964 amendment to KRS 842.285,
there is an apparent contradiction in the section. KRS 842.285(3)
provides that: "The court shall not substitute its judgment for that
of the board as to the weight of evidence on questions of fact."
This provision is essentially a restatement of the "substantial evidence
rule," and would appear to authorize the court to continue its adherence to that rule. But when we look to KRS 342.285(3) (d), we
find that the court's review is limited to determining, inter alia,
whether or not "the order, decision, or award is clearly erroneous
on the basis of the reliable, probative, and material evidence contained in the whole record." (Emphasis added.) This provision
would ostensibly require the court to follow the "clearly erroneous
rule."
In view of this conflict in KRS 842.285, as it stands after the
1964 aemndment, it might reasonably be expected that the Court of
Appeals will adopt the "clearly erroneous rule" since the scope of
review allowed by that rule is much broader than that allowed by the
"substantial evidence rule." Under the "clearly erroneous rule," the
court may both weigh and consider the evidence not to determine
if the finding of fact has a reasonable basis, but to determine if it is
right. Although the Court of Appeals may well resolve the conflict
presently existing in KRS 342.281 in favor of the "clearly erroneous
rule," since this interpretation would give the court much more
611 Mullins v. Blanton, 385 S.W.2d 779 (Ky. 1964); Tecon Corp. v. Oser,
385 S.W.2d 55 (Ky. 1964); J&R Coal Co. v. Carter, 382 S.W.2d 875 (Ky. 1964);
Imperial Elkhorn Coal Co. v. Newsome, 382 S.W.2d 864 (Ky. 1964); Creekmore
v. Workmen's Compensation Board, 382 S.W.2d 196 (Ky. 1964).
612 Savage v. Claussner Hosiery Co., 379 S.W.2d 473 (Ky. 1964); Humble
v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 239 S.W.2d 469 (Ky. 1951); George I. Stagg
Co. v. O'Nan, 286 Ky. 527, 151 S.W.2d 54 (1941).
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latitude in reviewing findings of fact of the board, the court had no
opportunity to interpret the statute this past term, hence the difficuly remains unresolved.
The well established rule that the weight to be given conflicting
evidence is a matter solely for the board was reiterated in five cases
this term. 613 The Court of Appeals also restated the well-founded rule
14
that the burden of proof is on the claimant to establish his claim.(
In Vicars v. Beaver Creek Mining Co., 1 5 the court held that
where the testimony of a defense physician that claimant did not
have silicosis was based upon certain X-rays of claimant, and such
testimony was in direct conflict with the claimant's physicians' testimony, the board abused its discretion in overruling a motion by
claimant to require the defense to produce the X-rays relied on
by defendant's physician.
In Cutshin Coal Co. v. Begley,616 the claimant stopped working
for appellants on March 7, 1959, not because of disability, but because he was having difficulty breathing. He was unable to work
thereafter. In June 1962, he was advised by a doctor of a condition
indicating silicosis, and shortly thereafter he fied his claim for compensation. KRS 342.316(2) (3) provide that "after the employe
first experiences a distinct manifestation of an occupational disease
in the form of symptoms reasonably sufficient to apprise him that
he has contracted such disease," then, under KRS 342.316(2), notice
of the claim shall be given "as soon as practicable," and, under KRS
342.316(3), the right to compensation shall be barred unless a
claim is filed within one year after the employee experiences such
symptoms. Appellants contended that when the claimant last worked
he was aware of symptoms indicating an occupational disease, therefore, he was required to give notice of his disability "as soon as practicable" under KRS 342.316(2) and to fie his claim within one year
under KRS 342.316(3). The board awarded total and permanent
disability to the claimant. The Court of Appeals held that on the
evidence the board could properly find that the employee was not
suffljciently aware that he had contracted an occupational disease
until shortly before he gave notice and filed his claim. This ques613

Branbam v. Eastern Coal Corp., 389 S.W.2d 926 (Ky. 1965); Mullins v.
Blanton, 385 S.W.2d 779 (Ky. 1964); Horton v. United States Steel Corp., 384
S.W.2d 73 (Ky. 1964); J&R Coal Co. v. Carter, 382 S.W.2d 875 (Ky. 1964);
Imperial
614 Elkhom Coal Co. v. Newsome, 382 S.W.2d 864 (Ky. 1964).
Branham v. Eastern Coal Corp., supra note 613; Akers v. United Carbon
Gas Co., 386 S.W.2d 957 (Ky. 1965).
615 387 S.W.2d 590 (Ky. 1965).

616 885 S.W.2d 59 (Ky. 1964).
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tion is one of fact to be determined by the board, and if based upon
sufficient evidence, the board's finding will not be disturbed.
Thus, although the court pointed out that the claimant was in
fact disabled as of the time he left appellant's employment since
he had not been able to work thereafter, it held that the three year
interim between the termination of employment and the filing of the
workmen's compensation claim did not preclude the Board from
finding that claimant had complied with the notice and filing requirements of KRS 342.816(2) (8). This result would appear correct
when we consider, as advanced by the court, that silicosis is difficult even for an expert to diagnose, that the difficulties experienced
by claimant could have had many causes other than an occupational
disease; and that claimant's knowledge of his disability did not necessarily establish that he was aware that he had an occupational disease.
Another interesting case decided this term which involved KRS
342.316(3) was Good v. Russell Fork Coal Co.6 17 Claimant was
laid off due to a reduction in the work force in December 1958. He
was called back to work in April 1959, and directed to take a physical
examination. The doctor recommended that claimant should not be
employed in the mines where he would be exposed to dust, and as a
result of this recommendation, appellant was dismissed from work.
Claimant did not file his claim for compensation until October 80,
1961. Claimant testified that at the time his job was terminated he
told the superintendent that he had been advised by the doctor that
he had silicosis, and that he was expecting workmen's compensation
benefits. The employer defended under KRS 342.816(3), which
provides that the right to compensation for an occupational disease
shall be barred unless a claim is filed with the board "within one
year after the last injurious exposure to the occupational hazard or
after the employe first experiences a distinct manifestation of an
occupational disease in the form of symptoms reasonably sufficient
to apprise him that he has contracted the disease, whichever shall
last occur." Claimant contended that a finding that he knew he had
silicosis at the time his last employment was terminated would not
bar recovery, because there was no evidence that he was disabled
at that time, and the statute does not commence to run until disability occurs. The board dismissed the claim on the ground that it
was barred by KRS 342.816(3). The Court of Appeals held that the
evidence was sufficient to support the board's dismissal of the claim
under KRS 342.316(8). The opinion explained that from claimant's
617387 S.W.2d 842 (Ky. 1965).
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own testimony it was apparent that he knew he had a compensable
disease at the time his job was terminated. Although the court
conceded that the statute does not begin to run until the employee
is disabled, it found that, in fact, claimant was disabled at the time
he was last discharged. This conclusion was based upon the fact
that, although claimant desired to work, he was dismissed solely
because he was afflicted with silicosis. Thus, the court restated the
rule that "disability," for workmen's compensation purposes, means
inability to do work which claimant regularly performs, and he need
not be disabled from any and every kind of work.61
When we view the Cutshin and Good cases together, the result
is interesting. In Cutshin, the court held that, although the claimant
had been disabled for more than three years, the board could properly find that the claimant was not sufficiently aware that he had
contracted an occupational disease until shortly before he ified for
workmen's compensation, therefore, he was not barred by KRS
342.316(3). In the Good case, even though the court found that claimant knew at the itme he was discharged that he was suffering from
an occupational disease, the opinion stated that the statute619 would
not begin to run until claimant was disabled. Thus, when we analyze
these two cases together, we find that in order for a claimant to be
barred under KRS 342.316(3) he must be both disabled and aware
that he has an occupational disease for more than a year before
the claim is filed.
KRS 342.316(4) provides that: "In claims for compensation due
to the occupational disease of silicosis . . . it must be shown that the
employee was exposed to the hazards of the disease in his employment within this state for at least two years immediately next before his disability or death." Pursuant to this statute, and Chapman
v. Eastern Coal Corp.,6 20 the court held that an employee has no claim
to compensation for silicosis unless the employee was exposed to the
hazards of the disease during the two years of Kentucky employment
immediately preceding the disability. Chapman had worked for
appellee inside coal mines from 1936 to 1944. In 1944 he began
working outside the mines, and he continued to work outside until
1961, when he left the employment of appellee because of a heart
attack. The board found that Chapman had not been exposed to
6

18 Leep v. Kentucky State Police, 366 S.W.2d 729 (Ky. 1962); E&L Transp
Co. v. Hayes, 341 S.W.2d 240 (Ky. 1960).
619 KRS 342.316(3).
620 385 S.W.2d 78 (Ky.
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silicon particles to a sufficient degree to cause silicosis since 1944 and
denied compensation. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
In Derby Coal Co. v. Caldwell,6' claimant suffered a ruptured
invertebral disc while working at hard labor in the appellant's mine.
It appeared from the medical testimony that a portion of claimant's
disability might be attributable to a nondisabling degenerative disc
condition which existed prior to the accident. Accordingly, the subsequent claim fund was made a party defendant, in accordance with
the provisions of KRS 342.120, and, pusuant to KRS 342.121, the
board appointed a physician to examine claimant and to determine,
inter alia, the extent to which claimant was permanently disabled.
The physician estimated that claimant was fifty per cent permanently disabled. The physician concluded the report by stating that
claimant could do only light work. Based on the physician's report,
the board awarded compensation on the basis of fifty per cent disability. The circuit court reversed as to the extent of the permanent disability, and awarded one hundred per cent permanent total
disability. The Court of Appeals held that the claimant, whose occupation consisted of hard labor in coal mines, was permanently
and totally disabled for workmen's compensation purposes when,
after the injury in question, he was unable, without further surgery,
to do even moderately hard work. "Totally disabled" does not mean
that claimant must be completely unable to do any work; it means
that he must be incapacitated to perform the type of work demanded
by his occupation. 622 Here, the physician's report, upon which the
Board's award was based, employed the term "disability" in terms of
general physical impairment rather than the claimant's capacity to
perform the type of work demanded by his occupation.
Another case decided this term which restated the rule that "total
disability," under workmen's compensation law, does not require
that the workman be unable to do any and every wind of work was
Eastern Coal Corp. v. Maynard.623 The employer admitted that while
claimant was in its employ he was exposed to conditions which cause
silicosis and that functional impairment of at least fifteen or twenty
per cent was proved. Of the five doctors who examined claimant,
four found that claimant also had a heart condition, while only
one did not find the heart condition and was of the opinion that
621383 S.W.2d 905 (Ky. 1964).
622 Leep v. Kentucky State Police, 366 S.W.2d 729 (Ky. 1962); E&L
Transp. Co. v. Hayes, 341 S.W.2d 240 (Ky. 1960); Clark v. Gilley, 311 S.W.2d
391 (Ky. 1958).
623 384 S.W.2d 320 (Ky. 1964).
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claimant was totally and permanently disabled, because of silicosis,
from engaging in further work in the mines or in other heavy manual
labor. The board found claimant to be permanently and totally disabled. The Court of Appeals held that a substantial functional disability resulting from silicosis, even though not total, may incapacitate the employee to work in the occupation for which he is qualified, and, if coupled with substantial incapacity to perform other
kinds of work, may constitute total disability. Further, the board
could accept the opinion of the one doctor to the effect that claimant
was totally and permanently disabled solely because of his silicotie
condition, even though the four other doctors attributed part of the
employer's impairment to a heart condition.
The Court of Appeals decided two significant cases this term
that dealt with mental disturbances which allegedly were precipitated
624
by compensable injuries. In Hollandv. Childers Coal Co., claimant
sustained a relatively minor physical injury when struck by slate
while working in appellees mine. Although the three physicians who
examined claimant could find no serious physical injury from the
accident, and concluded that claimant's physical impairment from the
accident was minor, claimant said he was unable to work, he was
insensitive to pin pricks on the right side of his body, had difficulty
in swallowing, and, eventually, became unable to feed or dress
himself, and became practically a bed patient. However, none of
the physicians accused claimant of malingering, and they concluded
that his condition was psychosomatic, that his emotional state precluded present employment as a miner, and that he was in need of
psychiatric treatment. Accordingly, claimant was committed to Eastern State Hospital. Claimant's psychiatrist at the hospital diagnosed
claimant's condition, as psychotic depressive reaction, and commenced treatment. The psychiatrist testified that 'claimant's mental
condition showed marked improvement, that the time of his discharge was approaching, and that he should be able to work after
discharge, but would be subject to possible recurrence of his depressive state. The psychiatrist concluded that claimant suffered some degree of physical disability, which disability precipitated the psychosomatic mental condition, but the psychiatrist would not deny that
anxiety over his compensation claim probably aggravated claimant's
condition. The Board found that the injury sustained by claimant arose
out of and in the course of his employment and awarded him compensation for twenty per cent permanent partial disability, but they re624

884 S.W.2d 298 (Ky. 1964).
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fused to attribute the ensuing emotional complications to the accident.
The Court of Appeals held that when a psychosomatic illness is caused
by a compensable physical disability, the disability resulting from
the psychosomatic illness is compensable. The opinion pointed out
that previous decisions had held that disability from traumatic neurosis is fully compensable if the originating or precipitating trauma
arises out of and in the course of the employment. 625 The court stated
that from the standpoint of causation it could perceive no logical
distinction between traumatic neurosis and a psychotic depressive
reaction resulting from an injury. The court held that, subject to the
maximum statutory limits, 626 claimant should be awarded compen-

sation for temporary total disability until released from the hospital.
The court stated that the line of causation from the original injury
to the existing disability is not broken by the fact that anxiety over
compensation aggravated the disability-that is, if the mental illness
is genuine, the claimant will not be denied compensation on the
ground that "compensation neurosis" aggravated the disability.
The second case decided this term which dealt with a mental
disturbance was Messer v. Drees

27

The Court of Appeals held that

where the claimant had been awarded compensation for temporary
total and permanent partial disabilities which resulted from an accidental injury, and subsequently, for the purpose of inducing the
Board to reopen the case, competent psychiatric evidence was introduced to the effect that claimant was permanently and totally disabled from the accident because of a resulting traumatic neurosis,
there was sufficient evidence of a change of circumstances to warrant
a reopening of the case, 628 and the Board erred in refusing to reopen.
In Norrington v. Charles E. Cannefl Co.,62 9 the Court of Appeals
held that a woman who had lived with deceased employee for seventeen years, but 'without a marriage ceremony and without having
obtained a divorce from her legal husband, was not a "dependent"
of such deceased employee within the workmen's compensation
statutes, therefore, not entitled to workmen's compensation benefits
upon his death.
The Court of Appeals, in Whittenberg Eng'r & Constr. Co. v. Lib625 Stone v. Arthur Hewitt Designs, Inc., 358 S.W.2d 513 (Ky. 1962);
Eastern Coal Corp. v. Thacker, 290 S.V.2d 468 (Ky. 1956).
620 KRS 342.095.
627 382 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1964).
62S KS

342.125(1).

629,383 SV.2d 137 (Ky. 1964).
630 390 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1965).
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erty Mut. Ins. Co., 630 restated the existing ruleG31 that the workmen's
compensation insurer of a subcontractor can recover from the general
contractor, in the form of a common law right of indemnity, reimbursement of workmen's compensation payments paid to the employees
of the insured subcontractor for injuries resulting from the negligence
of the general contractor.
631 Johnson v. Ruby Lumber Co., 278 S.W.2d 71 (Ky. 1954); Ruby Lumber
Co. v. K. V. Johnson Co., 299 Ky. 811, 187 S.W.2d 449 (1945).

